Introduction
In August 2026, Irish Senator Michael McDowell described Ireland as ‘hopelessly undefended’. The Senator questioned, among other things, Ireland’s offensive drone capacity and the vulnerability of vital undersea cable infrastructure, contributing to an analysis in which Ireland’s traditional stance on neutrality has become a security vulnerability on Europe’s western edge (McDowell, 2026). His criticism comes at a time when Ireland’s European neighbours, such as France, are raising defence spending (European Parliament Members’ Research Service, 2026) and increasingly engaging in militaristic posturing (La France au Royaume-Uni, 2026).
These developments raise questions about whether the Irish Military Intelligence Service (IMIS) can close the gaps which McDowell identifies, and whether Ireland can afford its historic neutrality as the European security environment becomes increasingly militarised.
Theoretical Framework
The first theoretical concept which structures this analysis is that of ‘shelter theory’. This theory proposes that small states seek political, economic, and societal shelter from larger states and international organisations in order to mitigate their vulnerabilities (Bailes, et al., 2016). Shelter may be acquired through membership in an alliance or multilateral agreement, or acquired through bilateral arrangement or security guarantees (Thorhallsson & Steinsson, 2018, p. 30, 209). Wherever drawn from, shelter is purchased by yielding sovereignty and incurring costs not borne by the larger states (Bailes, et al., 2016, p. 2). The distinction between where shelter is derived is of importance as, if derived from bilateral agreements or international norms, the shelter gained may not be as comprehensive as if derived from alliance membership or multilateral arrangement (Thorhallsson & Steinsson, 2018, p. 198), a vulnerability discussed later in this article.
The second concerns the contested meaning of ‘neutrality’. Irish neutrality is neither constitutionally enshrined nor codified as Austrian or Swiss neutrality is. In practical terms, neutrality is therefore defined in whichever terms the government of the day decides (Leahy, 2026). Following a poststructuralist analysis, such as that conducted by Karen Devine, the public conception of ‘neutrality’ in Ireland is an active one, defined by the promotion of peace, non-aggression, independent foreign policy decision-making, and the primacy of the United Nations (UN) (Devine, 2008a, p. 19; 2008b, p. 13). The ‘triple lock’ of requiring UN approval before Irish troops can be deployed on a peacekeeping mission alongside Government approval and a vote in the Dáil (McDonagh, 2025), therefore, is constitutive rather than procedural; UN primacy is central to the understanding of the Irish polity of what neutrality is.
Ireland’s Historic Neutrality
Following the Irish civil war and the establishment of an independent Irish republic across 26 of the 32 counties of Ireland, engaging in a foreign war was not on the agenda of Éamon de Valera. Yet, when viewed through shelter theory, Irish neutrality during World War II was already taking a form of shelter through Ireland’s aid of the Allied forces. The Irish state permitted Allied planes to pass through the ‘Donegal Corridor’, interned German aircrews while returning those of the Allies, and supplied the Blacksod weather data which postponed the D-Day landings (Kinsella, 2023). Although formally neutral, Ireland extended the cooperation that made Allied protection of its western flank possible, benefitting future relations with the larger Allied powers. This pattern of declared non-alignment with undeclared cooperation continued through the 20th and 21st centuries, with the Irish military serving more often as a UN Peacekeeping force than a traditional one.
This neutrality remains largely supported by the Irish electorate. A February 2026 Irish Times/Ipsos B&A poll found 71% of respondents in favour of inserting a guarantee of neutrality into the Constitution (Leahy, 2026). The same poll, however, found 85% agreeing that the State should take more responsibility for its own defence; the Irish polity does not treat neutrality and capability as mutually exclusive.
The Security Value of Military Intelligence
Preserving Irish neutrality while addressing this defence deficit is a difficult tightrope for Dublin to balance. From the actions of the Irish state, it appears that intelligence has become the preferred method. IMIS, previously known as the Directorate of Military Intelligence or J2, has grown significantly in recent years, and has sought to expand its powers (Irish Legal News, 2025). IMIS now occupies a purpose-built headquarters, maintains a formalised training school, and has conducted training with US military forces (Gallagher, 2025).
Intelligence is particularly attractive for Ireland as it remains relatively cheap compared to traditional military buildup and politically uncontroversial as it does not violate neutrality. Should Ireland announce an intention to raise the number of offensive drones in stockpile, for example, it implicitly announces a change in posture; hiring additional analysts does not. As Ireland’s defence spending is roughly 0.3% of GNI, the lowest in the EU (O’Keeffe, 2026), information gathering is the easiest capability Dublin can build at scale without first confronting a hostile electorate.
