The Information War in the 2025–2026 Protests in Iran: Connectivity Controls, Media Capture, and Social Polarisation
Executive Summary
Amid ongoing social protests in Iran, information has become a central arena for resistance, control, and manipulation. Iranian authorities restrict connectivity, shape digital narratives, and combine online control with physical repression. Over 47 years of Islamic rule, these practices have evolved into a structured information warfare model that integrates digital surveillance, censorship, and coercive tactics. This model relies on, among other mechanisms, the use of bots, the co-optation of digital infrastructure, the constriction of the internet service provider market, preferential access to internet SIM cards, and the deployment of AI-driven propaganda. At the same time, protesters, Iranian citizens, and members of the diaspora seek alternative channels to access information, communicate, and document abuses. Social polarisation and online misinformation further complicate the protest landscape, particularly regarding the legitimacy of demonstrations, reported casualty figures, and core social demands.
Introduction
The control and manipulation of information have long been central to conflict dynamics (Libicki, 1995). Among the seven domains of information warfare identified by Libicki, psychological warfare has been prominent during the recent protests in Iran. In response to the protests that began on 28 December 2025 (Amnesty International, 2026), the regime has deployed a complex information war strategy, operating across several fronts and enabled by near-total control over information and communication channels.
Through the coordinated use of digital infrastructure, AI-enabled tools, automated bot networks, and public figures loyal to the Ayatollah, the regime sought to demoralise protesters, restrict internet access to curb further mobilisation, and manipulate public opinion (Amnesty International, 2026). These efforts aimed to convince the opposition that its capacity for resistance had been neutralised and that disengagement was more viable than continued protest—key objectives of information warfare (Szafranski, 1994). The strategy also relied on media manipulation to exacerbate social polarisation (Laman Mais, 2023), contributing to battlefield ambiguity and reinforcing the so-called “fog of war” (Von Clausewitz, 2010).
The internet shutdown initiated on 8 January, at the height of the mobilisations (Loft, 2026), disrupted protester coordination and prevented information about the regime’s repression from reaching the international community. Information warfare theory holds that “the more dependent the adversary is on information for decision-making, the more vulnerable it is to hostile manipulation of these systems” (Szafranski, 1994, p. 7). In Iran, protesters are totally dependent on digital communication infrastructures that remain firmly under state control. Limited alternatives persist—such as satellite internet services like Starlink—but their use is criminalised, as are VPNs and other tools that enable free communication and access to information (Payande, 2024).
During the 2025–2026 protests, the Islamic Republic of Iran has deployed a consolidated information warfare strategy rooted in long-standing practices of infrastructure co-optation, media manipulation, repression, and misinformation. Digital blackouts, narrative control, and the strategic use of online polarisation form part of a broader effort to manage dissent and limit international scrutiny. In response, protesters and members of the Iranian diaspora have mobilised digital tools to document human rights violations, verify casualty figures, and amplify social demands despite restricted connectivity.
Analysis
Regime Control of Internet Infrastructure and Access
Iran ranks among the countries with the lowest levels of internet freedom worldwide. According to 2025 estimates, it appears among the three worst performers globally, alongside Russia and China (Freedom House, 2025). A similar pattern is observed with respect to press freedom, where Iran is likewise considered one of the most repressive environments for journalists (Grinko et al., 2022).
This situation is partly explained by the highly centralised, state-run internet platform known as the National Information Network (NIN) (O’Neil, 2025). The NIN enables the regime to suppress opposition, control public access to the internet, and expand state surveillance capabilities (O’Neil, 2025; Grinko et al., 2022). It constitutes the Iranian regime’s response to the growing use of the internet among the population and to the role of digital networks in social mobilisation. As of March 2025, approximately 3.2 million Iranians use the internet, with an estimated penetration rate of 79.6 per cent (Kemp, 2025). Nevertheless, internet access remains constrained, and pervasive state surveillance raises serious concerns.
