Introduction
The launch of China’s new Type 095 (09V) Sui-Class nuclear powered submarine represents a significant expansion of the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) capabilities in undersea warfare. Although the submarine’s primary application has been considered more closely in relation to China’s Indo-Pacific strategy, it must be analysed how its capabilities can extend beyond that theater. China’s Arctic strategy has developed quickly, through extensive scientific research, infrastructure investment, and its claim as a ‘near Arctic state’, a statement rejected by the Arctic Council’s eight other member states (Pompeo, 2019). Within this contested context, the introduction of a nuclear attack submarine may raise broader strategic questions as to whether or not China is gradually developing the means to expand its undersea presence into the polar regions, with both the Type 095 and China’s Arctic posture pointing to an expansion of their reach into Arctic and under-ice environments. This bears weight for the future Arctic security dynamics alongside China’s ongoing cooperation with Russia, another powerful regional actor.
China’s Arctic Ambitions and Strategic Context
These capabilities are especially relevant when considered within very contested strategic spaces such as the Arctic. China’s engagement in this region has been gradual and multi-dimensional, but deliberate, declaring itself as a ‘near Arctic state’ in its 2018 white paper (State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2018). The drivers of this engagement span both civil and military dimensions, with scientific cooperation, resources, and multilateral access to the Arctic on one hand, and on the other, development of military capabilities on a ‘new strategic frontier’ (European Parliament Research Service, 2018).
China’s near Arctic state ambitions are reflected clearly in the pace of their research engagement, which rose sharply in past years. In 2024, China deployed three icebreakers to the Arctic region, (du Fretay, 2026) and September of the same year, Chinese researchers completed one of the largest Arctic scientific expeditions, with a crewed submersible dive beneath the surface of the ice, building on it 2025 with 43 manned submersible dives (Humpert, 2025). The following year, in 2025, Chinese researchers published a study introducing a new submarine detection method that utilizes a passive depth discrimination method capable of detecting submarines with up to 93% accuracy, developed specifically within the Beaufort Sea’s complex acoustic environment using data from China’s 2020 Arctic expedition (Lee, 2025). The dual use pattern of civilian platforms collecting militarily relevant environmental data mirrors the precedents set by other naval powers, and suggests that China’s scientific Arctic presence is functioning as a part of larger operational groundwork for future undersea activity.
Operational and Strategic Implications for China’s Arctic Presence
The Type 095 is a closer step in bridging the gap between scientific foundations and operational application. Its pumpjet propulsion eliminates the acoustic signature that made the Type 093 a liability, a vulnerability that would be critical in the Arctic environment. Its advanced sonar capabilities give the Nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) the ability to accurately navigate the challenging under-ice conditions that would blind other systems. Crucially, the expanded reactor output acts as the submarine’s source of endurance that Arctic deployments demand, with distances from Chinese ports making this a non-negotiable. The Type 095’s capabilities fill the gaps that its predecessors did not, allowing for a more consistent Chinese Arctic presence. Its larger size has an optimal length to beam ratio that allows for increased speed, using less energy. (Sutton, 2026) The X-shaped rudder arrangement and pointed bow also boosts speed, while expanded reactor output, pressure hull diameter, and internal isolation systems minimize acoustic signatures. The submarine has a vertical launch system that has attack missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, and hypersonic cruise missiles (Brahy, 2026). These capabilities go much farther than those of the Type 093, guiding the understanding that the Type 095 could play a role in more complex future missions in the region.
Capabilities on paper, however, do not directly translate into operational proficiency gained through sustained experience in Arctic conditions. While this is a gap that China has yet to close, it does not diminish the strategic weight of what the Type 095 represents. Asymmetric warfare through the use of submarines is an aspect of Chinese military strategy that allows them to deliver disproportionate effects on their adversaries without going into direct combat, a philosophy compatible with China’s strategic thought (Ghiselli, 2018) and military doctrine. A Chinese SSN capable of extensive under-ice operations forces Arctic states to further extend their tracking umbrella and surveillance architecture into an increasingly demanding environment.
The Russian Dimension
Russia and China have continued to develop their cooperation in the Arctic, the pace of this dynamic accelerated by Western sanctions that pushed Moscow toward Beijing as an alternative trade and investment partner (Rotnem, 2025). Alongside their countries’ economic and trade cooperation, Chinese and Russian military vessels have embarked on joint patrols in larger numbers, one of them in 2023 resulting in the US Navy dispatching four destroyers and a reconnaissance aircraft as the eleven ship patrol neared the shores of Alaska (CBS News, 2023).
