In recent weeks, the Syrian government has accused Hezbollah of operating within Syrian territory, including perpetrating targeted attacks on religious figures and planning attacks on Israel from Syria. In this regard, Syrian authorities have claimed that Hezbollah and other Iran-linked cells are aiming to draw the country into the ongoing conflict in the Middle East. Following Bashar al-Assad’s ousting in late 2024, Hezbollah has retained a constrained presence in Syria, which the transitional government perceives as a threat to its objective of securing internal stability. While Hezbollah’s presence in Syria has primarily been reduced to control over individual aligned cells conducting smuggling operations along the Lebanese-Syrian border, the Syrian government seeks to distance itself from Iranian influence to avoid being drawn into the wider regional conflict. Nonetheless, due to operational degradation, Hezbollah may resort to more coercive tactics on Syrian territory, which Damascus seeks to avoid.
Hezbollah’s Presence in post-Assad Syria
In February 2026, Syrian authorities arrested members of a Hezbollah-aligned group responsible for a rocket attack on the Mezzeh military airport near Damascus, Syria. Similarly, in the following months, police apprehended several members of Hezbollah-aligned cells plotting attacks against religious figures and senior government officials. These incidents exemplify the efforts being made by the Syrian government to counter the remaining influence of Hezbollah in Syria. Particularly, such efforts have become more pertinent after Syria’s Interior Ministry reportedly foiled a cross-border rocket attack on Israel from the southern Syrian province of Quneitra, planned by Hezbollah. Consequently, the Syrian government has accused the Lebanon-based group of instigating instability in Syria, particularly given that a stable and reintegrated Syria would run counter to Iran’s strategic objectives amidst the current conflict. Nonetheless, Hezbollah’s power has been significantly degraded after the ousting of Bashar al-Assad in late 2024. This raises the question to which degree Hezbollah remains present in Syria today and whether it could be able to destabilise the country in pursuit of its own objectives.
Under Bashar al-Assad, Hezbollah retained a strong operational presence in Syria. Particularly, the group relied on the al-Assad government, which at that time formed part of the so-called Axis of Resistance between Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, to secure a land corridor from Iran to Syria (through Iraq) to transport arms to Hezbollah in Lebanon. For decades, Hezbollah retained a reliable supply line of weapons. Moreover, Syria under al-Assad historically served as a crucial point for the trade and production of narcotics that funded Hezbollah’s activities. As a consequence, Hezbollah was able to establish a physical presence in Syria, which included partaking in the Syrian civil war on behalf of the al-Assad government. This underscores how Hezbollah, as an organisation ideologically centred on resistance to Israeli occupation, shifted toward pragmatic involvement in a foreign civil war to preserve its military supply lines. Tellingly, Hezbollah fighters were implicated in the commitment of war crimes against civilians on behalf of the then-Syrian government.
The fall of Bashar al-Assad has prompted the interim Syrian government to counter Hezbollah’s influence in Syria. This has included efforts to strengthen cooperation with the Lebanese government on border security and proclaim its backing for Hezbollah’s disarmament. Currently, Hezbollah’s presence in Syria has been reduced to individual aligned cells mainly focused on smuggling weapons through tunnels on the Lebanese-Syrian border. Moreover, the group has been accused by the Syrian government of conducting destabilising operations against senior officials and clerics. Nonetheless, it must be noted that while evidence for Hezbollah’s smuggling operations is strong, allegations of the organisation purposely inciting internal instability in Syria mostly originate from the Syrian government. While this involvement has been denied by Hezbollah, it has provided the Syrian government, wary of being drawn into the regional conflict, with a narrative to distance itself from the once-dominant Iranian influence.
As such, by denying Hezbollah access to Syrian territory, Hezbollah’s arms supply lines have been degraded significantly, forcing it to depend on unreliable smuggling operations. This policy falls in line with the wider security policies of the al-Sharaa government. Particularly, it indicates a broader effort to avoid explicit alignment with its former allies so as to mitigate internal and external threats. Instead, al-Sharaa has opted not to antagonise foreign powers that could induce internal instability through sectarian strife, as exemplified by Israel’s aid to Druze militias in the southern province of Suwayda.
Implications for Syria and Hezbollah
Hezbollah’s reduced, yet remaining, presence in Syria could have significant implications for the country’s internal stability. Since the fall of Bashar al-Assad, Syria has seen a rise in violent sectarian attacks against its Alawite and Druze population. Syria’s interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, has chosen to attempt stabilising the country through the integration of sectarian factions into national institutions, rather than through the sectarian-isation of political institutions, which could entrench divisions rather than overcome them. As such, any threat to this unity, whether it be Israel supporting Druze militias, Russia supporting Alawite militias, or Hezbollah targeting religious leaders, endangers Syria’s societal reconstruction.
For Hezbollah, the Syrian government’s repressive policies have contributed to its degradation from an organised para-statal military organisation with secure supply lines in Syria to one reliant on unpredictable smuggling networks. Such operational setbacks, combined with continued Israeli attacks in Lebanon, constrain the organisation’s military and financial position. This will likely force Hezbollah to continue operating through decentralised proxy cells in Syria. Moreover, the group’s increasingly confined operational agility may force it, and by extension the IRGC, to employ more coercive tactics, such as armed attacks in Syria. This would put Syria in precisely the position al-Sharaa seeks to avoid: an unwilling stage for a conflict it has no strategic interest in fighting.
Recommended Reading
Al-Aloosy, M. (2022) – Hezbollah in Syria: An Insurgent’s Ideology, Interest, and Survival
Ali, M. H. (2025) – Hezbollah and the Captagon Trade
Jadah, M. (2026) – What is Hezbollah (still) doing in Syria?
Mamoun, A. (2026) – Why Does Hezbollah Continue Its “Intervention” in Syria?