Executive Summary:
On 10 July 2026, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the establishment of the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces (JRRF) within the Ukrainian Ground Forces. This initiative means that usual assault units will be integrated with unmanned systems and artillery under a single structure. Unlike traditional rapid reaction forces, this formation is designed to respond to combined warfare, where drones are dominated. If the JRRF has permanent access to drones, artillery and support, a unified command could eliminate fragmentation. If these assets remain temporarily attached, and their roles overlap with those of the Air Assault Forces (AAF) and the Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), the reform will create an additional layer of command.
Therefore, success must be assessed in terms of actual operational autonomy and coordination.
Key Points:
- The JRRF is a reserve, not tied to holding a section of the front, and will be deployed in cases of urgent offence operations.
- The main organisational change is unified command over both assault and supporting components, bringing unified training, logistics, planning, and deployment of drones, artillery, infantry.
- The main risk is that this new command doesn’t come with permanently assigned resources or a clear division of functions with the USF or AAF.
Analysis
Modern drone warfare in the Russia-Ukraine war has made it more difficult to concentrate large forces due to the wide kill zone. However, drone usage doesn’t exclude artillery and conventional warfare, so effective offensive requires close coordination between drones, artillery, electronic warfare, air defence, engineering units, logistics. Furthermore, infantry alone can’t hold defensive lines effectively for months on end while carrying out extremely complex offensive operations. ArmyInform reports about a single assault regiment: its subunits operated simultaneously across nine areas of responsibility under different commands, causing fragmentation in command.
The Joint Rapid Reaction Forces, established by presidential decree on 10 July 2026, respond to both a changing battlefield and this fragmented command model. They are not tied to a specific section of the frontline and will be deployed wherever the opportunity for a counter-attack appears. A single command of JRRF is responsible for training, discipline, logistics, planning, and deployment of the offensive. This enables drones, artillery, and support to work with the assault units as one system, from preparation to combat employment.
Advantages:
- Assault units are meant to train together with drones, artillery, and support before deployment. This could turn assault units from temporary “firefighting” units into a standing mobile reserve.
- JRRF’s mobile role is intended to take specialized offensive tasks off line brigades, so they could focus on holding the front rather than also running assault operations at the same time. This could reduce the strain on line units and help sustain both defence and offence.
Limitations:
- A new command doesn’t create additional personnel, artillery, ammunition, air defence assets, or training time. The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) links problems in Ukrainian combined-arms operations to shortages of personnel, equipment, and time for collective training. This could increase competition for specialists, since JRRF draws from the same manpower pool as other forces.
- It hasn’t been clarified which drone units will form a permanent part of JRRF and which will be provided by Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), which employs unmanned capabilities across air, land, and maritime domains. Furthermore, the AAF and assault units within the army corps already perform rapid reaction tasks. Without distinctions, the new structure risks adding more layers of command rather than removing the fragmentation.
Policy Implications
For Ukraine:
- Determine which unmanned, artillery, engineering, electronic warfare and logistical assets of the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces are under constant control;
- Establish clear lines of command between the JRRF command, the USF and the Ground Forces;
- Assess the reform in terms of deployment speed, the ability to restore combat readiness and the quality of coordinated operations, rather than solely on the basis of the number of units formed.
Sources:
- Ministry of Defence of Ukraine. Unmanned Systems Forces. Available at: https://mod.gov.ua/en/about-us/unmanned-systems-forces
- Neschetna, S. (2026). To “restore order”: Voloshyn to lead a new military branch following scandals involving assault brigades. TSN. Available at: https://tsn.ua/ukrayina/shchob-navesty-poriadok-voloshyn-ocholyt-novyy-rid-viysk-pislia-skandaliv-zi-shturmovymy-bryhadamy-3126680.html
- NV. (2026) ‘Butusov says he does not understand why Joint Rapid Reaction Forces should be established within Ukraine’s Defence Forces’. Available at: https://nv.ua/ukr/ukraine/events/ob-yednani-sili-shvidkogo-reaguvannya-yuriy-butusov-kritikuye-docilnist-stvorennya-50624306.html
- President of Ukraine. (2026) On strengthening the capabilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: Presidential Decree No. 592/2026, 10 July. Available at: https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/5922026-60317
- Samoilenko, K. (2026) ‘A fist against the positional trap: why Ukraine’s Armed Forces are establishing Joint Rapid Reaction Forces’. ArmyInform. Available at: https://armyinform.com.ua/2026/07/20/kulak-proty-pozyczijnoyi-pastky-navishho-u-zsu-stvoryuyut-obyednani-syly-shvydkogo-reaguvannya/
- Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center Press Service. (2026) What will the newly established Joint Rapid Reaction Forces look like? Available at: https://uscc.org.ua/9619-2/
- Watling, J. (2025) Emergent approaches to combined arms manoeuvre in Ukraine. Royal United Services Institute. Available at: https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/insights-papers/emergent-approaches-combined-arms-manoeuvre-ukraine
- Interfax-Ukraine. (2026). General Staff on the establishment of Joint Rapid Reaction Forces: bringing the most combat-capable military units together into a single branch. Available at: https://interfax.com.ua/news/general/1184438.html
