Executive Summary
Denmark’s new conscription system began on 3 August 2026, when around 1,600 young people started 11 months of military service. The intake is the first under a system that subjects women and men to the same conscription rules, with women accounting for around 20% of the cohort. All 1,600 recruits volunteered, meaning that the lottery has not yet been needed to fill the 2026 intake (Danish Defence, 2026a). The reform was agreed in 2024 as Denmark accelerated its defence build-up. It extends service from 4 to 11 months, increases the number of conscripts and gives them operational duties after basic training (Ministry of Defence, 2024a; Danish Defence, 2026a). The timing reflects a changed security environment. Denmark faces a growing Russian military threat, hybrid activity and increasing strategic competition in the Arctic, while Danish defence planning must also account for uncertainty over future US support for Europe (DDIS, 2025). The inclusion of women in the expanded recruitment pool has raised questions, but the case for it is strong. The harder question is whether increasing the overall number of personnel is the most effective way to spend additional defence resources when modern warfare also depends heavily on drones, surveillance, cyber capabilities and other technologies.
Introduction
On 3 August 2026, around 1,600 young people began Denmark’s new 11-month military service at 14 locations across the country. The intake includes the Army, Navy, Air Force and Special Operations Command. Around 20% of conscripts are women, and all who began service volunteered (Danish Defence, 2026a). A parliamentary majority passed the reform on 30 April 2026, approving 11-month service, full gender equality in conscription and an increase in the number of conscripts as part of the 2024–2033 Defence Agreement (Ministry of Defence, 2024a). The security environment has changed considerably since the four-month model was introduced in 2006. The Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS, 2025) states that Russia is rebuilding its military capabilities and preparing for the possibility of war with NATO. Its assessment identifies a potential weakening of NATO cohesion, including uncertainty over whether the United States would support European allies, as one condition that would increase the risk of a conventional Russian attack (DDIS, 2025). The reform can therefore be understood as an attempt to increase Denmark’s capacity for territorial defence and mobilisation. The pressing issue is whether additional personnel are the best use of that spending, or whether the same resources would generate more capability elsewhere.
What changed?
For most Danish conscripts, military service has increased from four to 11 months. The first three to five months are devoted to basic military training, followed by operational service and further training. Some specialist services have 12-month arrangements (Danish Defence, 2026a; Danish Defence, 2026b). Because service is now longer, conscripts can take on more than basic duties. After basic training, they can perform guard and readiness duties, patrols, operate drones, support naval combat information and assist with radar operations. The Danish Armed Forces explicitly state that these roles can release professional soldiers for tasks requiring greater specialisation (Danish Defence, 2026a). The reform is also designed to increase the number of personnel. The Defence Agreement provides for up to 7,500 conscripts annually across the Danish Defence and the Danish Emergency Management Agency, including at least 6,500 in the Defence over the period of the agreement (Ministry of Defence, 2024a).
Women were included in the same conscription system in 2025. Women turning 18 after 1 July 2025 have been required to attend the assessment process and enter the same lottery as men. Compulsory service is only used if voluntary recruitment does not fill the available places (Ministry of Defence, 2025). This matters for more than equality. Expanding the recruitment pool gives the Armed Forces access to skills that a male-only system lacks. Women already performed military and intelligence functions, and research on women in intelligence identifies their contributions to areas including intelligence gathering, analysis and counter-terrorism (Drumhiller, 2025; Veronika, 2024).
Does Denmark need more people or more technology?
