India’s Independent Foreign Policy Shifts from 2018 to 2025

5 Oct 2025

By Aamnah Fatima Khan, Vaibhavi Katal, Vedika Znwar

As the first long-form publication emerging from a CISES working group, this white paper represents a significant step forward in our mission to produce rigorous, student-led policy research on international security, economics and global strategy.

Developed by Team 4 of our Geopolitics and Conflict Working Group, edited by Alexander Anderson.

I. Executive Summary

Between 2018 and 2025, Indian foreign policy shifted its gears from prudent non-alignment to assertive strategic autonomy to avoid commitments that limit flexibility while strengthening issue-based alliances that maximise opportunities. Historically guided by non-alignment, India’s foreign policy during this period has instead been characterised by a pragmatic, issue-based approach: deepening ties where interests are served, resisting pressure to fully align with any one bloc, and utilising its growing economic and strategic influence to expand its role in global governance (Miller, 2018)). The period also coincided with significant systematic shifts like the US-China rivalry, post-pandemic recovery, the Russia-Ukraine war, and the implications of protectionist trade policies that forced India to adjust rapidly and assertively.

This white paper explores India’s foreign policy trajectory, focusing on how its pursuit of strategic autonomy has impacted its reactions to global disturbances and redefined its place in the international order. The key findings are: First, India’s influence has expanded dramatically as it has positioned itself as both a regional power and a global broker. From rejecting to join the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in 2019 to its victorious G20 presidency in 2023, India has shown the ability to influence global agendas rather than just responding to them. The G20 conference in New Delhi, which produced a consensus despite significant divides over Ukraine, bolstered India’s reputation as a bridge between developed and developing nations (Grossman, 2023).

Second, India has adopted assertive multilateralism as its strategy. Previously, India was hesitant about multilateral organisations; however, now it has taken substantial steps to build platforms like QUAD (with the US, Japan, and Australia), the I2U2 (with the US, the UAE, and Israel), and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. These forums have allowed India to broaden collaboration in areas ranging from maritime security to supply chain resilience, vital technologies, and energy transition, all while keeping engagements flexible and interest-driven (Ganguly, 2009).

Third, India has enhanced its ability to strike a balance with major powers. Relations with the United States strengthened in defence, technology, and commerce, despite ongoing tensions over tariffs and market access. Simultaneously, India maintained strong energy and defence links with Russia, particularly in the aftermath of Ukraine, despite Western pressure, while carefully maintaining a difficult and hostile but economically crucial relationship with China. This multi-vector interaction demonstrates India’s rejection of zero-sum agreements (Sikri, 2014).

These shifts in foreign policy have certain implications. Regionally, India is strengthening its position as both a defence manufacturer and an economic partner. Its relationship in the Indian Ocean and West Asia, such as the UAE-India Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement and growing connectivity projects, indicates a more prepared neighbourhood and extended-neighbourhood policy (Ministry of Defence, 2025). India’s autonomous position implies that it cannot be viewed as an ally in the classic sense. Instead, it is a critical partner whose involvement is required for Indo-Pacific stability, supply chain diversity, and global digital and climate governance.

Globally, India’s strategy demonstrates that middle powers may carve out a niche for themselves in the face of great-power rivalry by exploiting multilateral forums and issues-based alliances. India’s advocacy for the Global South, commitment to inclusive growth, and promotion of digital public goods place it in a vital position to shape the rules and norms of a changing order. To summarise, India’s foreign policy from 2018 to 2025 demonstrates confident and adaptable strategic autonomy that shows India as assertive, pragmatic, and flexible. This will help India handle systemic volatility while growing India’s influence in regional and global forums.

II. Introduction

In the last decade, the Russia-Ukraine war, economic decoupling, pandemic-related disruptions, escalating great-power competition, and climatic emergencies have all contributed to the instability of the global political and economic order. In this unstable setting, India has emerged as a crucial actor, with consequences well beyond South Asia. Previously seen only as a regional power with a cautious, non-aligned stance, India has now increasingly displayed the ability to impact results in multilateral forums, establish strategic alliances across regions, and assert its autonomy in ways that reset global alliances (Ghosh, 2025). Between 2018 and 2025, India’s foreign policy underwent a significant metamorphosis, shifting from incremental modifications to a more confident, autonomous, and assertive position that emphasised the need for strategic autonomy.