As early as 2001, the regime mandated that internet service providers (ISPs) not directly controlled by the state remove content deemed “anti-government” or “anti-Islamic” and required that all ISPs be brought under national authority control (Grinko et al., 2022). The Iranian regime also introduced a domestic Domain Name System and server infrastructure routed through local Internet Exchange Points (IXPs), consolidating its control over online activity (Grinko et al., 2022).
Restrictions on internet access intensified following the role played by social media during the 2009 “Green Movement” (O’Neil, 2025). Since then, internet shutdowns have become a recurrent and increasingly refined tactic, deployed during major protest movements, including the 2017 “Dey protests”, the 2019 “Aban protests”, and the 2022 “Woman, Life, Freedom” uprising (O’Neil, 2025).
The National Information Network operates in parallel with the global internet, allowing critical sectors—such as banking, healthcare, and government services—to remain functional while access for the broader population is restricted or cut entirely (O’Neil, 2025). Initially proposed in 2005, the NIN has enabled the regime to significantly reduce the financial costs of a full internet shutdown, estimated at approximately USD 370 million per day (O’Neil, 2025).
As a result, segments of the population have turned to virtual private networks (VPNs). While VPNs may provide partial access to the internet, they do not ensure stable or reliable connectivity. Demand for connectivity has been so high that the VPN market is estimated to exceed USD 85 million annually, prompting the government to criminalise their use since 2022 (O’Neil, 2025). Even when VPNs are employed, website blocking remains effective due to the centralisation of connection mechanisms and the filtering and blocking of IP addresses associated with content labelled as “criminal”, which allows comprehensive state control over online activity (Payande, 2024; Grinko et al., 2022; McCoy et al., 2026).
On 8 January 2026, amid escalating social mobilisations, the Iranian regime imposed a nationwide internet shutdown. The disruption lasted for several weeks, and as of 30 January, access had not been fully restored (Loft, 2026). During this period, the regime deployed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), its Basij militia, and multiple divisions of Iran’s police force (FARAJA) to suppress protests that had spread across all 31 provinces (Amnesty International, 2026). Security forces employed lethal force, carried out mass arrests, pursued demonstrators into hospitals, and subjected detainees—some convicted on drug-related charges—to torture and execution, in blatant violation of international law (Human Rights Watch, 2026; Pakzad, 2026; Amnesty International, 2026).
White SIM Cards for Selective Connectivity and Control of the Iranian Infosphere
During the protests, several accounts supportive of the regime retained uninterrupted internet access. This exemption from the digital blackout can be explained not only by the estimated 3 per cent of the population that maintained connectivity through Starlink (McCoy et al., 2026) but also by the use of so-called white SIM cards, which began to be deployed in 2013 (Tabriz, 2025). These SIM cards grant privileged, unfiltered access to the internet, allowing users to bypass content restrictions and access platforms otherwise blocked in Iran, including Telegram, X, and Facebook (Tabriz, 2025)
Initially, white SIM cards were presented as a mechanism to “assist” journalists operating within Iran, for whom internet access is essential for professional activity (Tabriz, 2025). Over time, however, they became a regime-controlled commodity, used to increase journalists’ dependence on state authorities and selectively distributed to government officials, public figures, and activists aligned with the regime (Iran International, 2025; Tabriz, 2025).
During the January protests, multiple pro-Khamenei accounts on X and TikTok remained active (Winston, 2026; IranWire, 2026). While these accounts claimed to represent ordinary Iranian citizens, their ability to operate on blocked platforms and maintain continuous connectivity suggests two likely explanations: affiliation with proxy networks operating from abroad during periods of domestic instability or the use of white SIM cards by internal actors with privileged access (Tabriz, 2025).
White SIM cards have enabled the Khamenei regime to deploy bots, external agents, and aligned figures to inject propaganda into the Iranian and the international infosphere, using social media platforms as instruments of information warfare (Prier, 2020; Sadat Khansari, 2025; Sadat Khansari, 2026).
However, the strategy is even more complex. Following updates to the X platform in November 2025 related to account location information, it emerged that several figures presenting themselves as regime opponents operating from abroad were, in fact, acting from within Iran and benefiting from privileged access through white SIM cards (Banihashemi, 2025; Sadat Khansari, 2025). Their objective is particularly noteworthy.
