Bangladesh has been deepening its political ties with China following the ousting of its former prime minister last year, shifting the geopolitical dynamic of South Asia.
Bangladesh’s previous prime minister, Sheikh Hasina, had been in office for the last 15 years until last August following calls for her resignation after a violent government crackdown on protests during the Student-People’s Uprising. After Hasina resigned and fled to India, an interim government was established under Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus, the current head of Bangladesh’s government.
In a shift from Hasina’s close friendship and collaboration with neighboring ally India, the Yunus administration has recently made significant agreements with China over water management, infrastructure and trade.
These new agreements not only signal the evolving interests and foreign policy aims of Bangladesh, but also the growing competition between India and China for dominance in the Indian Ocean region (IOR) and greater South Asia.
Which Issues are Bangladesh and China Cooperating On?
Interim Leader Yunus visited China from the 26th-29th of March, during which time the Bangladesh and Chinese leaders reached a number of significant policy agreements.
New infrastructure development projects, as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), have been confirmed and planned for Bangladesh.
It was also announced that the two countries would collaborate for further investment in Bangladesh and plan to begin negotiations on a China-Bangladesh Free Trade Agreement. By the end of Yunus’s visit, Bangladesh received $2.1 billion in Chinese investment and loans.
Notably, there were important agreements reached on water management, as Bangladesh is one of the most vulnerable countries in the world to the impacts of climate change and has already experienced environmental destruction to its river flows. As part of an effort to regulate the disruption to the country’s rivers, Bangladesh announced that China would be participating in the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project (TRCMRP), which aims to manage the river’s water system.
Just last year Prime Minister Hasina voiced her preference for India to undertake the project. However, Yunus’s most recent meeting confirms the participation of Chinese companies, and leaves it to be seen whether India will still be involved.
Has Bangladesh’s Relationship with India been Fractured?
A noticeable rift has emerged between the normally friendly neighbors following the ousting of Sheikh Hasina. India has significantly reduced visa issuances for Bangladeshi citizens, and Bangladesh has voiced its anger at India’s refusal to extradite Hasina where she is currently in self-imposed exile.
However, there have been no indications from the interim government that they intend to abandon the cooperation they still have with India, as it remains one of the largest sources of imports to Bangladesh and is a long-time security partner.
Additionally, Bangladesh’s friendly and cooperative relations with China are nothing new– they have existed since the late 1970s with China contributing significant military and economic assistance over the years.
Why this recent relational shift between Bangladesh, China and India matters is that it is part of a growing trend of China expanding its reach across South Asia, competing for influence over India’s strategic neighborhood and the IOR.
What Does this Mean for South Asia’s Geopolitical Environment?
While Bangladesh’s increased cooperation with China is likely attributed to opportunities for economic growth and environmental management, it also signals a shift away from its previous reliance on India.
Consequently, this also means changes to South Asia’s geopolitical environment, including shifts in defense alliances, Indo-Pacific security strategy and the growing importance of environmental policy.
Bangladesh’s closeness with China has become a security concern for India, as China is a close security partner with Pakistan, India’s primary state enemy. Analysts have identified that Bangladesh’s recent rapprochement with Pakistan, a stark departure from past hostility between the two countries, is likely due to the close relationship between Pakistan and China, now an increasingly important partner for Bangladesh.
This relational shift also signals the possibility of China growing its maritime dominance in the IOR. Known as the ‘String of Pearls’ theory, scholars and analysts have proposed that China is strategically establishing commercial bases among key maritime countries throughout the IOR, such as Bangladesh, to dominate the Indo-Pacific.
While China denies its maritime strategy has any hostile intentions, India’s perception of these actions as a national security threat aiming to ‘encircle’ India serves to increase tensions between the two as China grows closer with Bangladesh.
Water sharing has also become a significant factor in the geopolitical environment as Bangladesh heavily relies on cooperation with India to manage their 54 shared rivers, yet have only a handful of sharing agreements for them. As climate change continues to threaten Bangladesh’s environment, allyship with China may become more appealing if it can provide better water management opportunities than India.
As competition continues to rise in the Indo-Pacific region between India and China, Bangladesh stands to benefit from strategic cooperation with both regional giants competing for its friendship.