Shelter theory clarifies what the capability purchases. The 2026 Cork Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) commits Ireland and the United Kingdom to information sharing regarding airspace and a coordinated response mechanism for undersea cable protection (UK Ministry of Defence, 2026). These arrangements are reciprocal; by sharing IMIS’s intelligence with partner countries, such as the UK, Ireland obtains surveillance coverage its own limited fleet cannot complete on its own. Intelligence, therefore, is acting as the currency with which Ireland can buy shelter as a small state.
Intelligence is Not a Substitute for Defence
The limits to the argument for intelligence-based defence, however, are severe. During Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit to Ireland in December 2025, unidentified drones were detected seventeen kilometres offshore, and Portuguese personnel had to provide counter-drone protection as Ireland could not (Security Ireland, 2026a). The inability to protect in this scenario did not stem from Ireland’s intelligence capacity, but rather in its capacity to act upon this intelligence to produce material security.
This speaks to the structural weakness of an intelligence-led defence strategy. A warning without the capacity to act strips intelligence of its utility, leaving it as a record of the events that Ireland could not respond to. Ireland possesses no interceptor aircraft, no surface-to-air capability, and a Naval Service operating only four of its eight vessels, none armed for combat (Security Ireland, 2026b). A perfect assessment that an undersea cable is about to be cut does not create the capacity to prevent it, and it is for this reason that Ireland is receiving the criticism of being ‘hopelessly undefended’.
Discussion
Two responses have dominated discussions on improving Ireland’s security, the Defence (Amendment) Bill 2026 and NATO accession.
The Defence (Amendment) Bill 2026 would remove the requirement for a UN Security Council mandate for deploying more than 12 personnel overseas (Tithe an Oireachtais, 2026). Many members of the parties in government, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, present the triple lock as allowing Moscow and Beijing a veto over Irish peacekeeping, citing the withdrawal from Operation IRINI after its mandate lapsed (Lenihan, 2026). Those in opposition, however, read the bill as a betrayal of Irish neutrality without a referendum (Sinn Féin, 2026). The electorate is divided, with 45% expressing a wish to retain the triple lock, 35% wishing to abolish it, and 21% undecided (Leahy, 2026). The passing of this bill would provide increased flexibility in Irish response to security threats; however, this is at the risk of violating the active neutrality of Devine by removing UN primacy, effectively breaking neutrality without a referendum.
NATO accession holds the possibility of converting the bilateral shelter-seeking Ireland currently maintains into a more stable form of multilateral shelter and supplying, through Article 5, the deterrence Ireland has been unwilling to purchase. Finland and Sweden concluded that non-alignment had become a liability rather than a shield, joining NATO in 2023 and 2024 respectively, and Ireland’s vulnerabilities are comparable; it holds an Exclusive Economic Zone carrying cables it cannot effectively protect, and its capital requires defence to be provided by Paris and London for high-profile events related to the 2026 EU Presidency (Coffey, 2026). The case against accession, however, is equally logical. Accession requires a referendum in a polity where NATO membership polled at 19% in support and 49% in opposition as of September 2025 (Drury & Moyer, 2025), and would surrender the credibility foundational to Ireland’s peacekeeping record and its authority in disarmament diplomacy. It would further commit Ireland to obligations it lacks the material capacity to honour, inviting the free-rider criticism.
Neither response addresses the material deficit in Ireland’s defence capacity. With a Permanent Defence Force of 7,756 against an establishment of 9,739 at the end of 2025 (Security Ireland, 2026b), no change to deployment procedure or alliance status will generate military hardware. Ireland’s focus should be procurement. The recent acquisition order from the Department of Defence with France’s Direction Générale de l’Armement for five Thales long-range radar systems is a necessary step. However, with full capability projected for the end of 2028 (RTÉ, 2026), six years after the Commission on the Defence Forces called ‘primary radar capability’ an immediate priority (Comisiún um Óglaigh na hÉireann, 2022, p. 39), the extent of the problem is palpable.
Conclusion
The assessment of whether Ireland is ‘hopelessly undefended’ has raised questions on Ireland’s position in Europe and on the sustainability of neutrality as a position. This, however, should not be the core focus. Ireland is under defended, and neutrality cannot be treated as a substitute for capability instead of an alternative route towards it. The advancement of IMIS has aided the Irish security position, but intelligence describes threats it cannot defeat, and will continue to do so while Ireland has no interceptors, no air defence, and a fleet it cannot fully crew.
Shelter theory holds that small states yield sovereignty for protection. Ireland has yielded it through bilateral agreements to the United Kingdom and partners in Europe, while still asserting its independence. Whether Ireland joins NATO, deepens its European arrangements, or rearms independently, each path requires expenditure the electorate has endorsed in principle but never been asked to fund (Leahy, 2026). Whichever path is chosen, the security of Ireland cannot retain its current combination of neutrality, bilateral cooperation, and limited national capabilities. A decision must be made, actionable neutrality or increased multilateral sheltering.
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