Recent developments under the new Trump administration have unsettled the transatlantic community, but they should be seen as a continuation of a US Grand Strategic shift that began under Obama: the pivot to Asia. Although the Trump administration lacks a coherent global strategy, its inconsistency will likely lead it to continue this shift, as in the first term. A key indicator of this shift was the administration’s early decision to impose sanctions on China, though whether this was driven by economic or geostrategic considerations remains debated.
The pivot to Asia has merit, given signs that the US and China are entering a second Cold War. However, misconceptions have shaped the current situation, particularly Trump’s attempt to end the war in Ukraine quickly to reallocate resources from Europe. The original Cold War required maintaining strong conventional and nuclear forces, but real competition occurred in the Global South and East Asia, where communist powers like the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba exerted global influence.
It is crucial to distinguish between great power competition and great power conflict—often described colloquially as “Cold War 2” and “World War 3.” A great power conflict would largely be an Asia-Pacific issue, whereas great power competition will likely unfold across Eurasia as well as potential key flashpoints along its Pacific flank such as in Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, and the South China Sea.
Daniel S. Markey, in China’s Western Horizon, highlights that China historically viewed threats as originating from Eurasia—until Western maritime powers arrived during the Opium Wars, shattering China’s self-perception and beginning the “Century of Humiliation.” China now seeks to overcome this by asserting itself globally. While expanding its navy, its primary goal is to deter US gunboat diplomacy, a concern highlighted by the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. China’s external infrastructure projects and dual-use ports, such as those in Djibouti and Pakistan, appear focused on securing energy supply routes and countering potential US or Indian control over the Strait of Malacca, rather than direct power projection.
It is easy to impose Western assumptions onto China. Sea power has been vital to the US and Britain, both maritime nations, but China, as a continental power, sees naval expansion as secondary to regional dominance. While it must counter US influence, its main priority remains securing influence within the first and second island chains rather than global maritime supremacy.
The fall of the Soviet Union created opportunities to develop infrastructure projects that facilitate the shipment of large volumes of goods across Central and South Asia, linking markets in Europe, mineral resources in Africa, and oil fields in the Middle East to sustain Chinese economic growth. Russia and Iran are also active in this sphere, and while they cannot be classified as allies, strong partnerships are emerging. While Iran and North Korea have provided visible support to Russia in Ukraine, Russia’s pivot towards the Chinese market for oil and natural gas, along with its reliance on dual-use technologies from China, has been crucial in mitigating the impact of Western sanctions. Furthermore, persistent allegations suggest that China has been supplying lethal aid to Russia’s war effort.
Beyond Ukraine, Russia has long maintained military and paramilitary influence in the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, and Africa, supporting autocratic regimes. This presence enables China to engage with these regimes diplomatically, economically, and through the provision of technology and training in regime stability—an aspect often overlooked in the West, as it falls under the remit of China’s People’s Armed Police rather than its military or intelligence agencies. While groups such as the remnants of the Wagner Group and Iran’s IRGC Quds Force are the most visible kinetic actors in these regions, it is important to recognise how these forces help sustain authoritarian regimes, thereby creating further opportunities for Chinese engagement.
Recent diplomatic efforts have been framed in some quarters as an attempt to distance Russia from China, but this is, frankly, a non-starter. Scholars like John Mearsheimer have drawn comparisons to Nixon and Kissinger’s Cold War-era rapprochement with China, which capitalised on the Sino-Soviet split. However, no such rupture has occurred between Russia and China today—if anything, their ties are deepening. The key to understanding this alignment lies in a concept that Ghoncheh Tazmini explores in Power Couple: Russian-Iranian Alignment in the Middle East—ontological security. This perspective holds that the global governance system, which promotes universal liberal values, serves as a primary tool of Western power projection. As Valery Gerasimov outlines in The Value of Science is in the Foresight, this is primarily achieved through Western civil society organisations, which can rapidly escalate through humanitarian interventions to military, intelligence, or special forces operations.
One of the key drivers of China’s current strategy is its response to Western pressure following the Tiananmen Square massacre. China recognises the threat posed by civil society activism and sees it as a potential tool for Western-backed regime change. While the Trump administration has undermined some of these mechanisms, such as USAID, Russia is unlikely to view the US as a reliable partner. Instead, Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran will see the West’s shifting priorities as confirmation of their assumptions, reinforcing their strategic alignment.
Given these dynamics, it is crucial for the US to continue shifting conventional military power towards the Pacific. However, this must be accompanied by efforts to ensure that regional allies in the Middle East and Europe provide deterrence against Russia and Iran while also contributing to the containment of Chinese influence across Eurasia. Military-industrial, economic, and diplomatic support as well as irregular warfare strategies can be leveraged to strengthen these alliances. While Europe has recently taken a more proactive role, it remains essential that the US manages this relationship carefully. A complete severance of ties could push Europe back towards viewing China primarily as a business partner. Though the transition of responsibility has been slow, the invasion of Ukraine has prompted Europe and NATO to reassess China as a strategic challenge. Capitalising on this shift will be vital if the US is serious about competing with China across the Eurasian landmass.