Some analysts argue that these actors seek to discredit the opposition by portraying it as radical or illegitimate (Banihashemi, 2025; Sadat Khansari, 2025). Others suggest a more dangerous function: honeypots, designed to lure genuine dissidents, extract sensitive information, or even organise mobilisations for which the government is already prepared, facilitating pre-emptive repression (Sadat Khansari, 2025).
Social Media Campaigns
During the recent mobilisations, social media platforms have been saturated with competing narratives aimed at shaping public opinion. These narratives can be broadly grouped into three positions:
Opposition to the Khamenei regime. This narrative is driven by internal resistance. When segments of the population were still able to access the internet, protesters documented the geographic spread of the mobilisations and the deployment of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Basij militia, and FARAJA against demonstrators (Amnesty International, 2026; Ferragamo, 2026).
Support for the restoration of the monarchy under Reza Pahlavi. This position has received backing inside and outside Iran, particularly through the diaspora. Supporters have circulated content documenting the massacre that occurred on 8 and 9 January (Amnesty International, 2026), as well as images and reports of large-scale solidarity demonstrations held worldwide (Sutherland, 2026).
Support for the Ayatollah’s regime. This faction portrays the protests as externally orchestrated, alleging coordination by foreign actors, including Mossad, and framing the mobilisations as aligned with U.S. intervention efforts (Loft, 2026; Eikdar, 2026). Pro-regime narratives have also disseminated videos purportedly showing demonstrations in support of Khamenei, some of which have been manipulated or generated using AI tools (Grinko et al., 2022; Lee Myers, Hsu & Thompson, 2026).
Across all factions, actors accuse one another of lacking authenticity or acting on behalf of external interests. Evidence of coordinated inauthentic behaviour—including fake accounts and bot networks—has been identified on multiple sides (Lee Myers, Hsu & Thompson, 2026; Combat Antisemitism Movement, 2025; CyberWell, 2025; Eikdar, 2026; Baruchin, 2026). Artificial intelligence has further compounded the problem through the use of deepfakes, avatars, and AI-generated personas, distorting public perception and amplifying uncertainty (Eikdar, 2026).
In the context of internal digital blackout and limited access to verifiable information, key questions remain unresolved: What are the Iranian population’s demands regarding Iran’s future after the Ayatollah regime? How many people have been killed during the repression? How many executions have been carried out?
Although internet access has been partially restored, early communications were unstable and marked by widespread fear of government surveillance, discouraging individuals from sharing evidence of abuses and events that occurred during the shutdown (Amnesty International, n.d.).
The Fog Surrounding Casualty Figures
Information warfare has enabled the regime to obscure the total number of casualties (Loft, 2026; Ferragamo, 2026). Estimates vary widely, ranging from 3,428 to 36,500 deaths, depending on the source (Iran Human Rights, 2026; Loft, 2026; Iran International, 2026). Conditions within the country do not allow non-governmental organisations to verify these figures, due to fear among affected families, the risk of regime retaliation, and the monitoring and interception of communications.
Images circulating online reveal a high level of brutality directed against protesters (Amnesty International, 2026). Contrary to official narratives in state media—where demonstrators are portrayed as Mossad agents, terrorists, rioters, or “enemies” (Loft, 2026)—the majority of those targeted appear to be young people, including students and professionals.
Key Social Demands
The initial mobilisations were driven by the collapse of the national currency, persistently high inflation, and the economic strain placed on shopkeepers—key actors in Iran’s domestic economy (Heqimi, 2026). Within days, however, these economic grievances evolved into broader demands for the overthrow of a regime with a long history of corruption and repression, which has repeatedly used lethal force against its population during past social movements (Amnesty International, 2026; O’Neil, 2025).
Living conditions in Iran have deteriorated sharply in recent years. According to the International Monetary Fund, the average consumer price inflation rate stands at 41.6 per cent (IMF, 2026), while several regions face recurring shortages of water and electricity (Chandelier, 2026). At the same time, the population accuses the government of prioritising financial support for external proxies, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, at the expense of domestic welfare (Talattof, 2026). This grievance is compounded by the regime’s readiness to suppress its own population through force, including the reported deployment of foreign militias (Iran International, 2026b).
