Executive Summary
A US-Brokered Trilateral Framework between the United States of America, the State of Israel, and the Republic of Lebanon has enabled Israel to return control of areas in Southern Lebanon to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). The ‘pilot zones’ cover three villages: Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh, Froun and Srifa. On the 21st July 2026, the LAF deployed to all three villages after the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) withdrew from Zawtar Al-Gharbiya, the only one of the three they had occupied. This scheme is seen by Israel as a test for Lebanon to see if they can disarm the militant group Hezbollah that has a strong presence in the South. The US frames the ‘pilot zone’ initiative as tangible progress, but there are major issues: Hezbollah has rejected the entire framework, and Israel has signalled it intends to still have a presence in the south.
Key Points
- The Trilateral Framework was agreed in June following US-brokered talks in Washington D.C.; implementation was finalised the following month in Rome.
- The initial implementation phase covers the villages of Froun, Srifa, and Zawtar Al-Gharbiya. Only Zawtar Al-Gharbiya was within the Israeli ‘security zone’, requiring IDF forces to withdraw to allow LAF deployment.
- Hezbollah has rejected the framework, stating that they will only discuss disarmament once Israel has ended its occupation of Southern Lebanon.
Analysis
The goal of the framework is to end the conflict between Lebanon and Israel and ensure the sovereignty and security of both countries. The pilot zones aim to see if the LAF can effectively disarm Hezbollah, upon which the LAF will assume full and effective security responsibility in these zones. However, displaced residents and the LAF say two of the three villages were never actually occupied by Israeli forces, fuelling skepticism that Israel is conceding meaningful ground and meaning the test of Israeli willingness to cede ground rests almost entirely on Zawtar Al-Gharbiya. However, the withdrawal from Zawtar Al-Gharbiya has already proved contentious. The same day Israeli troops withdrew from the village, it was reported that shots were fired from the Israeli-occupied ‘security zone’. According to Israel, LAF troops advanced approximately 150m into the security zone, crossing the barriers and prompting warning shots. Overall, the apparent minimal change for Israel suggests that the ‘pilot zones’ may be more symbolic than substantive. It could be seen as designed to generate positive news and diplomatic momentum without requiring Israel to relinquish significant territory or leverage.
Additionally, Israel’s previous declaration 5 days before the framework was agreed that they will keep IDF troops in Southern Lebanon “for as long as necessary” suggests that they have long-term plans of maintaining their security zones in the region. Hezbollah’s continued rejection of the framework and refusal to disarm remains the largest issue: the framework depends on the LAF eventually disarming Hezbollah in the ‘pilot zones’; however, with Hezbollah rejecting the idea of disarmament until Israel has ended its occupation, this suggests the success is unlikely. Furthermore, Hezbollah’s significant influence in Southern Lebanon shows that disarming them will prove a significant political risk for Beirut.
Policy Implications
- Lebanon must balance between satisfying US and Israeli demands to disarm Hezbollah while also avoiding a confrontation with a group that holds significant political legitimacy and power among its base, particularly in the South.
- Israel’s apparent intent to prolong its occupation of the ‘security zone’ risks undermining the framework’s credibility and strengthening Hezbollah’s narrative that the deal is merely cosmetic, complicating the Lebanese government’s efforts to sell the framework to a domestic audience that is already doubtful.