It is worth noting the participation of corporate representatives from China at the US-China summit held on 14-15 May—specifically, who they were, why they were selected, and what outcomes they achieved with their US counterparts. The Chinese readout was primarily political, emphasizing the need for “steady, sound, and sustainable development” and conveying Beijing’s vision for the future of bilateral relations. Both the language Beijing emphasized and the corporate list it obscured point to the same statecraft logic. Commercial substance flows through enterprise channels, while the bilateral relationship’s visible layer is reserved for political signaling.
On the corporate side, the list of US business representatives was already widely known while the summit was underway. However, the Chinese side remained highly opaque. Observers could only catch glimpses of some participants from Xinwen Lianbo broadcasts, while no official list was released. Given Beijing’s consistently restrained approach to public messaging, the decision not to disclose the identities of corporate representatives followed established practice. The contrast itself is the strategy. Official messaging was explicit and consistent, while corporate engagement remained implicit. The readout pursued a dual-track approach, firm and visible at the political level but open and understated at the commercial level.
Based on the footage aired by CCTV’s Xinwen Lianbo, ten Chinese business representatives attended the banquet. They came from technology, manufacturing, and aerospace sectors, including Lenovo Chairman and CEO Yang Yuanqing, Xiaomi founder Lei Jun, ByteDance CEO Liang Rubo, Haier Chairman and CEO Zhou Yunjie, Hisense Chairman Jia Shaoqian, Fuyao Glass Chairman Cao Hui, Lens Technology Chairwoman Zhou Qunfei, Wanxiang Group Chairman Lu Weiding, COMAC Chairman He Dongfeng, and China National Aviation Holding Chairman Liu Tiexiang. Their US commercial ties are substantial and specific. Haier operates a manufacturing facility in South Carolina; Fuyao runs an automotive glass plant in Ohio; Lenovo’s PC business depends on Qualcomm and Micron chips; Lens Technology supplies both Apple and Tesla; COMAC and AVIC remain reliant on Boeing aircraft and engines. The seating arrangements were also noteworthy. Jensen Huang was seated at the same table as representatives from Hisense, Lens Technology, Wanxiang and Fuyao; Qualcomm CEO Cristiano Amon was placed alongside executives from Lenovo, Xiaomi and Haier; while Boeing CEO Kelly Ortberg shared a table with representatives from COMAC and CNAH. A clear pattern showed suppliers were seated opposite their customers, while production-side firms were placed alongside procurement-side counterparts; each pairing corresponded to an existing US supply chain relationship or commercial partnership. Arguably, these interactions remained confined to the firms’own operations rather than being incorporated into the summit’s official deliverables.
Equally noteworthy are the prominent absences. The leaders of major internet platform companies, including Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent, were not in attendance, nor were representatives from leading frontier technology firms such as DeepSeek in AI, Huawei, or Unitree and AgiBot in the robotics. These sectors — platform internet services, sanctioned telecommunications, frontier AI, and new energy vehicles and batteries — carry the highest political salience in the current US–China commercial relationship, and the least amenable to corporate-level engagement alone.
Liang Rubo of ByteDance (the parent company of TikTok) was perhaps the most subtle figure in attendance. By September 2025, a Trump executive order had moved the TikTok controversy into a commercially driven settlement framework. TikTok had shifted from a contested political issue to a manageable commercial transaction, allowing ByteDance to appear as a participant in commercial engagement rather than as the subject of a political controversy.
Taken together, these patterns point to a dual-track management strategy. Officially, Beijing maintained its firm rhetoric: emphasizing its need to build a peaceful and stable relationship with the US, reiterating Taiwan as a red line, and calling on the US to respect China’s core interests. However, at the business level, engagement remained active but low-profile—that is, kept out of official publicity and without the public release of figures or specific outcomes. At his 15 May press conference, Wang Yi referred to the economic and trade dimension only in passing, stating simply that the two sides had “in-depth discussions on China–U.S. economic and trade ties.” Conversely, the US side was more explicit. Washington indicated that the establishment of the board of trade and the board of investment was one of the areas that both China and the US were seriously discussing and exploring.
This asymmetry of visibility serves several functions. The most immediate purpose is to retain bargaining leverage. If US–China commercial cooperation was publicly elevated as the summit’s central achievement, Beijing’s leverage in seeking concessions from Washington on issues such as Taiwan, export controls and tariffs would be correspondingly reduced. Likewise, considering domestic legitimacy, it requires the official public posture to remain restrained rather than friendly. Amid recurring surges in anti-China sentiment in Washington, any signal amplified as a concession would constrain Beijing’s room to maneuver in subsequent negotiations. Commercially, keeping corporate cooperation low-profile can help preserve its continued operating space, thereby shielding it from the disruptions caused by shifting political messaging. Particularly considering the Trump administration’s tendency toward abrupt policy shifts, Beijing has strong incentives not to tie commercial substance to political posturing. Out of the spotlight, the commercial track can sustain a steadier rhythm.
The firmness of public messaging and the careful selection of corporate representatives are two facets of the same statecraft approach. Commercial substance will likely continue moving through the enterprise track, even as its visibility remains subject to careful management. Accordingly, future summits should be read through delegation composition rather than merely through official readouts to understand Beijing’s true priorities. Against the broader backdrop of recurring anti-China sentiment and renewed trade tensions, Beijing is unlikely to adopt an openly friendly public posture. Yet it is equally unlikely to stop maintaining commercial substance through unofficial channels. This subtle asymmetry is likely to define US–China relations, not an exception, but the norm.
Further readings
Billman (2026) The Chinese Companies That Made the Trump-Xi Dinner Cut
Bao (2026) A State Banquet, Selfies with Musk and Huang’s Noodle Run : The spectacle of Trump’s Beijing visit
Chan, Czin, Hass, and Kim (2026) What Beijing Got from the Trump-Xi Summit
Hua (2026) 特朗普访华国宴，中美企业家为何是他们？(Trump’s State Banquet in Beijing: Why These Business Representatives?)