Executive Summary
Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign seeks to strengthen the Chinese Communist Party by curbing private interests, enforcing discipline and improving effectiveness. Recent expulsions of senior officials show that even members of the political and military elite are vulnerable to investigation. However, the campaign also creates important risks since harsher penalties may encourage bureaucratic paralysis and make personal loyalty to Xi increasingly central to political survival.
Introduction
In July 2026, China expelled one of its most senior officers, Ma Xingrui, who was one of the Politburo members and was alleged to have engaged in corruption and exchanged political benefits for sexual favors (Chen, 2026). The Politburo is China’s second highest leadership organ and is currently formed by 21 members, following Zhang Youxia and He Weidong expulsions also due to corruption charges (Stevenson, 2026). Other organizations inside the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are also facing similar situations as the Central Military Commission is now reduced to two agents since the start of investigations regarding Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli (Bloomberg, 2026). All these investigations compose an anti-corruption campaign initiated by Xi, resulting in a number of expulsions from the CCP at a rate not observed since Mao Zedong (The Economist, 2026). As the ousters of high rank members serves to enforce greater loyalty, the policy also promotes a similar message to other agents that may behave corruptly.
A broader perspective on Xi’s intention with his anti-corruption campaign suggests that this movement aims to reform the CCP through bigger efforts to enforce political priorities and adequate behaviours. Xi is concerned his party might follow the historical pattern of other authoritarian regimes that were dismantled because of its own inefficacy and internal issues (Thomas and Wang, 2026). If his efforts to eliminate internal complicators succeed, that could be a huge victory for both himself and the party in the sense of its efficacy. However, this strategy may also receive backlash as it increases dependency on Xi himself and provides incentives for bureaucratic paralysis. All this context has significant implications for the elite dynamics inside the CCP.
Discussion
Although it may seem that Xi, as an authoritarian leader, only seeks to preserve his status and secure his own private benefits derived from his position, he actually shows himself as genuinely concerned about the long-term survival of the CCP beyond his command (Thomas and Wang, 2026). After achieving his position in 2012, the Chinese leader rapidly imposed restrictions on government officials’ extravagant expenses and strengthened disciplinary organs. Furthermore, the corruption inside the Chinese military institutions may have undermined Xi’s ambition of transforming the People’s Liberation Army into a “world-class” military by 2050, in a manner such that the US embassy in Beijing described the Chinese President as “personally disgusted by the self-dealing and money worship he had witnessed among his CCP colleagues” (Bloomberg, 2026). Xi thus believes that internal reform is necessary to prevent officials’ private interests and privileged groups opposed to change from undermining the Party’s continuity (Thomas and Wang, 2026).
Through disciplinary pushes, Xi might be able to promote more efficient governance and standard action patterns inside his party. Even though authoritarian regimes are likely to suffer from difficulties to remain effective as they lack instruments to guarantee rule of law inside its institutions, the internal reform strategy is designed to compensate for this externality by imposing self-correction mechanisms that creates sufficient accountability and legitimacy to maintain the regime’s rule (Thomas and Wang, 2026). As Xi demonstrates less tolerance for misconduct and shows that even high-ranking officials can be targeted by these investigations, he tightens his control over CCP members. Stronger discipline tools over the bureaucracy thereby increases the costs of undesired behaviours and enforce compliance over the defined party’s agenda.
Yet, this line of anti-corruption campaigns also offers perverse incentives that may undermine Xi’s original goal. The greater importance of direct loyalty to Xi, because of the demonstrations that the party leader is willing to lash out those he dislikes, increases the centrality of Xi to the party functioning (The Economist, 2026). This environment of greater pressure and harder penalties over bureaucrats discourage innovation and increase risk avoidance. This undermines problem solving capacity and disfavours quick strategic actions under emergency situations (Thomas and Wang, 2026).
As Xi continues to break norms further adopted by his predecessors, the intra-elite dynamics inside the CCP thus becomes more unpredictable. The broad scope of the measures and the different character of the officials expelled send a signal that Xi is examining more closely his peers’ behaviour and loyalty (Chen, 2026). With this, further purges are likely, since Xi views his internal reform plan as something that should be continuous and the purges as part of this institutional design. Ahead of the probable fourth term after next year’s 21st Party Congress, Xi is likely looking to form a new cohort of lieutenants (Thomas and Wang, 2026). These new members will likely show themselves even more directly loyal to him, sidelining the effort to form networks of interest with other senior figures (Deng, 2026).
Conclusion
Xi’s anti-corruption push is part of an internal institutional reform project but also may generate vulnerabilities for the CCP. The purges seek to improve discipline, curb private interests and preserve the party’s long-term capacity to govern. If it works, the campaign has the potential to sharply increase the CCP’s efficiency and resilience. Their continuity, however, depends on a leader that prioritizes the survival of the CCP beyond his own tenure. By making personal loyalty increasingly important for political advancement and survival, Xi has strengthened his image at the center of relations among party elites. While this reinforces control in the short term, it also weakens the institutional basis of the reform process. The more the CCP depends on Xi to discipline officials, define acceptable behaviour and maintain elite cohesion, the harder it becomes for a future successor to exercise authority with comparable legitimacy.
References
Bloomberg (2026). Why Xi Jinping Has Purged His Top Military Leaders. 29 January. Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-01-29/china-military-purge-why-xi-jinping-is-targeting-his-top-generals
Chen, A. (2026). ‘Even Politburo members can be touched’: what the latest purge says about Xi Jinping’s China. The Guardian, 17 July. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jul/17/even-politburo-members-can-be-touched-what-the-latest-purge-says-about-xi-jinpings-china
Deng Yuwen (2026). Why Xi Is Kneecapping His Own Top Men. Foreign Policy, 15 April . Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/04/15/ma-xingrui-xi-china-purges-xinjiang/
Stevenson, A. (2026). China Purges Top Officials Over Corruption and Sex Charges. The New York Times, 14 July. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/14/world/asia/china-expels-politburo-official-sex-corruption.html
The Economist (2026). Xi Jinping expels another leader from his top team. 15 July. Available at: https://www.economist.com/china/2026/07/15/xi-jinping-expels-another-leader-from-his-top-team
Thomas, N. and Wang, S. (2026). Xi’s Forever Purge. Foreign Affairs, 4 May. Available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/xis-forever-purge