Executive summary
On August 28 of this year, China’s National People’s Congress Standing Committee adopted a revised National Defense Mobilization Law, which entered into force on October 1 2026. Adopted in 2010, the law sets out how the state can organise personnel, industry, transport, technology, and other civilian resources for national defence. The revised law adds provisions on mobilisation data, advanced technology and the development of mobilisation forces in emerging fields.
The revision does not give Beijing a power it previously lacked. The 2010 law already allows local governments to requisition civilian resources after mobilisation has been ordered. It requires designated organisations to prepare for military production and repair, while also allowing citizens and organisations to be assigned national-defence duties. Beijing says the revision will update the law to reflect changes already made to the institutions responsible for mobilisation and make the system more standardised, data-driven and efficient.
Background & Context
China’s mobilisation system grew out of Mao’s “people’s war,” which expected society as a whole to support the armed forces. Its purpose later changed. By the mid-to-late 2000s, the system instead focused heavily on economic development and domestic emergencies. These activities built some useful capabilities, but much of it had limited value in a large war.
Beijing thus began reversing this trend in 2015, moving routine planning towards civilian economic authorities, especially the National Development and Reform Commission. The Communist Party leadership called for further reform in 2019. In 2021, the NPC Standing Committee temporarily adjusted four defence laws while responsibilities were reorganised. Local National Defence Mobilisation Offices then appeared across China in late 2022 and early 2023.
The revised law puts parts of this transformation on a legal footing. Articles 5 and 6 create a target-responsibility system and a mechanism for testing mobilisation capacity, while Article 7 provides for data support. Later provisions require mobilisation surveys to be updated and government bodies to supply accurate, complete and timely information. The final law also explicitly provides for the collection and use of data related to mobilisation while requiring that data security be protected.
The aim is to give authorities a clearer picture of which resources are available and ready for military use. A 2024 US–China Economic and Security Review Commission report found longstanding problems with unclear responsibilities, unreliable data and poorly integrated information systems.
The scope of mobilisation is also being updated. The revised law names cybersecurity organisations alongside transport, telecommunications, energy and manufacturing bodies that must prepare specialist support teams. Article 8 also calls for the application of advanced technology and to develop forces in “emerging fields,” extending the system further beyond its traditional base in heavy industry and transport. Software, data and civilian technical expertise are becoming part of mobilisation planning.
The revision is not evidence that China has decided to go to war. It aims to make sure China’s existing mobilisation powers work more effectively in practice. Beijing already had the power to call on civilian society. It now wants to clarify what can be mobilised, how quickly and for how long. As the war in Ukraine has shown, military strength in a prolonged conflict depends not only on the weapons available at the outset but also on the ability to replace losses and keep forces supplied over time.
Recommended Readings
Hoffman, S. (2026, June 12). New mobilization law to deepen security obligations. Jamestown Foundation. https://jamestown.org/new-mobilization-law-to-deepen-security-obligations/
Richter, E., & Wang, H. (2025, May 15). China’s transition to a war-oriented national defense mobilization system. National Bureau of Asian Research. https://www.nbr.org/publication/chinas-transition-to-a-war-oriented-national-defense-mobilization-system/
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. (2024). China’s new measures for control, mobilization, and resilience. In 2024 report to Congress (Chapter 7). https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2024-11/Chapter_7–Chinas_New_Measures_for_Control_Mobilization_and_Resilience.pdf