This evolution must be understood against the backdrop of a shifting geopolitical landscape. The US-China rivalry has evolved into a systematic battle including technology, economics, military influence, and morals. China’s increased aggressiveness in the Indo-Pacific, particularly along the Himalayan border, has had a direct impact on India’s security calculations (Ghosh, 2023). Meanwhile, after years of fluctuating between engagement and protectionism, the US has pursued stronger security and technical alliances with India while maintaining some economic friction. Europe has begun to decouple selectively from both China and Russia, revamping its trade and investment relationship with India. Simultaneously, the war in Ukraine has caused middle powers throughout the world to reconsider energy security, sanctions compliance, and their options in a polarised world.

For India, these adjustments reaffirmed the need for strategic autonomy that has been the guiding principle in its foreign policy since independence, but has taken sharper contours in the current period. Strategic autonomy is not synonymous with isolation or neutrality; rather, it represents India’s will to pursue its national interests without being forced into inflexible alliances (Tharoor, 2025). From resisting pressure to reduce Russian energy imports to expanding defence and technology cooperation with the United States, and from refusing to join the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) to facilitating consensus-building at the G20, India has consistently demonstrated that its decisions are shaped by sovereignty, pragmatism, and the pursuit of multiple alliances.

The global impression of India has altered in tandem with these policy changes. India is both the world’s most populated country and one of the fastest-growing economies, with a projected GDP of $5 trillion in the coming years (Government of India, 2025). Its digital public infrastructural system has drawn international replication, and its climate and energy policies are becoming more crucial to global transition solutions. Its military modernisation increased naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and leadership positions in forums such as the QUAD and I2U2 strengthened its position as a global agenda-setter, rather than just a regional power. In short, India’s expanding influence is both a cause and result of its changing foreign policy decisions.

This white paper examines India’s foreign policy trajectory from 2018 to 2025 within the larger context. It investigates how India’s goal of strategic autonomy has influenced its reactions to global shocks, its balancing act with other countries, and its efforts to strengthen its position in global governance frameworks. The analysis identifies three key dimensions of this trajectory: India’s growing influence through leadership in multilateral and minilateral forums, its increasingly assertive, interest-based multilateralism, and its mindful but confident balancing acts with major powers, particularly the US, China and Russia. Taken together, these achievements highlight a significant transformation in India’s worldwide image: no longer reactive or defensive, but proactive, agenda-setting, and secure in its independence (Chiranjeevi, 2025).

The objective of this paper is twofold. First, it aims to examine the changes in India’s foreign policy from 2018 to 2025, paying special emphasis to the external causes, internal concerns, and strategic calculations that underpin these decisions. Second, it seeks to examine the significance of these transformations for regional dynamics in South Asia and the Indo-Pacific, Western strategies that increasingly rely on India’s engagement, and the changing architecture of global governance. By linking India’s policy decision to bigger structural shifts, the article sheds light on how a growing power transforms strategic autonomy into tangible action and what this means for the future of international politics.

India’s stance at this time displays both continuity and change. The continuity lies in its refusal to be bound by alliances that limit its options; the change lies in the increasing assertiveness with which it promotes its interests in multilateral forums, its willingness to take on leadership roles, and its ability to form new partnerships outside of traditional spheres (Miller, 2018). For example, India’s successful G20 presidency in 2023 not only produced a consensus proclamation during a period of geopolitical impasse, but it also overlooked concerns such as debt sustainability, climate financing, and digital public goods. Similarly, India’s minilateral engagements, ranging from QUAD to I2U2, show a transition from symbolic involvement to genuine collaboration in areas such as infrastructure, technology, health security, and marine resilience. These activities highlight the connection between autonomy and leadership: India’s freedom of action does not isolate it but rather makes it more appealing as a partner capable of bridging gaps (Miller, 2018).

