Executive Summary
China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are pressing for an early conclusion of the South China Sea Code of Conduct (COC), a framework under negotiation since 2018. At the China–ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Manila on 22 July, Foreign Minister Wang Yi described a “critical window” as having opened for finalizing the agreement, and ASEAN foreign ministers reported “significant progress” and expressed hope of concluding it by the end of 2026. Yet negotiations are advancing alongside a changing operational status quo. This briefing informs that the significance of the COC lies not simply in whether it creates rules, but in what kind of regional order those rules would institutionalise.
Key Points
- Negotiators have met monthly since January 2026, compared with four or five sessions annually previously. Philippine Foreign Secretary Theresa Lazaro identified geographical scope, legal nature, and the COC’s relationship with the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DOC) among the remaining issues, while reporting growing consensus on self-restraint.
- The pace of negotiation, however, has not been matched on the water. AMTI recorded 933 China Coast Guard (CCG) ship-days, which refers to one ship being present in the area for one day, around Scarborough Shoal in the first six months of 2026, against 1,099 for all of 2025. It also recorded 112 days of observed interaction between Chinese and Philippine vessels during the same period.
- The legal context remains contested. On the tenth anniversary of the 2016 South China Sea arbitral award, fourteen countries reaffirmed the ruling as final and legally binding. China rejected the statement, Vietnam did not join the public statement, having instead conveyed support bilaterally to the Philippines in a June meeting.
Analysis
China is not opposed to establishing regional rules; rather, it seeks to shape those rules on terms that preserve its sovereignty claims and limit external involvement. Beijing’s formula and recurring narratives that the region’s future belongs to regional countries narrows who is entitled to shape the rules rather than opposing rules as such. This is consistent with a wider pattern in China’s normative diplomacy: Beijing rarely rejects a framework outright, and instead redefines it from within, retaining the language of order while shifting its content toward sovereignty and state control.
The AMTI data makes the cost of this pattern concrete. A code concluded on this trajectory is likely to reflect the balance of control established before signature, however not resolve it. This does not require bad faith on Beijing’s part; enhanced patrols may equally function as negotiating leverage. Either explanation converges on the same point: the COC’s provisions on enforcement and geographic scope will decide whose reading of regional order it ultimately embeds. What China is trying to institutionalize on terms that preserve regional control, limit external involvement, and accommodate its preferred approach to dispute management.
Policy Implications
- Negotiating parties should judge the COC by enforceability, dispute settlement, and alignment with UNCLOS rather than treating conclusion by 2026 as a success metric in itself.
- ASEAN claimants should press for an explicit UNCLOS and 2016 award reference in the preamble; its absence would mark the code as a parallel framework rather than a reinforcement of existing law.
- External powers should keep marking the award’s anniversary jointly, without framing the COC as a contest over outside influence, given only partial ASEAN appetite for that framing.
- ASEAN should close the gap exposed by Vietnam’s bilateral, non-public endorsement before 2026, since unresolved intra-bloc division lets Beijing negotiate member states individually rather than as a unified bloc.
References
“China Stands with ASEAN in Reinforcing Unity against New Challenges, Uncertainties: Chinese FM.” 2026. July 23. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202607/23/content_WS6a61726ac6d00ca5f9a0c5db.html.
“Joint Statement on the Enhanced Strategic Partnership between the Republic of the Philippines and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam.” 2026. June 1. https://mofa.gov.vn/en/web/ministry-of-foreign-affairs/detail/chi-tiet/joint-statement-on-the-enhanced-strategic-partnership-between-the-republic-of-the-philippines-and-the-socialist-republic-of-viet-nam-59970-177.html.
“Joint Statement on the Tenth Anniversary of the Philippines-China South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal Award.” 2026. United States Department of State, 2026 July 11. https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/07/joint-statement-on-the-tenth-anniversary-of-the-philippines-china-south-china-sea-arbitral-tribunal-award/.
News Releases – ASEAN, China Aim to Conclude South China Sea Code of Conduct by Year-End. 2026. July 23. https://pco.gov.ph/news_releases/asean-china-aim-to-conclude-south-china-sea-code-of-conduct-by-year-end/.
“Occupational Risk? Chinese Presence Surges at Scarborough Shoal.” 2026. Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, July 2. https://amti.csis.org/occupational-risk-chinese-presence-surges-at-scarborough-shoal/.
“Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China on Certain Countries’ Playing up of the ‘South China Sea Arbitration Award’ 10 Years After Its Issuance_EMBASSY OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA.” 2026. July 13. https://si.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/fyrth/202607/t20260713_11980464.htm.