Conclusion
Information warfare is a critical element in contemporary conflicts. It distorts decision-making on the battlefield and obscures the reality of events on the ground. The Iranian regime has developed an effective apparatus to isolate its population, erase evidence of crimes against humanity, polarise society, and manipulate public opinion. In the aftermath of the 2025–2026 protests, the prevailing outlook suggests a further shift toward what several experts have described as an “absolute digital isolation” (Payande, 2024).
International human rights bodies recognise internet shutdowns and information manipulation as violations of freedom of expression, access to information, and, in protest contexts, the right to life and accountability for mass atrocities (UN Human Rights Council, 2026).
Sustained digital isolation undermines international accountability mechanisms, obstructing evidence collection, victim identification, and independent verification, limiting the effectiveness of sanctions, fact-finding missions, and international legal proceedings (Amnesty International, n.d.; Human Rights Watch, 2026).
The population in Iran remains effectively captive. The regime has demonstrated a willingness to rely on proxy forces to kill its own citizens, reflecting that Khamenei’s primary objective is not the protection of the population but the preservation of power and territorial control—even if such a strategy ultimately excludes the Iranian people themselves.
The Iranian population is now caught in a crossfire of information warfare, saturated with bot networks, regime-aligned public figures, AI-generated images and videos, and digital isolation. This environment leaves the population exposed to a regime that has, over decades, refined a systematic playbook of information war, repression and authoritarian control.
References
Amnesty International (n.d.) A Web of Impunity: The Killings Iran’s Internet Shutdown Hid. Available at: https://iran-shutdown.amnesty.org/ (Accessed: 25 January 2026).
Amnesty International (2026) What happened at the protests in Iran? Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2026/01/what-happened-at-the-protests-in-iran/ (Accessed: 2 February 2026).
Anvari, A. (2026) ‘168 protests, 73 cities: Iranian diaspora takes uprising message worldwide’, Iran International. Available at: https://www.iranintl.com/en/202601211223 (Accessed: 5 February 2026).
Banihashemi, P. (2025) ‘Commentary: Iran’s white SIM card scandal reveals privilege, state control, and fake dissent’, Itemlive. Available at: https://itemlive.com/2025/12/23/commentary-irans-white-sim-card-scandal-reveals-privilege-state-control-and-fake-dissent/ (Accessed: 26 January 2026).
Baruchin, R. (2026) ‘Exposing online manipulation behind Iran’s anti-protest campaign’, Cyabra. Available at: https://cyabra.com/blog/exposing-online-manipulation-behind-irans-anti-protest-campaign/ (Accessed: 2 February 2026).
Chandelier, A. (2026) ‘Water shortages, blackouts and air pollution: How environmental damage fuelled Iran’s protests’, Euronews. Available at: https://www.euronews.com/green/2026/01/15/water-shortages-blackouts-and-air-pollution-how-environmental-damage-fuelled-irans-protest (Accessed: 4 February 2026).
Combat Antisemitism Movement. (2025) ‘Iranian Bot Army flooded social media with antisemitic propaganda during recent war with Israel, report finds’. Available at: https://combatantisemitism.org/cam-news/iranian-bot-army-flooded-social-media-with-antisemitic-propaganda-during-recent-war-with-israel-report-finds/ (Accessed: 25 January 2026).
CyberWell. (2025) Coordinated Influence Operation: Iranian Bot Network Exposed Confirmed by a 16-Day Silence. Available at: https://lp.cyabra.com/hubfs/Reports%20Fiels/IRANIAN_BOT_NETWORK_EXPOSED_July_2025.pdf (Accessed: 25 January 2026).
Eikdar, S. (2026) ‘AI and the Islamic Republic’s new propaganda playbook’, IranWire. Available at: https://iranwire.com/en/features/149053-ai-and-the-islamic-republics-new-propaganda-playbook/ (Accessed: 2 February 2026).
