Established in 2002, the Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD) is the premier defence and security conference in the Asia-Pacific region and provides a unique opportunity for allies and adversaries to engage and challenge each other in a fluid multilateral setting. From Friday 29th May to Saturday 31st May, 44 countries from across the Asia-Pacific and Europe attended and demonstrated the enduring challenges and trends that continue to plague security in the region. This year’s Dialogue revealed the struggle of smaller states as they try to cling onto the rules-based international order in the face of a world increasingly governed by hard power. The US portrays itself as an inconsistent ally in the region while China continues to cast doubt on its approach to regional neighbours.
Perhaps the most noteworthy contribution from the Chinese Delegation was not in what was said, but who was not there to say it. On Thursday, China’s Ministry of National Defense indicated its delegation would be led by the Defence University’s Major General Meng Xiangqing, not Defence Minister Dong Jun. Both Hegseth and Koizumi directly addressed his absence, stating hope of future opportunities for dialogue. While Dong’s SLD absence prompted speculation of an alleged disciplinary probe, it is more likely a reflection of Beijing’s long-held preference for controlled environments where policymakers can mould the narrative and the CCP’s dislike for engagement in multilateral forums. Lim highlights that the level of delegation sent to the SLD has historically been linked to the hostility of the international climate: it is not a new occurrence for China to send sub-ministerial delegations. Although the Singapore Defence Minister said on Sunday that irrespective of who is sent countries attending the forum should “respect the Chinese participation,” the active decision to not send Dong, despite supposedly improving relations with the US, signals a continuation of China’s distaste for multilateral forums, instead opting to work bilaterally.
General Meng criticised supposed Japanese Militarism under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. Japanese Defence Minister Koizumi, in his own speech, was quick to highlight the hypocrisy of Chinese criticisms arguing, “there’s a country that has a huge arsenal of nuclear weapons … and yet Japan is labelled with ‘new militarism.” While Chinese criticism of Japanese investments in defence, particularly since Takaichi’s comments over Taiwan in November 2025, serves as a useful misdirection from its own expansionism in the South China Sea, Japan has still failed to soothe both domestic and foreign enquiries into its shifting defence posture. Japan has set defence spending records for 12 consecutive years, relaxed rules that will allow it to sell lethal weapons to other countries, and discussed revising Article 9 of Japan’s constitution – a pacifist clause that renounces war. While allies such as the US view this as long overdue considering the changing security environment, Japan’s failure to fully reconcile with its militaristic past in the region that continues to hinder relations with South Korea, highlights they must embrace accountability to improve messaging. The fact that many within Japan itself disagree with the shifts in defence policy further hinders improved messaging with anti-war protests across the country in recent months swelling to become Japan’s largest in decades.
In his Saturday Speech, Hegseth once again called on allies in the region to increase defence spending to offset China’s growing power saying “we need partners, not protectorates.” This demand is increasingly pertinent given a recent report from CSIS that said it would take the US at least two years to replenish four critical munitions used heavily during the Iran war, bringing into question their ability to fight conflicts in multiple theaters simultaneously. However, Hegseth’s remarks portrayed a fundamental tension between demanding partners to increase their defence spending to 3.5% of GDP and adopting a softer line on China. Compared to his speech last year, when he warned that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan was “imminent”, he did not mention Taiwan once in his speech this year. Instead, he echoed the concept of “constructive strategic stability” coined by Xi at the recent high-profile bilateral meeting in Beijing and praised Trump for improving relations with China. The inconsistent messaging of China as a threat while regurgitating CCP phrasing leaves allies questioning the pertinence of the threat.
Mixed messaging combined with the fact that the reality amongst US Allies in the Asia-Pacific is that their defence priorities and fiscal capacity are varied makes US calls for increased spending land bluntly. Asia’s defence spending is projected to rise in 2026 having continued uninterrupted since 2008, but the 3.4% increase in real terms in 2026 from 2025 is lower than the average growth of the previous decade, at 4.6%. This is reflective of the fact defence spending sits at the crossroads between threat perceptions and economic capacity. The economic ramifications of the US-led war in the Middle East has impacted economic capacity with the IMF highlighting Asia accounts for 80 percent of LNG exported through the Strait of Hormuz and disruptions to shipping have also pushed food prices upward. In response many countries such as Indonesia estimated and the Philippines have announced money saving measures ‘reduce non-essential spending’. Furthermore, while Manila’s Teodoro struck the most combative tone at the conference, saying that China is “unrepentant with their expansionism and unrelenting” due to clashes in the South China Sea, across Southeast Asia more generally, defence policy is often geared towards domestic challenges and maintaining regime stability. This means that while the US may demand allies to step up, economic limits in part caused by the US war in Iran, and a broad variety of priorities means Washington may find a tough crowd.
In an international system dominated by Great Powers, broader multilateral forums with smaller states can risk appearing secondary. Although it is difficult for small states to resist the gravitational pull of the US and China, they can, through multilateral forums, remind great powers that support is not automatic. In his keynote speech, To Lam’s emphasis on preserving the rules-based order contrasted sharply with Hegseth’s rhetoric about defence spending, cautioning against the subjective interpretation and selective use of international law where small states were pressured to choose sides. Furthermore, Chan Chun Sing, Singaporean Defence Minister, commented on the desire for ASEAN to “stay out of trouble” and pursue principled strategic autonomy. This demonstrates that in the face of Great Power Dynamics, smaller states are attempting to avoid getting dragged into the competition and empower their strongest tool: the rules-based international order.
The Shangri-La Dialogue revealed a fundamental asymmetry in security dynamics in the Asia-Pacific. China selectively engages on its own terms while the US demands unrealistic commitments. Although relations between the two have thawed, simmering competition and mistrust boils below the surface. Japan is enhancing their own independent capabilities while smaller states, navigating economic headwinds and varied threat perceptions, try to leverage multilateral efforts. Washington must offer a coherent strategy to allies that acknowledges their varied economic and security considerations, builds trust or they risk allowing Chinese Hegemony in the Asia-Pacific.
Recommended Readings
Easley (2023) Stabilizing Japan–Korea relations: Restraining nationalism, appraising Beijing, reassuring Washington
Jamali, Hussein and Liu (2024) US-China competition: Framing New Security Architecture in the Asia-Pacific Region
Sumadinata (2023) Analysis of United States Foreign Policy in Asia Pacific and Its Impact on Regional Security Stability