Executive Summary
Elections have been scarce in Burmese history, but they have been a symbol of hope and political reform. Following almost fifty years of brutal stratocracy, the 2010 general election dissolved the junta and introduced a quasi-civilian government. The 2015 general election was also seen as a turning point. The victory of the National League for Democracy headed by Nobel-laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, daughter of the founding father of modern-day independent Myanmar, brought the country into the international fold, along with revitalised diplomacy and dynamic trade relations. The later period of Myanmar’s democratic transition became obscured by global condemnation of military-orchestrated genocide against the Muslim Rohingya community and, in 2021, General Min Aung Hlain, a key actor of the genocide, organised a coup d’état and reasserted total military control. The junta announced elections for the first time since the unlawful return to military rule, raising the question whether these elections signal genuine reform or a consolidation of authoritarian control.
Key Points
- The elections started on the 28th of December 2025 and the second and third rounds are expected to take place on the 11th and 25th of January 2026 respectively.
- The elections have been denounced as staged by democracies around the globe and international institutions, including Japan, Australia, Norway, the United Kingdom, the European Parliament and the United Nations.
- Voter-turnout in the first phase was comparatively low at an estimated 52 percent.
Analysis
The brutal 2021 military coup plunged the country into a violent era of instability and insecurity, with numerous ethnic resistance groups emerging and engaging in active combat with the junta across the country. The protracted civil war has resulted in fragmented governance structures, with armed groups exercising sovereignty over large portions of the country, including autonomous institutions, infrastructure and tax systems. As of 2025, the junta reportedly controlled only 20% of national territory, rendering the self-proclaimed national government a minority stakeholder.
Map representing political control zones as of March 2025 (HDX 2025)
In an attempt to defeat armed groups, the regime has indiscriminately conducted crackdowns and air-raids on zones populated by civilians, leading to around 80,000 civil casualties and 3,6 million displaced. The current elections constitute at best a slight strategic shift. While the Tatmadaw has been exponentially losing ground over the past few years, it seems to be using the electoral process as a tool to cement its authority in areas it has maintained sovereignty over. The first phase only included 102 townships out of 330 nationwide, excluding areas under rebel governance. Repressive tactics persist: local testimonies indicate voting occurs under fear of reprisals, in stark contrast with the junta’s alleged “multi-party democratic” elections. The military government is also prosecuting over 200 people for alleged “disruption” of the electoral process. Unsurprisingly, the Union Solidarity and Development Party, launched by the junta in 2010, claims to have won 90 percent of the seats in the first phase.
Experts agree that the election’s main aim is to garner international recognition. To date, the United Nations and the EU do not recognise the junta. An electoral victory under a solely nominal change may be used by the Tatmadaw to argue for de jure recognition by the international community. It may also cement the de facto status of the junta as the primary interlocutor for neighbouring countries and other trade partners, such as China, India and even Russia. On the ground, the destructive course fostered by the military is likely to perdure. Instability and physical insecurity can be expected to worsen, with intensified civil war and heightened persecution of the Rohingya. This deterioration is likely to escalate as a regional security risk, causing instability at the borders with India and China particularly.
Policy Implications
- These elections pose a high risk to Bangladesh, as fleeing Rohingya groups continue to seek refuge along the border in Cox’s Bazar. Facing a political crisis of its own, Bangladesh will need to adopt a flexible foreign policy toward the junta. Even in the best case scenario, the junta, a well-documented sponsor of the genocide, is likely to impede any substantive policy progress.
- China, as the junta’s principal business partner, will have to balance international pressure with continued economic support. Its strategic Belt and Road Initiative projects to secure access to the Bay of Bengal make China’s diplomatic maneuvering particularly sensitive.
- Intensification of civil conflict poses a significant threat to India. With a border stretching over 1,643 kilometres, potential clashes with armed groups in border areas will necessitate renewed engagement with both the Tatmadaw and non-state actors. With an already tense Indo-China border, increased armed conflict could strain India’s security policy.
- The elections expose ASEAN’s structural shortcomings. Since the 2021 implementation of the Five Point to Consensus to deal with Myanmar’s reversion to authoritarian rule, genuine policy progress remains to be seen. Whether ASEAN can take concrete actions despite its non-interference principle will determine the association’s future as an active or passive political actor.