The strongest case for reform is not that modern warfare has become a numbers game, but that Denmark needs more people to operate a larger, more technologically sophisticated force. The DDIS (2025) assesses that Russia is conducting hybrid warfare against NATO, including sabotage and cyber activity, and expects the hybrid threat to Denmark to increase. Denmark is simultaneously investing in new capabilities. Its Defence Agreement includes long-endurance drones for surveillance and sovereignty missions in the Arctic and North Atlantic (Ministry of Defence, 2024b). This creates a different rationale for conscription from simply putting more soldiers on a battlefield. Conscripts can perform surveillance, drone operations, guarding and other support tasks, while professional personnel concentrate on roles requiring more extensive training (Danish Defence, 2026a). Britain illustrates why personnel numbers alone are an inadequate measure of military capability. The British Army had around 70,860 trade-trained personnel in April 2025 and 70,760 in April 2026 (Ministry of Defence, 2026). In a parliamentary debate, Labour MP Derek Twigg described the Army as being at its smallest size since the Napoleonic period, although this comparison depends on the personnel measure used (House of Commons, 2025). Personnel numbers alone do not capture military capability: the Army’s Ajax armoured vehicle programme only reached initial operating capability in November 2025, eight years behind its original schedule, and trials were paused again in January 2026 after further safety issues (House of Commons Library, 2026). The British experience also shows why personnel numbers cannot simply be dismissed. Former senior British commanders have argued that sustained high-intensity warfare requires sufficient personnel alongside advanced weapons (Bucknall, 2021). Technology can increase the effectiveness of individual soldiers, but it does not eliminate the need for people to operate, maintain and replace those systems (ITV News, 2025).
Denmark must thus find a balance between soldiers and technology. A larger conscript force is useful if it frees professional personnel for specialised tasks or expands the number of trained people available for mobilisation. It is less useful if additional personnel consume resources that would otherwise generate greater capability in air defence, surveillance, drones, ammunition or specialist personnel. The Arctic makes this calculation particularly important. The first 2026 cohort is scheduled to undertake training in Greenland, while the new system allows conscripts to perform operational duties in Greenland and elsewhere in the Kingdom after their initial training (Danish Defence, 2026a). Denmark, therefore, needs personnel for territorial presence, as well as the surveillance and technological capabilities required to monitor a vast, sparsely populated region.
Policy Recommendations: What should Denmark measure?
Gender integration should not be treated as an experiment whose success depends on proving that women are as useful as men. The relevant test is whether the expanded system produces more military capability. Denmark should therefore evaluate the reform against several measures that capture both the personnel and technological sides of its defence strategy.
First, retention. The proportion of conscripts who continue into professional service or the reserve will show whether the 11-month period is creating a sustainable personnel pipeline. This matters because the value of conscription extends beyond the initial period of service: a larger trained reserve gives Denmark a greater pool that can be mobilised if the security situation deteriorates. High numbers of recruits followed by low retention would make the expansion less valuable over the longer term.
Second, readiness. The number of people completing service matters less than the number capable of performing defined operational tasks to the required standard. Denmark should therefore assess how many conscripts can be deployed for territorial defence, surveillance, logistics, maritime security, and other assigned functions upon completion of their training. This would also show whether the additional seven months of service produce substantially more usable capability than the previous four-month model.
Third, capability per krone. Denmark should compare the resources devoted to training and maintaining additional conscripts with alternative investments in drones, air defence, surveillance, cyber capabilities, ammunition and specialist personnel. The question is not whether technology can replace people. Many of these systems require people to operate and maintain them. The question is where an additional krone produces the greatest increase in usable capability.
Fourth, gender integration should be measured through retention and progression, not simply recruitment. Women already represent a larger share of Denmark’s first 2026 conscription cohort than their share of full-time armed forces personnel across the EU, where women accounted for 13% in 2024 (EIGE, 2026). Denmark should monitor whether women remain in the Armed Forces after conscription and whether they progress into specialist and leadership roles. This would show whether widening the recruitment pool is also widening the pool of experienced military personnel.
Finally, Denmark should assess whether conscription is producing capabilities that match the threats identified by the DDIS. A force designed primarily around numbers would be ill-suited to a security environment that also includes cyberattacks, sabotage, surveillance challenges, and competition in the Arctic. The success of the reform should therefore be judged by the combination of personnel, technology and readiness it generates, rather than by the size of the annual intake alone.
This would also give other European states something concrete to learn from Denmark. The useful question for governments considering similar reforms is not simply whether conscription produces more soldiers, but which additional capabilities those soldiers provide and what they cost compared with alternative ways of strengthening defence.
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