On 22 and 23 December 2025, the second summit of the Alliance des États du Sahel (AES) took place in the Malian capital Bamako. In this context, Burkina Faso’s president, Ibrahim Traoré, was appointed as the new rotating president of the Alliance. In addition, several measures aimed at deepening cooperation in the military, media-cultural, and financial domains were adopted. Not least, the joint force of the three countries had already been formally commissioned some days prior to the summit, with a primary focus on combating jihadist terrorist groups.
The AES was established in September 2023 as a defense pact between the military governments of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Its creation was prompted by threats from the West African regional organization ECOWAS to intervene in Niger following the July 2023 coup led by General, and current ruler, Abdourahmane Tiani, with the aim of restoring constitutional order under the formally elected President Mohamed Bazoum. After the three countries withdrew from ECOWAS in January 2024, their military governments signed a treaty in July of the same year establishing a joint confederation, which is intended to evolve into a federation in the long term. Among the most recently announced measures of deeper regional integration are plans to create a common currency to replace the CFA franc and thereby ensure financial sovereignty, the abolition of roaming charges within member states, the introduction of a common biometric identity format, and the imposition of a 0.5 percent tariff on goods imported from non-member states. The three countries have also undertaken a strategic reorientation in the security sector.
Accordingly, they terminated stabilization and counterterrorism missions conducted by the United Nations (MINUSMA), France, and the United States, and instead sought closer cooperation with Russian forces, notably the Wagner Group and the Africa Corps. Moreover, the three states intensified security relations with countries such as Turkey, China, and Iran, particularly with regard to arms imports. They also sought to deepen mutual cooperation and to establish an interoperable military unit to combat jihadist terrorist groups, especially in the tri-border Liptako-Gourma region.
Jihadist groups currently control large swaths of territory, particularly in Mali and Burkina Faso. Analysts estimate that jihadist organizations control between 60 and 70 percent of Burkina Faso’s territory. Severe terrorist attacks on military infrastructure in Bamako in September 2024, as well as the recent fuel blockade of the Malian capital, which largely paralysed public life and economic activity in the city in autumn 2025, further indicated a growing influence of terrorist groups in Mali as well. The Sahel has thus become a new hotbed of global jihadism, accounting for more than half of all global victims of global terrorist violence. In addition to the al-Qaeda-affiliated group JNIM, the Islamic State’s regional branch, ISSP, has also become increasingly active in AES territory. Since the first coup in Mali in 2020 and the subsequent withdrawal of international troops from all three countries by 2023, following military coups in Burkina Faso and Niger, the security situation has deteriorated significantly in all three countries.
While transnational cooperation and greater interoperability among national armed forces operating jointly can offer advantages in combating terrorist groups in a region characterised by porous borders, the success of this project has yet to materialise in concrete terms. Although Niger’s Minister of Defense, Salifou Mody, already spoke in January 2025 of the operability of the AES cross-border joint force, its official commissioning took place only in the run-up to the second AES summit. Thus, the United Force of the AES (FU-AES), comprising 5,000 troops under the command of Burkinabè General Daouda Traoré, was officially established on 20 December 2025, even though uncertainties persist regarding its actual level of operational readiness. In the context of the FU-AES’s commissioning, Malian President Goïta presented an initial assessment of the three states’ military cooperation, highlighting in particular the joint operations Yéréko I and II, during which several ISSP militants were reportedly neutralized in Niger in spring 2025. Already a year earlier, contingents from the three countries had conducted the Tarhanakal exercise together with Chadian and Togolese forces.
While this exercise demonstrates that good relations persist with some ECOWAS member states, such as Senegal and Togo, the rupture in security cooperation between ECOWAS and the three AES countries has facilitated an expansion of extremist groups toward the Gulf of Guinea. As recently as April 2025, more than 50 Beninese soldiers were killed in an attack by JNIM in northwestern Benin. Togo, Senegal, Ghana, and Côte d’Ivoire are also increasingly becoming targets of Islamist terrorist militias. This is particularly significant given that extremists encounter similar social and economic challenges in the northern, often marginalized regions of the coastal states, facilitating their expansion. Beyond complementing a predominantly military-centered strategy with comprehensive political components aimed at greater political inclusion of marginalized populations and the leveraging of economic potential, deeper regional cooperation would be a sensible approach to addressing the terrorist threat preventively. In light of existing tensions between AES states and ECOWAS member countries, above all Nigeria, comprehensive regional security cooperation beyond the AES, potentially including the littoral states of the Gulf of Guinea, does not currently appear foreseeable.
In addition to the commissioning of the FU-AES, the summit decided on the launch of a joint television broadcaster and the establishment of a confederal development bank intended to stimulate private investment through public funds. Regional tensions were also reflected in the summit’s final communiqué, which, alongside condemning destabilizing terrorist activities, accused certain countries in the region of supporting such activities, without specifying which states were meant. While the trend toward deeper regional integration among the three AES countries could be beneficial in many respects, the security challenges remain immense. It is questionable whether the AES will succeed in countering terrorism through military means alone. In the context of significant human rights violations in counterterrorism operations and the persistent discrimination of already marginalized groups such as the Tuareg and Fulani, it appears advisable to address the driving factors for joining jihadist groups through an inclusive political process and to flank military measures with political and economic initiatives.
Written by Nils Arvid Neubert
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author(s) and do not represent the views or positions of CISES, its leadership or affiliated organisation(s)