Executive Summary
Since the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) has expanded its operational reach beyond South Asia. The group has since demonstrated the capability to promote, facilitate and orchestrate attacks across multiple regions such as Russia, Paris, and Germany (Shea, 2025). Yet European policymakers have lacked a coherent response. Due to geopolitical crises, resource constraints and declining political appetite, terrorist activity in Afghanistan was deprioritised in favour of other concerns, including the war in Ukraine and instability in the Middle East.
Managing this threat requires a shift toward pragmatic pursuit of indirect regional security cooperation and sustained disruption of Islamic State’s transnational support architecture. The adoption of a multilateral counterterrorism (CT) strategy combining intelligence disruption, conditional engagement with the Taliban, humanitarian stabilisation efforts, digital countermeasures and cooperation with regional actors such as India, Pakistan and Turkey is a sufficient response to the current threat. This approach offers the most realistic means of containing ISKP’s external operations without renewed intervention.
Introduction: Why ISKP Matters
Founded in 2014 from defectors of the Taliban (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and al-Qaeda) ISKP has established itself along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border, particularly around Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (Krause, 2025). The group exploits Afghanistan’s political and economic environment to recruit disaffected individuals who view Islamic State (IS) as a credible alternative to existing governance structures (Coolsaet, 2022). Consequently, ISKP has expanded beyond its insurgent origins and increasingly demonstrated the capability to project influence beyond Afghanistan and Pakistan.
While rising to become a central component for IS’s wider militant ecosystem, the group has emerged as Europe’s most significant external jihadist threat in terms of threat projection and likeliness for mass casualty attacks (Zelin, 2024). Through online propaganda and external operational capability, ISKP has demonstrated both the ability to motivate self-directed attacks and facilitate coordinated external operations, including the Crocus City Hall attack and a disrupted plot targeting the Paris Olympics in 2024 (Ingram, et al., 2020; Krause, 2025; Baruah, 2024; Winter, 2025; Brooke-Holland and Loft, 2025). Alongside these high-profile attacks, seven more mass casualty events within Europe were foiled throughout 2025, reinforcing the threat presented by ISKP (Schulz, 2022; Pintoe, 2026).
ISKP’s threat, therefore, stems from the group increasingly seeking to project violence beyond its immediate region. Whilst al-Qaeda viewed the US and Europe as occupiers, ISKP’s perspective fundamentally differs from what policymakers have experienced. ISKP views Europe as the ideological arch-enemy, with references towards Crusaders within propagandic magazine Voice of Khorasan, and uses Israel as an enemy of crusader colonisation, thereby causing Europe to face a direct threat (Smith et al. 2024). In response, this brief argues that intelligence-led disruption, regional cooperation, humanitarian stabilisation and conditional engagement with the Taliban offer the most effective means of containing ISKP’s operational reach.
Analysis: Why ISKP Persists
Effective policy requires understanding the factors enabling ISKP’s resilience. Three factors are particularly important: the Taliban’s limited success against ISKP, the infeasibility of renewed intervention and shortcomings within existing CT frameworks.
The Taliban Problem
The Taliban are simultaneously a CT actor against ISKP and a political obstacle for European engagement. With humanitarian issues and anti-western attitudes, Europe’s engagement with such a group comes at a clear political cost. However, the group’s control over territory in Afghanistan and its ability to appeal to diasporas that share anti-Western sentiment in the post–Global War on Terror context makes it a relevant, though limited, actor in counterterrorism considerations (Alkhouri and Webber, 2022). Consequently, limited engagement may represent an acceptable political cost given the current threat environment.
The Taliban has achieved measurable success through kinetic operations. Since 2023, attacks against Afghan civilians have declined, presenting the group as a credible force in attacking ISKP militants (Giustozzi, 2024). However, ISKP continues to have strongholds where they maintain their ‘online jihad,’ and sustain operational capacity to conduct international attacks (Winter 2025; Smith et al., 2024). ISKP’s online focus not only attracts more foreign fighters, but also leads to increased chances of homegrown European attackers. Consequently, while ISKP has faced disruption in its ability to operate openly within Afghanistan, it still continues to operate. As such, Taliban long-term successes remain limited.
The Taliban’s limitations are furthered by severe constraints, including food insecurity, aid dependency and competition from groups such as the TTP (Baruah, 2024; Winter, 2025; International Institute for Security Studies, 2024). Due to their inability to invest resources into long-term campaigns, the Taliban can suppress but not eliminate the threat. This thereby creates limited opportunity for European policymakers to pursue pragmatic engagement on a shared security interest without formal recognition of the Taliban government.
