Executive Summary
In July 2026 the European Union (EU) banned Sudanese gold imports and cyanide and mercury exports to weaken both factions of the Sudanese civil war. However, the extent of smuggling routes and of non-EU suppliers’ share of the chemical market will weaken the effects of the regulation. An investigation promoted at the EU level with the aim of imposing precise sanctions would achieve more concrete results.
Key Facts and Figures
- On the 13th of July 2026 the Council of the European Union approved a series of trade restrictions on goods fuelling the civil conflict in Sudan, including a ban on importing Sudanese gold and exporting cyanide and mercury to the country.
- Sudan has been caught in a violent civil war since 2023. The conflict counterposes the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), linked to the internationally recognised government, and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
- Gold exports drive the war machine. Both factions are heavily involved in the gold smuggling trade: between 50% and 70% of the country’s gold is smuggled.
Analysis
The Council’s decision stems from a desire to control critical chokepoints in the gold trade, yet current trends suggest that the measure will largely miss its intended target.
The first part of the regulation, which bans gold imports from Sudan, is likely to be easily circumvented due to the extent of the smuggling trade. On the one hand, European banks are now forced to demand detailed transaction-routing disclosures from clients in East Africa and the Gulf, increasing the chances of detecting laundered Sudanese gold. However, the structure of the trade makes it almost impossible to detect origin. Sudanese gold is often smuggled into neighbouring countries and then flown mainly to the United Arab Emirates (UAE). There it is re-melted together with legally-mined gold into new bullion bars, effectively erasing its origin. It reaches Europe through Switzerland, where it is imported as recycled gold, which benefits from lower traceability requirements: processing by an accredited Swiss refinery gives the metal a clean, internationally-recognised certificate of origin. This does not mean that the ban will be useless, because imposing stricter controls makes it more likely to uncover international laundering schemes. But, without formal investigations at the European levels, individual companies will not bear the financial and administrative burden of tracing the origin of the gold they import.
The second part of the regulation, concerning the export of cyanide and mercury, metals used in gold mining, also seems to show little promise. One of the largest suppliers of cyanide is the Czech company Draslovka, which deals mainly with entities affiliated to the Sudanese government. With the exception of this however, the supply line of minerals will remain mostly unaffected, because most imports originate from outside of the EU. China, the United Kingdom (UK) and the UAE are the largest exporters to Sudan, and the Council’s decision will not alter their behaviour.
Policy implications
Alongside this broad sector ban, the EU should pursue an investigation into the transnational networks laundering Sudanese gold. The European Commission, in coordination with the European External Action Service, should carefully map logistic networks and transit hubs operating in African regional corridors and Gulf refineries. These findings can be used to levy targeted sanctions against specific intermediaries and front companies that the ban might not affect, which will hit the financial channels sustaining Sudan’s war economy more seriously. The bans alone are therefore unlikely to make a difference. Unless these networks are dismantled, European markets risk continuing to absorb metal whose origins have been obscured.