Independently of this relationship, Russia has long maintained a substantial military presence in the Arctic, which is bolstered by their highly developed military infrastructure such as bases, airfields, and radar installations, from the North East Passage, to the Northern Fleet Headquarters at Severomorsk (Humpert, 2022). This infrastructure continues to position Russia as one of the main gatekeepers of Arctic undersea operational access, even for its partners. This introduces an asymmetry as Chinese undersea capabilities begin to develop independently of Russian operational enablement. Sino-Russian cooperation may be put to the test with the introduction of a Chinese SSN capable of advanced, covert operations that no longer require Russian permission or cooperation, shifting a bilateral dynamic in which Russia has, until now, held the operational advantage in undersea access. This shift shows a gradual movement away from Russian facilitated access towards more independent Chinese under-ice operational capacities. China’s patterns in Arctic engagement through scientific access, with parallel capability development (Raspotnik, 2025) may extend well beyond the frameworks that have defined the partnership to date. Over time, this dual track approach may erode the functional frameworks that have underpinned Sino-Russian Arctic cooperation.
The Type 095’s extensive capabilities will begin to narrow the SSN capability gap. If used in Arctic contexts, the Type 095 holds the potential to challenge Russia’s previously established undersea dominance in the High North. The Type 095, with its extensive capabilities, will, if used in Arctic contexts, begin to narrow the capability gap with modern SSNs, rather than surpassing Russia’s established undersea Arctic advantage. The accelerated rate of Chinese naval production capacity and development cycles could slowly close this gap, raising the probability of long-term capability convergence. Alongside this, a more autonomous Chinese Arctic undersea presence would slowly reduce Russia’s leverage over both the operational scope and conditions of Chinese activity in the High North.
Discussion
Collectively, these elements discussed: scientific expansion, increasingly joint partnership, and rapid production and development of increasingly capable submarines demonstrates a commitment on China’s part to their presence in the Arctic, both present, and future thinking. Submarines such as the Type 095 would, if deployed in Arctic environments, shift the strategic balance, holding the potential to put to the test both Russian, and NATO allied undersea superiority.
Despite this, the gap and timeline between capability, doctrine, and practice remains to be seen. Even if the Type 095 is capable of operations under ice, there is no public evidence yet that China has developed the operational doctrine to go along with it, as well as other crucial elements such as logistics, or crew training that would support long-term sub-ice missions. What we know now is based largely off of satellite imagery and open source analysis, therefore claims at this stage carry a degree of uncertainty, but should nonetheless be carefully considered. This gap matters, but not in a sense that necessarily discredits the argument that this bears strategic weight. The assumption that this gap will continue to exist, taking into account China’s rapid cycles of development and production, is a risk, and a gamble that other Arctic states should not make. The strategic weight, and response that comes with this should then shift, for both NATO member states and Russia, demanding planning for what the future may look like with the potential integration of the Type 095.
For Russia particularly, the implications for the future Sino-Russian cooperation become all the more ambiguous, and complicated. An argument could be made that an increasingly capable Chinese partner could serve as an asset for Russian interests, which would add pressure on NATO in the high north; ideal for Russia as they would not have to utilize more of their own resources to do so. However, this framing might introduce the tensions that Chinese autonomy brings to the table. Russian power, and strategic leverage in the Arctic has been based on dominance, and access, built on elements like geographic position, military infrastructure, and a familiarity with the operational environment. Having a Chinese SSN presence that may no longer depend on Russian coordination holds the potential to erode any leverage, or power over strategic access Russia holds. Despite continuing partnership, this may gradually shift the balance of the partnership.
Conclusion
The developments discussed within this article indicate a significant strategic shift in China’s Arctic presence, with the Type 095 acting as a potential operational embodiment. Its capabilities of advanced stealth, endurance, sonar architecture, and strike capacity make it the first Chinese SSN where Arctic operations become a credible possibility. Combined with China’s accelerated investments in Arctic research and cooperation with regional partners, the foundations for China’s expanded undersea presence have already been laid.
This does not imply an imminent deployment beneath the Arctic ice, but, as Chinese undersea capabilities develop independently of Russian facilitation, Sino-Russian Arctic cooperation will face a test. As the strategic value of the High North continues to grow, the Type 095 and the capabilities that follow it will be central to how China positions itself as an increasingly active near-Arctic state.
References
DELEURY, P. (2020). SSN chinois de type 093 (type 09III) – AGASM-Sous-marins sous-marin. [online] AGASM-Sous-marins. Available at: https://www.agasm.fr/ssn-chinois-de-type-093-type-09iii/ [Accessed Apr. 2026].