Freedom House. (2025) Freedom on the Net 2025. An Uncertain Future for the Global Internet. Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2025/uncertain-future-global-internet (Accessed: 26 January 2026).
Ferragamo, M. (2026) ‘Iran’s Protests and the Internet Blackout That Followed’, Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: https://www.cfr.org/articles/irans-protests-and-internet-blackout-followed (Accessed: 26 February 2026).
Grinko, M., Qalandar, S., Randall, D. and Wulf, V. (2022) ‘Nationalizing the internet to break a protest movement: Internet shutdown and counter-appropriation in Iran of late 2019’, Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction, 6 (CSCW2), Article 314, pp. 1–21. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3555205 (Accessed: 26 February 2026).
Heqimi, A. (2026) ‘Very Few People Understand What is Happening’: The Iran Uprising Explained’, UConn Today. Available at: https://today.uconn.edu/2026/02/uprising-in-iran-a-comprehensive-qa-on-what-needs-to-be-told/ (Accessed: 26 February 2026).
Human Rights Watch. (2026) Iran: Human Rights Situation Spirals Deeper into Crisis. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/02/04/iran-human-rights-situation-spirals-deeper-into-crisis (Accessed: 14 February 2026).
International Monetary Fund. (2026) Inflation rate, average consumer prices. Available at: https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PCPIPCH@WEO/IRN?zoom=IRN&highlight=IRN (Accessed: 5 February 2026).
Iran International. (2025) ‘Iranian pro-government users apologize as X unmasks internet privileges’. Available at: https://www.iranintl.com/en/202511248262 (Accessed: 5 February 2026).
Iran International. (2026a) ‘Over 36,500 killed in Iran’s deadliest massacre, documents reveal’. Available at: https://www.iranintl.com/en/202601255198 (Accessed: 5 February 2026).
Iran International. (2026b) ‘Iran using Iraqi militias to help crush protests, sources say’. Available at: https://www.iranintl.com/en/202601071907 (Accessed: 24 February 2026).
Iran Human Rights. (2026) ‘At Least 3,428 Protesters Killed in Iran; Serious Risk of Protester Executions’. Available at: https://iranhr.net/en/articles/8529/ (Accessed: 24 February 2026).
IranWire. (2026) ‘Propaganda vs. Reality During Iran’s Internet Blackout’. Available at: https://iranwire.com/en/news/147453-propaganda-vs-reality-during-irans-internet-blackout/ (Accessed: 24 February 2026).
Kadivar, M.A., Khani, S., Vahabli, A., Abedini, V. and Barzin, S. (2025) ‘Contingency of Structures: Triggers and the Social Geography of Revolutionary Episodes in Iran 2017-2022’. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5840223 (Accessed: 25 January 2026).
Kemp, S. (2025) ‘Digital 2025: Iran’, Data Portal Available at: https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2025-iran (Accessed: 25 January 2026).
Laman Mais, I. (2023) ‘Media, Manipulation, and Information War’, Grani, 26 (5), pp. 55-65. Available at: https://grani.org.ua/index.php/journal/article/view/1945 (Accessed: 25 January 2026).
Lee Myers, S., Hsu, T. and Thompson, S. (2026) ‘Battles Over Truth Rage Online Amid Iran’s Internet Blackout’, The New York Times. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/16/business/iran-internet-blackout-protests-disinformation.html (Accessed: 25 January 2026).
Libicki, M. C. (1995) What Is Information Warfare? . National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies. Available at: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/html/tr/ADA367662/ (Accessed: 28 January 2026).
Loft, P. (2026) ‘Iran protests 2026: UK and international response’, House of Commons Library. Available at: https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10462/ (Accessed: 7 February 2026).
McCoy, B., Ramirez, R., Kwong, E. and Nair, A. (2026) ‘Iran offline: How a government can turn off the internet’, NPR. Available at: https://www.npr.org/2026/01/26/nx-s1-5684190/news-iran-protests-internet (Accessed: 7 February 2026).
