Executive summary
The Kingdom of Jordan has long been one of the United States’ closest security partners in the Middle East, with its military facilities previously used mainly for training, counterterrorism and operations in neighbouring countries. However, the war with Iran has changed the role of Jordan’s military infrastructure. The Kingdom has become an increasingly important logistics and air defence hub for US operations, while American facilities inside Jordan have become repeated targets of Iranian missile and drone attacks. Jordan’s longstanding partnership with Washington is therefore becoming both more strategically important and more dangerous for the kingdom.
Background & Analysis
For much of the past two decades, Jordan’s military priorities centred on instability along its borders. The wars in Iraq and Syria produced jihadist infiltration, weapons trafficking and large-scale drug smuggling from southern Syria. Jordan joined the US-led campaign against Islamic State in September 2014 and strengthened its border defences over the following years. By 2023, it was also reportedly conducting airstrikes against suspected drug-smuggling networks inside Syria. By 2023-2024, Jordanian and Western officials linked some of these networks to Iranian-supported militias.
Jordan has responded to these security threats by working closely with international partners, particularly the United States. It became a US Major Non-NATO Ally in 1996, and cooperation became more visible during operations against Islamic State after 2014. A 2021 agreement formalised American access to Jordanian facilities for training, transit, logistical support and force deployments. As of December 2024, nearly 4,000 US troops were deployed in the kingdom.
This relationship had previously enabled Jordan to support operations elsewhere without facing enduring attacks from another state. Signs of change have appeared before 2026. In October 2023, Jordan requested US Patriot systems, identifying ballistic missiles and drones as major threats. In January 2024, an Iran-backed militia killed three US service members at Tower 22, an American military outpost in northeastern Jordan. Three months later, Jordanian aircraft intercepted Iranian drones crossing its airspace during an attack involving more than 300 missiles and drones directed at Israel.
These events demonstrated two sources of exposure. Jordan’s geography places it under possible flight paths between Iran and Israel, even when it is not the intended target. Hosting American forces creates a separate danger by making facilities inside Jordan targets for groups seeking a possible way to attack or deter the United States.
The war that began with US and Israeli strikes on Iran on 28 February 2026 turned both dangers into an enduring defence problem for Jordan. As of 21 March, the Jordanian military reported that 240 missiles and drones had been launched towards Jordan, of which 222 were intercepted. These official figures cannot be independently verified, and the intended target of every projectile still remains uncertain.
Subsequent attacks nevertheless show that US facilities were deliberately targeted. In July 2026, an Iranian attack on a base in Jordan killed two American service members, with a third initially reported missing. On 30 August, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said it launched ballistic missiles and drones at the King Hussein and Al Azraq air bases in Jordan in response to a U.S. strike on Iranian rocket launchers on Larak Island.
Jordan’s military role has consequently changed in degree and function. Muwaffaq Salti Air Base has become an important logistics hub for the American campaign against Iran, while US personnel and equipment have been moved from Iraq to Jordan. The country has also become a key location for early warning and interception. According to ABC News citing an Associated Press report, American air defences destroyed many of Iran’s airborne weapons targeting facilities in Jordan.
Hosting US defence infrastructure comes with limitations for Jordan. Ballistic-missile defence depends on radar, integrated command systems and a reliable supply of interceptors. The protection these US-supported systems provide therefore relies on continued American support. The Iran and Ukraine wars have strained American interceptor stocks, which could constrain Washington’s ability to sustain that protection.
This creates a trade-off. Restricting the American presence might reduce Jordan’s prominence as a target for Iran, but it could weaken the military and air-defence support on which the kingdom relies. Furthermore, such a move would not remove the danger from weapons crossing Jordanian airspace towards Israel. Closer cooperation with the United States could strengthen Jordan’s protection, while an expanded role in hosting US forces could increase its exposure to Iranian attacks.
Recommended readings:
Rumbaugh, W. (2025, December 5). The depleting missile defense interceptor inventory. Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/depleting-missile-defense-interceptor-inventory
Sharp, J. M. (2026, January 8). Jordan: Background and U.S. relations (CRS Report No. RL33546). Congressional Research Service. https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL33546.html
U.S. Department of State. (2021b, January 20). U.S. security cooperation with Jordan. https://2021-2025.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-jordan/