CBS News (2023) ‘U.S. Navy sends 4 destroyers to Alaska coast after 11 Chinese, Russian warships spotted in nearby waters’, CBS News, 7 August. Available at: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-navy-destroyers-alaska-coast-11-chinese-russian-warships/ [Accessed Apr. 2026].
Halna du Fretay (2026). Faced with Russian and Chinese Ambitions US Seeks to Accelerate Construction of New Arctic Icebreakers. [online] Armyrecognition.com. Available at: https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/navy-news/2025/faced-with-russian-and-chinese-ambitions-us-seeks-to-accelerate-construction-of-new-arctic-icebreakers [Accessed Apr 2026].
Ghiselli, A. 2018, “Revising China’s Strategic Culture: Contemporary Cherry-Picking of Ancient Strategic Thought”, The China Quarterly, vol. 233, pp. 166-185.
Jérôme Brahy (2026). China to launch first Type 095 nuclear submarine as US naval edge narrows in Pacific. [online] Armyrecognition.com. Available at: https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/navy-news/2026/china-to-launch-first-Type 095-nuclear-submarine-as-us-naval-edge-narrows-in-pacific [Accessed Apr. 2026].
Lee, J. (2025) ‘Arctic advantage: China’s new tech boosts sub detection capabilities near Alaskan waters’, South China Morning Post, 16 April. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3306777/arctic-advantage-chinas-new-tech-boosts-sub-detection-capabilities-near-alaskan-waters [Accessed Apr. 2026].
Humpert, M. (2025). China Completes 43 Manned Arctic Dives in 2025, Demonstrates Dual Submersible Operations Under Ice. [online] gCaptain. Available at: https://gcaptain.com/china-completes-43-manned-arctic-dives-in-2025-demonstrates-dual-submersible-operations-under-ice/ [Accessed Apr 2026].
Sutton, H.I. (2026). China’s Own Seawolf-class Submarine: The Type 095 – Naval News. [online] Naval News. Available at: https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/03/chinas-own-seawolf-class-submarine-the-Type 095/ [Accessed Apr. 2026].
Rotnem, T. (2025). Polar Partners? Russia and China in the Arctic | China Research Center. [online] China Research Center. Available at: https://www.chinacenter.net/2025/china-currents/24-2/polar-partners-russia-and-china-in-the-arctic/ [Accessed Apr 2026].
Humpert, M. (2022). From Ukraine to the Arctic: Russia’s Capabilities in the Region and the War’s Impact on the North. [online] Highnorthnews.com. Available at: https://en.highnorthnews.com/politics/from-ukraine-to-the-arctic-russias-capabilities-in-the-region-and-the-wars-impact-on-the-north/166030. [Accessed Apr. 2026].
Peck, M. (2025). Advanced Chinese Submarines Could Threaten U.S. Underwater Dominance, Study Warns. [online] National Security Journal. Available at: https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/advanced-chinese-submarines-could-threaten-u-s-underwater-dominance-study-warns/ [Accessed Apr. 2026].
Pompeo, M. (2019) Remarks at the Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting. Arctic Council Ministerial, Rovaniemi, Finland, 6 May. Available at: https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-pompeo-remarks-at-the-arctic-council-ministerial-meeting/ [Accessed Apr. 2026].
https://modern-submarines.com (2017). Classe Shang – Type 093 – Modern Submarines. [online] Modern Submarines. Available at: https://modern-submarines.com/submarine-sous-marin-classe-shang-type-093/ [Accessed Apr. 2026].
State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China (2018) China’s Arctic Policy. Beijing: State Council Information Office. Available at: http://english.scio.gov.cn/node_8002680.html [Accessed Apr. 2026].
European Parliament Research Service (2018) China’s Arctic Policy. Brussels: European Parliament. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/620231/EPRS_BRI(2018)620231_EN.pdf [Accessed Apr. 2026].
Raspotnik, A. (2025). China’s Arctic Strategy and Hybrid Warfare: Targeting Governance and Strategic Responses. [online] The Arctic Institute – Center for Circumpolar Security Studies. Available at: https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/chinas-arctic-strategy-hybrid-warfare-targeting-governance-strategic-responses/. [Accessed Apr. 2026].
Pavel Devyatkin (2026). Restraint and Diplomacy in Arctic Policy: Cooperation Amid U.S.-Russia-China Tensions. [online] Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. Available at: https://quincyinst.org/research/restraint-and-diplomacy-in-arctic-policy-cooperation-amid-u-s-russia-china-tensions/. [Accessed Apr. 2026].