Executive Summary
The Lebanese government’s current plan for the disarmament emerges from the aftermath of the 2023 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. This conflict and the previous conflicts Hezbollah have had with Israel stem from an interpretation of the 1989 Taif in which, Hezbollah was allowed to retain its arsenal and armed structure due to a clause in the Taif agreement allowing weapons to be maintained to “liberate occupied territories”. Despite Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, Hezbollah has maintained and expanded its arsenal engaging with Israel in 2006 and 2023. Following the 2023 conflict the Lebanese government began a new disarmament initiative, developed under heavy international and regional pressure the initiative aims to permanently dismantle Hezbollah’s armed strength. The initiative has four stages targeting 4 regions in Lebanon in which Hezbollah holds sway. Although the Lebanese army has begun assuming control of positions south of the Litani and has successfully disarmed several Palestinian factions, no stage-specific deadlines have been set, with the government committing only to completion by the end of 2025.
Hezbollah’s leader Naim Qassem has rejected disarmament and threatened a Karbala-like confrontation invoking Shia symbolism of a defiant martyrdom. Yet Hezbollah has hinted at a willingness to engage with the plan so long as certain criteria are met. These mixed signals may be a sign of division between pragmatists and ideologues. The current end of 2025 deadline for disarmament is unrealistic, given the size of Hezbollah’s arsenal and limited progress and the group’s unwillingness to cooperate amid threats of violence.
Policy implications are stark: Hezbollah has been weakened; it remains one of if not the most powerful armed factions in Lebanon (including the Lebanese army) with vast stockpiles of weaponry and a loyal support base. Forcible disarmament against the will of Hezbollah risks destabilising Lebanon’s internal security and further war with Israel. International efforts to support the Lebanese state should proceed carefully prioritising incentives and off ramps for Hezbollah with a recognition that meaningful progress to disarm Hezbollah depends less on the current plan than the 2026 elections.
Background
The current disarmament plan for Hezbollah takes place in the backdrop of the most recent conflict and ceasefire deal between Hezbollah and Israel. Hezbollah was allowed to keep its weapons under the Taif agreement and all other militias following the Lebanese civil war were disbanded and turned in their weapons to the Lebanese government. Hezbollah was exempted from this through a clause in the Taif agreement “[t]aking all the steps necessary to liberate all Lebanese territories from the Israeli occupation, to spread state sovereignty over all the territories …” (Khatib, 2021).This clause was used to give legitimacy for the existence of Hezbollah’s arsenal and following Israel’s defeat and withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 Hezbollah and Lebanon would use the Israeli control of the disputed Shebaa farm area as continued justification for Hezbollah’s arsenal (Khatib, 2021). Hezbollah would engage Israel in 2006 and most recently in 2023 and following a ceasefire agreement and significant international and regional pressure the Lebanese government has moved to create a plan for the permanent disarmament and disbandment of Hezbollah’s arsenal (Rahal and Sawaya, 2025).
The Disarmament plan covers details of over factions within Lebanon with the notable goal of bringing all weapons under state control. Details of the current plan are only known to cabinet ministers and senior leadership in Hezbollah however, what is known to the public is (Rahal and Sawaya, 2025):
· The current disarmament plan has four phases.
I. South of the Litani river
II. North of the Litani river
III. In Beirut and its suburbs
IV. In the Beqaa valley region
The current set has no set timeline with the only date being set as the end of 2025 for the plan to be complete. No dates for either of these 4 stages has been made; however, the Lebanese army has begun to take over Hezbollah’s positions south of the Litani river. The Lebanese government has seen some success in disarming other non-state actors within Lebanon beginning the disarmament of several Palestinian factions around Beirut. However, the disarmament plan has caused contention from Hezbollah. The Leader of Hezbollah Naim Qassem has outright refused disarmament stating, “we will not leave the field nor give up its weapons” (Palestine Chronicle Staff, 2025). Naim Qassem also stated that any attempt at disarmament will be met with a Karbala-like confrontation (L’Orient Today, 2025). Karbala holds significance among Shia muslims, as a great tragedy in which Hussien ibn Ali the grandson of the Prophet Muhammed and his retinue fought to the last man against a numerically larger force (Halverson, et al., 2011). Despite this Hezbollah has previously expressed a willingness to disarm so long as there is coordination on a national defence strategy and Israel withdraws from the positions it still occupies in Lebanon (Palestine Chronicle Staff, 2025).
Analysis
The end of 2025 date for the complete disarmament of Hezbollah is optimistic at best even with Hezbollah’s cooperation considering Hezbollah’s extensive article leaves little time for delay currently it is unclear to what extent the Lebanese government has dismantled Hezbollah’s extensive arsenal. This deadline makes it likely that the government will fail to reach a disarmament plan, however, the Lebanese government could utilise its success at disarming Palestinian factions as a counterpoint to any criticism. Furthermore, Naim Qassem’s rhetoric referencing Karbala indicates one of two things. Firstly, Hezbollah’s willingness to use violence if it is either forced to disarm or disarmed on terms that are not preferable to the group. Secondly the reference to Karbala indicates a willingness not just to use violence but to use violence even if the group knows it will be ultimately defeated, playing into the notion of martyrdom found in Islamic theology. This second point is perhaps the most worrying, indicating not just a willingness to use violence but a willingness to bring the whole of Lebanese society and security into conflict even if it knows it will ultimately be defeated. Hezbollah’s mixed messages may indicate a rift within the organisation between those who are more pragmatic and those who are ideologues. Either way with little progress with the disarmament plan and threats of suicidal violence Hezbollah’s disarmament seems increasingly pinned on the results of the 2026 general election rather than the current plan.
Policy Recommendations
Hezbollah has been weakened from its most recent war with Israel however, it is potentially still the strongest force within Lebanon previous reports highlighted its strength as being stronger than the Lebanese army whether that fact is still true is speculative. However, what is not speculative is that Hezbollah still controls a vast array of armaments and loyal followers, Naim Qassem’s reference to Karbala also must be considered. Hezbollah, if threatened, will not hesitate to launch a devastating internal and external war should it face an existential threat to its power and support base. Therefore, any attempt to support the Lebanese government’s disarmament plan must be cautious and ensure plenty of off ramps for Hezbollah to avoid escalation and an existential threat to Lebanese society and security.