Why External Intervention Is No Longer Viable
The legacy of the US’s 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan, combined with widespread scepticism toward Western involvement, limits Europe’s ability to directly intervene. Western scepticism has only grown since 2021 due to consistent extra-territorial operations and disregard for national sovereignty. For instance, the US declared ISKP a terrorist organisation in May 2025 and utilised missile strikes on key figures like Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in August 2022 (Maizland, 2026). Resultantly, these manoeuvres by European allies signal a lack of political legitimacy towards the Taliban because they are willingly breaking national sovereignty. Thus, the Taliban government might not accept Western presence, and in fact might be counterproductive in supporting ISKP claims of Taliban illegitimacy (Barauh, 2025).
Additionally, a CT operation focused on degrading ISKP would require decades-long commitment (Bacon, 2024). However, large-scale intervention is both politically impossible and financially unwise given Europe’s current socio-economic hardships from the Russo-Ukraine war and Middle Eastern instability. Moreover, despite years of military pressure, ISKP’s persistence further illustrates the limitations of relying on kinetic approaches. Rather than attempting to rebuild a security presence in Afghanistan, European priorities must focus on coordinating partner states, and provide the aforementioned aide to address deep lying social issues to disrupt ISKP’s ability to regenerate, recruit and project power externally.
Why Existing CT Frameworks Fall Short
European CT frameworks remain focused on disruption and kinetic action despite ISKP’s ability to adapt to digital and transnational environments. Whilst military pressure limits ISKP’s organisational freedom, it does not address the social, economic and ideological conditions that sustain recruitment (Ingram, et. al, 2020; Coolsaet, 2022).
ISKP’s resilience stems from transnational networks and permissive socio-economic environments. The group exploits economic insecurity, weak governance and perceptions of political exclusion to present itself as an alternative source of identity and purpose. Effective containment therefore requires both disruption of financial and logistical infrastructure and measures that reduce the appeal of extremist alternatives (Jones et al., 2017). A kinetic approach risks aggravating grievances whilst leaving the conditions that enable regeneration intact.
Policy Recommendations: A Pragmatic Containment Strategy
Because direct intervention in Afghanistan is no longer politically or strategically viable, Europe should pursue a containment strategy centred on intelligence-led disruption, regional cooperation, humanitarian stabilisation and limited engagement with the Taliban. The objective is not to eliminate ISKP outright, but to constrain the group’s capacity in recruitment, finance and threat projection beyond South Asia.
1. Constrained Engagement with the Taliban
Diplomatic engagement does not require political recognition. Through intelligence sharing, quiet diplomacy and the use of intermediaries, European governments can cooperate with the Taliban on shared CT objectives whilst avoiding formal endorsement (International Institute for Security Studies, 2024). Increasing realisation from Taliban officials that ISKP cannot be defeated without external assistance increases the likelihood of this becoming a viable policy route (Menon, 2024). However, engagement must be conditional and focused on counterterrorism objectives, whilst being subject to regular review. Additionally, any cooperation must account for Taliban factionalism and the enduring relationships between some members and militant actors.
To further support this, Europe can address the socio-economic conditions exploited by ISKP recruiters. Through humanitarian and development initiatives, humanitarian support can aim to reduce the conditions exploited by ISKP recruiters. Priority should be given to food security, local livelihoods, education initiatives and humanitarian assistance delivered through European-led organisations. Whilst humanitarian assistance alone will not eliminate ISKP, it addresses some of the environmental conditions that allow the organisation to recruit and regenerate over time.
2. Regional Cooperation
In relation to tackling ISKP, regional actors possess stronger incentives and greater local access than European states. Whilst cooperation might reveal competing political priorities that hinder cooperation, Pakistan, India, Turkey and Gulf partners provide possible regional allies in conducting CT operations. For instance, Turkey has a proven success in tackling ISKP finances by dismantling smuggling networks, which aids in isolating ISKP from the wider IS framework (Smith et al., 2024). Additionally, Pakistan remains a crucial partner due to its geographic position and experience confronting militant organisations that can help reduce exploitation of the porous Afghanistan–Pakistan border by ISKP and other non-state actors (Palmer and Holtz, 2023). Thus, a broader regional framework would improve intelligence collection, restrict militant movement and increase pressure on the networks that facilitate ISKP operations.
3. Disrupting ISKP’s Transnational Support Architecture
European policymakers should prioritise disruption of the wider IS support ecosystem. This includes targeting smuggling networks, identifying illicit Hawala networks linked to ISKP financing and working with technology companies to remove extremist propaganda.
Unlike large-scale military campaigns, these measures directly constrain ISKP’s ability to finance operations, recruit supporters and sustain external attack planning. Limiting digital outreach would also reduce opportunities for self-radicalisation and foreign fighter mobilisation, among individuals exposed to ISKP content online. By targeting the logistical, financial and digital foundations underpinning ISKP’s operations, Europe can reduce the group’s ability to threaten European security without becoming re-entangled in Afghanistan militarily.
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