Megiddo, G. and Benjakob, O. (2025) ‘The Israeli Influence Operation in Iran Pushing to Reinstate the Shah Monarchy’, The Iran Post. Available at: https://theiranpost.com/the-israeli-influence-operation-in-iran-pushing-to-reinstate-the-shah-monarchy/ (Accessed: 27 January 2026).
O’Neil, C. (2025) ‘Iran’s Digital Fortress: The Rise of the National Information Network’, American Foreign Policy Council. Available at: https://www.afpc.org/publications/policy-papers/irans-digital-fortress-the-rise-of-the-national-information-network (Accessed: 27 January 2026).
Pakzad, S. (2026) ‘Don’t take us to a hospital: Iran protesters treated in secret to avoid arrest’, BBC. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c5yx015nkplo (Accessed: 7 February 2026)
Payande, I. (2024) Internet in Iran: Censorship, Sanctions, and the Challenges Facing Users. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4879453 (Accessed: 7 February 2026).
Prier. J. (2020) ‘Commanding the Trend: Social Media as Information Warfare’. In Information Warfare in the Age of Cyber Conflict. Routledge, pp. 88-113. Available at: https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780429470509-7/commanding-trend-jarred-prier (Accessed: 27 January 2026).
Sadat Khansari, M. (2025) ‘Iran’s White-SIM Internet: How Tehran Hacks the Feed You Trust’, National Council of Resistance of Iran. Available at: https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/iran-resistance/demonizing-mek/irans-white-sim-internet-how-tehran-hacks-the-feed-you-trust/ (Accessed: 25 January 2026).
Sadat Khansari, M. (2026) ‘Foreign AI Operations or Iran’s Cyber Forces Propping Up an Opportunist Campaign’, National Council of Resistance of Iran. Available at: https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/terrorism-a-fundamentalism/foreign-ai-operations-or-irans-cyber-forces-propping-up-an-opportunist-campaign/ (Accessed: 2 February 2026).
Sutherland, C. (2026) ‘Make Iran Great Again: Worldwide Protests Show Solidarity With Iranians’, Time. Available at: https://time.com/7345482/worldwide-protests-solidarity-with-iranians/ (Accessed: 20 February 2026).
Szapranski, R. (1994) A Theory of Information Warfare, Preparing for 2020. Air University Maxwell Force Base US Air Force. Available at: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/html/tr/ADA328193/ (Accessed: 20 January 2026).
Tabriz, M. (2025) ‘Iran Internet Ban: The Islamic Republic Filters for Millions of People, Not for Its Own’, Iran Wire. Available at: https://iranwire.com/en/features/146582-iran-internet-ban-the-islamic-republic-filters-for-millions-of-people-not-for-its-own/ (Accessed: 25 January 2026).
Talattof, K. (2026) ‘Neither Gaza nor Lebanon! Iranian unrest is about more than the economy − protesters reject the Islamic Republic’s whole rationale’, The Conversation. Available at: https://theconversation.com/neither-gaza-nor-lebanon-iranian-unrest-is-about-more-than-the-economy-protesters-reject-the-islamic-republics-whole-rationale-265696# (Accessed: 2 February 2026).
Turani, B. (2026) ‘Tehran ignored warnings of unrest, chose force over reform’, Iran International. Available at: https://www.iranintl.com/en/202601219494 (Accessed: 23 February 2026).
United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner. (2026) Human Rights Council Adopts Resolution Extending Mandates of Fact-Finding Mission and Special Rapporteur on Iran and Calling for an Urgent Investigation into Human Rights Violations in Iran in the Context of the Protests Beginning 28 December 2025. Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/media-advisories/2026/01/human-rights-council-adopts-resolution-extending-mandates-fact-finding (Accessed: 23 February 2026).
Von Clausewitz, C. (2010) On war (M. Howard & P. Paret, Trans.). Eisenbrauns. (Original work published 1832). Winston, A. (2026) ‘Target Pahlavi: Fearing unifying figure, Iran launches disinformation campaign against crown prince’, The Jerusalem Post. Available at: https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-885629 (Accessed: 23 February 2026).