The Indian External Affairs Minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar, had been invited as a guest at the exclusive Weimar Triangle, which took place in January 2026. There, he met with Germany’s Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs Johann Wadephul, France’s Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot, and Poland’s Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski. For the first time since its creation in 1991, the Weimar Triangle has welcomed a non-European country from the Global South. This could be a signal of either strategic recalibration or tactical experimentation with Global South nations, depending on subsequent institutionalization. During the meet, Dr. Jaishankar highlighted that India would seek to position itself as an important security and trade partner, especially during these unsettled times, as the international order is becoming highly multipolarized.
Parallely, Poland’s EU Council Presidency has highlighted that Indo-Pacific securitization is vital for strengthening the EU’s transatlantic waterways. This is one of seven priority areas for its tenure from January to June 2025. At present, the Weimar Triangle faces significant obstacles in aligning EU interests, challenged by U.S. policy shifts, the disputed National Security Strategy 2025, Chinese assertiveness, and the dragging Russia–Ukraine peace process. Similarly, India is also under pressure from Trump’s administration, China’s territorial expansion in the LAC, and ongoing tensions with Pakistan. India and the EU may find common ground due to mutual pressures, however, it is important for EU to strengthen strategic diversification with other Indo-Pacific nations, as Japan’s current security expansion, ASEAN’S collective interest in the Natuna Region, South Korea’s technological integration and similar complementary partnership from other regional partners would prove beneficial to strengthen the EU-Global South ties.
The successful signing of the EU‑India Free Trade Agreement this month would represent India’s nineteenth trade deal, offering an easy market-access to all 27 EU member states and a space for tariff reduction & import diversification. Currently, bilateral trade between the EU and India is worth 120 billion euros a year. Economists anticipate that the FTA could increase trade between the two countries by 30–40% in five years. India already exports 40% of Europe’s generic medicines, which was critical during the COVID-19 and exported 8.2 billion euros in textiles to the EU in 2024, despite facing 9.6% in tariffs.
Beyond trade, Europe faces durect/indirect security concerns. This year’s Weimar meeting was exclusively focused on EU defence and security issues such as arms production capacity, cybersecurity, protection of critical infrastructures and the Ukraine Crisis. The invitation suggests European interest on India’s naval capacity and willingness for burden sharing roles, however, the effectiveness and immediate strategic perimeter remains untested.
Germany’s Federal Foreign Office indicated the Indo-Pacific is “vital for both regions’ security and prosperity”. About 90% of European trade to Asia goes via the Indian Ocean which lacks constant European naval presence in contrast to India and other regional partners’ notable dominance. With India’s growing ambitions in submarine cable diplomacy, European leaders have expressed interest in India’s security potential particularly in light of recent Russian drone attacks on submarine cables in the Baltic Sea. However, while India offers certain strategic advantages such as, maritime presence, democratic power structures and resource capacity, there’s a heavy demand for securing alternative regional partners especially in the areas of trade, technology, critical infrastructure and regulatory alignment.
Specifically, Poland borders Ukraine and Belarus and faces direct Russian cyber threats, therefore it spends 4.7% of GDP on defence ( NATO’s highest). Similarly, India spends $74-81 billion annually. Thus, the 2024–2028 bilateral action plan serves as an important lynch-pin to concretize the depth this partnership. However, significant challenges still remain, as the European environmental laws, specifically the ‘Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive and Deforestation Regulation’, could negatively affect 40% of India’s agricultural exports, worth €4.5 billion each year. These regulatory differences may affect mutual developmental models and has the possibility to negatively affect more than the existing tariff structures.
In addition, there is also the Russia dilemma. India’s close relationship with Russia, despite Europe’s repetitive concerns, may present a challenge that could restrict how deeply the two sides cooperate on security matters, in the future. India’s Weimar invite has indeed created a gateway for other Global South nations towards selective cooperation, however lasting partnership will require both EU-Global South nations to navigate their regulatory differences and accept potential trade-offs.
Recommended Readings:
- Ashraf, T. (2021). ‘The European Union’s impact in South Asia: Norms or geopolitics? In New challenges and opportunities in European-Asian relations’ (pp. 191–211). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68632-1_9
- Bogdanova, K., & Bogdanova, K. (2025, March 31). ‘The Weimar Triangle: Driver of Ukraine’s EU integration & Security?’. Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe. https://www.idm.at/en/idm-pps-1-2025-the-weimar-triangle/
- Jaishankar, S. (2024). ‘The India way: Strategies for an uncertain world’ (Revised ed.). HarperCollins Publishers India. https://harpercollins.co.in/books-by-s-jaishankar-the-india-way/
References (APA):
ASEM Info Board (Jan, 2025). Poland’s EU Council Presidency. https://aseminfoboard.org/community/polands-eu-council-presidency/
European Commission. EU-India Free Trade Agreement, Investment Protection Agreement and Geographical Indications Agreement. https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/india/eu-india-agreements_en
Federal Foreign Office (2026, January 7). Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Germany. https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/europe/cooperation-in-europe/weimar-triangle-india-2751122
India Briefing (2026, January 15). India-EU FTA: Context and broader negotiations.
Ministry of External Affairs of France. The Weimar Triangle. https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/germany/the-weimar-triangle/
Ministry of External Affairs of India. PIB (2026, January 7). Press remarks by EAM Dr. S. Jaishankar at India – Weimar format meeting. https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/40575/Press+remarks+by+EAM+Dr+S+Jaishankar+at+India++Weimar+format+meeting+January+07+2026
Ministry of External Affairs of India. Press Information Bureau (2024). Action Plan (2024-2028) for the Implementation of the India-Poland Strategic Partnership. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/38202/Action_Plan_20242028_for_the_Implementation_of_the_IndiaPoland_Strategic_Partnership
Ministry of External Affairs of Poland (2026, January 7). Meeting of Weimar Triangle and India foreign ministers. https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/meeting-of-Weimar-Triangle-and-India-foreign-ministers
Polskie Radio (2026, January 14). Poland to host trilateral parliamentary meeting marking 35 years of Weimar Triangle.
Polskie Radio (2026, January 15). Poland says it thwarted Russian-linked cyberattacks on energy infrastructure. https://www.polskieradio.pl/395/7784/Artykul/3634270,update-poland-says-it-thwarted-russianlinked-cyberattacks-on-energy-infrastructure