Executive Summary
Negotiations over the Strait of Hormuz remain constrained by disagreement over transit fees, shipping access and the role of mediators. Iran favours a mandatory fee, while Oman supports a voluntary model. The US and shipping associations, including BIMCO, the International Chamber of Shipping and INTERTANKO (International Chamber of Shipping, 2026), oppose Iran’s mandatory fee, citing legal, commercial and precedent risks. A reported interim shipping arrangement remains uncertain, particularly over Iran’s exclusion of US and Israeli vessels.
The dispute is broader than Hormuz. Pakistan’s role as a mediator has come under pressure following its defence pact with Saudi Arabia and Turkey, while the nuclear issue and wider US-Iran disputes remain unresolved.
Introduction
Talks between Iran, Oman and the United States on reopening the Strait of Hormuz have continued since late June 2026, but no agreement has been reached. The main disputes concern Iran’s proposed transit fee, the management of shipping lanes, and which vessels would be allowed to pass. Regional diplomacy has become increasingly difficult following the Saudi-Pakistan-Turkey defence pact signed on 7 August, which has raised questions in Iran about Pakistan’s neutrality as a mediator.
The transit fee is only one part of a larger dispute over access, sanctions and mediation. Even a limited reopening of Hormuz would therefore address the immediate shipping crisis without resolving the Iran-US confrontation.
Analysis
Iran believes that paying navigation service fees, whether in the form of charges or taxes, should be mandatory. Iranian officials say these fees would cover navigation and environmental protection (Marine Insight, 2026). Oman has instead proposed a voluntary system modelled on the Strait of Malacca, with a foundation funded by governments and shipping interests to support navigational safety (Marine Insight, 2026).
Trump called any charge on shipping “unacceptable,” while Secretary of State Marco Rubio called for a return to pre-conflict arrangements (Marine Insight, 2026). Gulf states, shipping companies and insurers share a broader concern: allowing Iran to collect a mandatory payment could establish a precedent for charging vessels to transit an international strait (AGBI, 2026).
A proposed interim arrangement would divide the strait into two lanes, inbound vessels using Iranian waters and outbound vessels using Omani waters, with no transit charges during mine‑clearing operations (Al Jazeera, 2026). Iran has reportedly dropped its demand to control both directions but would still exclude vessels linked to the United States or Israel, a condition Washington has rejected (Al Jazeera, 2026). Any agreement would require a US Treasury sanctions exemption before shipping companies could operate under it (Al Jazeera, 2026).
The Saudi-Pakistan-Turkey defence pact signed on 7 August has introduced an additional layer of complexity. Pakistan brokered the Islamabad Memorandum and has served as the main channel between Tehran and Washington. However, its deployment of around 8,000 troops and air defence assets to Saudi Arabia under the pact has led an advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader to argue that Pakistan is no longer neutral and should stop mediating (Bulut, 2026).
Iran’s official response has been more cautious. The Foreign Ministry and state media have presented the pact mainly as evidence of Gulf frustration with US security guarantees (Middle East Forum, 2026). While this suggests that Tehran has not formally abandoned the Pakistani channel, the pact has raised questions about Pakistan’s credibility as a mediator.
Even a deal on Hormuz would leave the core disputes between Iran and the United States unresolved. Before the strikes, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) estimated that Iran held around 440.9 kg of uranium enriched to 60% and 184.1 kg enriched to 20%. The IAEA has since been denied access and cannot verify the current size or location of these stocks (Institute for Science and International Security, 2026).
Other major disputes remain outside the Hormuz talks, including Iran’s missile and drone programmes, US sanctions, and frozen Iranian assets. Washington has ruled out releasing the frozen assets upfront, while the US Treasury has continued to impose new measures targeting trade with Iran (Iran International, 2026). A Hormuz agreement would therefore address an immediate security and shipping crisis but would not resolve the broader confrontation.
Policy Recommendations
- Any agreed fee structure should follow Oman’s voluntary model rather than Iran’s compulsory approach. This would protect freedom of transit and avoid creating a precedent that could be used to justify charges in other international straits.
- Pakistan’s role as a mediator is increasingly contested within Iran. Washington and its Gulf partners should therefore avoid relying on a single diplomatic channel and support Oman’s parallel efforts.
- The nuclear issue should be reopened as a separate track. The loss of IAEA access to Iran’s nuclear stockpile is a greater long-term concern than the technical terms of a Hormuz fee and should not be left dependent on a narrower shipping agreement.
Bibliography
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