Since the sudden removal of Bashar al-Assad from power at the hands of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) towards the end of 2024, Syria’s interim President, Ahmed al-Sharaa, has presided over a chaotic attempt at integrating a diverse and fractured population into one country after years of civil war. The recent fighting in Aleppo between the Syrian government and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) has once again brought this troubled process into focus, raising questions regarding the country’s future.
Since taking power, al-Sharaa has pledged to form an inclusive transitional government that would respect all religious groups. In addition to dropping his nom de guerre, Abu Muhammed al-Jolani, he has attempted to create a moderate image of himself through changes in his public statements and wardrobe. However, this has not eliminated uncertainty in the minds of various Syrian minority groups about the intentions of this new regime. Al-Sharaa’s past leadership of an al-Qaeda aligned HTS has led to continued fears of Islamist rule.
While the government has maintained a stance in favour of safeguarding minority communities and a democratic transition of power, sectarian violence has continued. This is exemplified by the March 2025 clashes between loyalists of the Assad regime and Syrian security forces in northwestern Syria, which led to a wave of revenge killings of civilians, largely from the Alawite minority group concentrated in the region. The enduring civil strife in the region represents a larger pattern of minority discontent. Southern Syria has also seen repeated violence involving the Druze minority groups. Despite al-Sharaa’s statements promising accountability for abuses against civilians, sectarian tensions persist.
Tensions between the Kurds and the Syrian state can be seen in this larger context. During the Syrian civil war, Kurds were able to establish control over a substantial part of northeastern Syria. This led to the establishment of the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) as a de facto autonomous region. The integration of the region and the militias that control it with the Syrian government has remained stalled. An agreement was signed between the government and the SDF to integrate the latter into state institutions in March 2025. However, various disagreements have stifled progress in its implementation. The Syrian government insists on Kurdish fighters joining the general army, while Kurdish forces insist on maintaining separate regiments. At a more general level, the historical denial of Kurdish cultural rights, such as having their language banned under the Assad regime, makes them hesitant to give up hard-fought autonomy to Damascus. The government in Damascus, however, has rejected calls for autonomy or a federal structure. It insists on a centralised system in the face of the diverse and fragmented Syrian population, fearing that concessions made towards the Kurds would empower other minorities to ask for similar rights. DAANES also levelled criticism at the new Cabinet in Damascus, which was sworn in in March 2025, arguing that it failed to take Syria’s diversity into account and maintained a single party’s control over it. Significantly, the cabinet did not include any members of DAANES or the SDF. Kurdish-held areas, as well as the Sweida province, were also excluded from the 2025 Parliamentary elections with the government citing ‘security concerns’ as the reason. Such issues have led to questions regarding Damascus’s actual commitment to representing and protecting minority groups.
The question of integration, particularly in the northwest, has implications for not just Syria but also various other powers involved in the region. Most notably, Turkey considers the SDF as a terrorist organisation due to its ties with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which waged a long insurgency in southwestern Turkey. Thus, Ankara has strongly resisted any autonomy or decentralised structure for the Kurds, fearing that such an arrangement could fuel instability within its borders. It strongly backs the regime in Damascus and maintains a substantial military presence in northern Syria. Turkey has also threatened military action if Kurdish fighters refuse to integrate with the Syrian state. The US, by contrast, has remained more ambivalent. While it has expressed support for the interim administration and Kurdish integration, it also depends on the SDF to fight Islamic State elements in the region and thus continues to back it.
The way Damascus decides to approach the issue of Kurdish integration will, thus, present a strong message regarding the country’s perspective on its minority populations, and may have the potential of inciting further large-scale violence. Despite the various issues that persist, Al-Sharaa’s decree restoring citizenship to Syrian Kurds who were earlier stripped of it, and recognising Kurdish cultural rights and language, is a step in the right direction.
References / Further Reading
Al Jazeera (2025a) ‘Syria merges Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces into state institutions,’ Al Jazeera, 10 March. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/3/10/syria-merges-kurdish-led-syrian-democratic-forces-into-state-institutions.
Al Jazeera (2025b) ‘Syria’s interim leader launches national dialogue on political transition,’ Al Jazeera, 25 February. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/2/25/syrias-interim-leader-launches-national-dialogue-on-political-future.
Al Jazeera (2026) ‘Syria decree grants Kurds new rights, formally recognising Kurdish language,’ Al Jazeera, 17 January. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/17/syria-decree-grants-kurds-new-rights-formally-recognising-kurdish-language.
Al-Khalidi, S. (2025) ‘Syria’s Sharaa rejects Kurdish demands for decentralisation,’ Reuters, 27 April. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrias-sharaa-rejects-kurdish-demands-decentralisation-2025-04-27/.
Hamdach, W. (2025) The fall of Bashar Al-Assad: winners, losers, and challenges ahead. https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2025/05/07/the-fall-of-bashar-al-assad-winners-losers-and-challenges-ahead/.
Harb, A. (2025) ‘US general highlights ‘close cooperation’ with Syria against ISIL threats,’ Al Jazeera, 10 December. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/12/10/us-general-highlights-close-cooperation-with-syria-against-isil-threats.
Inayatullah, S.D. (2025) ‘Syria: Hundreds demonstrate for Druze ‘self-determination,’’ DW, 18 August. https://www.dw.com/en/syria-hundreds-demonstrate-for-druze-self-determination/a-73667048.
Knipp, K. (2026) ‘Syria: No end to conflict between Kurds, central government,’ DW, 14 January. https://www.dw.com/en/syria-no-end-to-conflict-between-kurds-central-government/a-75506075.
Mallinder, L. (2025) ‘Syria shares results of parliamentary election amid inclusivity concerns,’ Al Jazeera, 6 October. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/10/6/syria-declares-results-of-1st-parliamentary-poll-amid-inclusivity-concerns.
Schaer, C. (2025) ‘How inclusive is Syria’s new technocratic cabinet?,’ DW, 31 March. https://www.dw.com/en/is-syrias-new-technocratic-cabinet-as-inclusive-as-it-could-be/a-72100412.
Shelton, J. (2025) ‘Syria delays election in Sweida and Kurdish areas,’ DW, 23 August. https://www.dw.com/en/syria-delays-election-in-sweida-and-kurdish-areas/a-73742611.Toksabay, E. (2026) ‘Turkey says it stands ready to help Syria after deadly clashes in Aleppo,’ Reuters, 8 January. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-ready-help-end-conflict-syrias-aleppo-parliament-speaker-says-2026-01-08/.