Executive Summary
Ukraine is moving to institutionalise its long-strike campaign. On 10th July 2026, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the creation of a dedicated command within the Armed Forces for long-range operations against Russia, instructing it to concentrate available resources on reducing Russia’s ability to sustain the war. The decision follows an expansion of Ukrainian attacks against Russian refineries, logistics hubs, military facilities and other infrastructure far behind the front.
Key Points
- The strategy predates the command. Ukraine has conducted deep strikes against Russian military targets since 2022 and has targeted energy infrastructure since early 2024. The July decision should be understood as an attempt to institutionalise this activity rather than the beginning of a new doctrine.
- Deep strikes are becoming more closely connected to operations at the front. Ukraine has expanded medium-range drone attacks against Russian air defences, logistics and communications 30–180 km behind the front. These attacks can both disrupt Russian battlefield operations and create openings for longer-range systems to penetrate deeper into Russia.
Analysis
Ukraine’s long-range strike capability has partly grown out of necessity. Restrictions and uncertainty surrounding the availability and use of Western-supplied long-range weapons encouraged Kyiv to develop domestic alternatives, particularly one-way attack drones. What began as a comparatively limited capability has since developed into a sustained component of the war. In early July 2026, Ukrainian drones struck the Omsk refinery around 2,700 km from Ukrainian-held territory, demonstrating the geographical reach now available to Kyiv.
The change has not only occurred at extreme range. Ukraine has simultaneously expanded intermediate-range strikes against Russian air defences, logistics, communications and other high-value targets behind the front. The relationship between medium- and long-range strikes is important. Destroying or forcing the relocation of Russian air-defence systems closer to the battlefield can create gaps for drones travelling towards targets deeper inside Russia. Conversely, deep strikes can force Russia to divert air-defence systems away from the front to protect refineries, airfields and other strategic infrastructure.
This does not mean that deep strikes are likely to be decisive on their own. Russia retains substantial strategic depth and a large industrial base, giving it considerable capacity to absorb damage. Individual strikes may also generate impressive images without producing lasting operational effects. The more important measure of success is therefore whether Ukraine can identify bottlenecks, repeatedly strike repaired facilities and connect attacks to wider military objectives.
This is where the new command could matter. A dedicated structure could allow Ukraine to concentrate limited long-range capabilities against priority targets and better connect intelligence, weapons allocation and assessments of strike effects.
Moreover, the immediate aims of this new command structure should be seen in conjunction with Ukraine’s weakening air defences. Deliveries of missile interceptors in 2026 have fallen to around one-third of 2025 levels, while Russia has increased the scale of its missile attacks. The problem is especially acute against ballistic missiles, which Ukraine relies heavily on scarce Patriot interceptors to defeat. On 31 July, Russia launched 27 ballistic missiles at Kyiv, of which Ukraine intercepted only one.
Policy implications
- The growing shortage of interceptors strengthens the case for Western investment in Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities. Competing demand from the Middle East has placed further pressure on already limited Patriot stocks, while expanding production will take time.
- Western support should therefore also help Ukraine attack the Russian strike system at source, including launchers, airfields, storage facilities and missile-production infrastructure. Deep strike cannot replace air defence, but it can complicate Russia’s strike campaign and reduce some of the pressure on Ukraine’s limited interceptor stocks.
Sources
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