At the same time, India’s balancing act with major nations demonstrates the complexities of autonomy in practice. India has strengthened defence cooperation with the United States, inked technology transfer agreements, and agreed on an Indo-Pacific policy, all while dealing with trade conflicts and rejecting alignments on sanction regimes. Energy imports from Russia increased even after 2022, defying Western criticism, although India sought diversification to prevent overdependence. Border conflicts with China remain unsolved, but economic contracts continue despite security concerns (Sikri, 2017). These dynamics demonstrate that autonomy is not a passive notion but rather an active approach requiring careful calibration, adaptability, and resilience.

The premise of this white paper is that India’s strategic autonomy will be the primary driver of its foreign policy between 2018 and 2025, altering its ties with major countries and impacting global governance. Autonomy has helped India to handle opposing demands, maximise economic and strategic advantages, and emerge as a credible leader in the Global South while maintaining Western partners’ trust. Strategic autonomy is no longer a relic of non-alignment; it has developed into a modern ideology of multi-alignment that is selective, pragmatic, and adaptive to global volatility.

In the upcoming chapters, this paper will examine this trend in further depth. It will investigate the factors driving India’s independence, ranging from economic objectives and security imperatives to domestic political narratives of sovereignty. It will chart the growth of India’s overseas interactions, from bilateral collaboration to multilateral leadership. Finally, it will consider the ramifications of these transformations for South Asia’s regional order, Western initiatives aimed at integrating India into a larger Indo-Pacific framework, and the contentious future of global governance. The core argument is that India’s decisions are important not just for its own progress, but also for the stability, inclusivity, and resilience of the global system.

III. Drivers of India’s Strategic Autonomy

India’s pursuit of strategic autonomy is closely tied to its colonial past. Centuries of British rule created a strong awareness of sovereignty and external control. It was not just about political freedom but also about seeking agency in global affairs (Mukherjee, 2020).

This historical awareness shaped India’s role in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) during the Cold War. Under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, non-alignment aimed to avoid being pulled into the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union (Saran, 2019). The principle was not about isolation; instead, it highlighted the right to engage with both sides on India’s terms while promoting decolonization, disarmament, and fair development (Tharoor, 2021).

After the Cold War ended and globalization grew, the focus on strategic independence remained. India rejected outside pressure to cut ties with Russia (Pant and rej, 2022) pursued an independent nuclear strategy despite sanctions (Tellis, 2001) and continually called for a multipolar world order (Jaishankar, 2021). Therefore, historical experiences laid the groundwork for strategic autonomy as both a defensive need and a value.

(i) Economic Interests: Promoting Growth, Strategic Partnerships, and Energy Security

In the years following liberalization in 1991, economic growth became essential to India’s foreign policy (Singh, 2020). The pursuit of strategic autonomy has since been linked to securing economic opportunities without relying too much on any one partner (Mukherjee, 2020). By diversifying trade and investment ties with the United States, European Union, Japan, Southeast Asia, and West Asia, India aims to protect itself from external shocks while enhancing growth prospects (Roy 2025).

Strategic partnerships have become key in this effort. Unlike formal alliances, these partnerships, like those with the U.S., France, and Japan, provide India access to advanced technology, defense equipment, and investment while allowing for independent decision-making (Khan, 2025). The idea of “multi-alignment” reflects this balance, as India collaborates with various actors to advance its goals without sacrificing autonomy (Saran, 2019).

Energy security plays a crucial role in this strategy. India depends on imported oil and gas, which requires careful ties with West Asia, Russia, and new energy partners (Gorenberg et al., 2025) The choice to continue buying discounted Russian crude during the Ukraine conflict shows the importance of economic pragmatism in maintaining independence (Pant and Rej, 2022). At the same time, India’s investments in renewable energy and leadership in the International Solar Alliance demonstrate its aim to shape global energy governance in line with its domestic growth needs (Ministry of External Affairs, 2023). Thus, economic interests support strategic autonomy, pushing India to avoid overdependence, diversify partnerships, and use its market size as a diplomatic tool (Mukherjee, 2020).

(ii) Geopolitical Dynamics: Managing Relationships, Regional Stability, and Global Governance

Today, strategic autonomy is notably visible in how India navigates geopolitical challenges. India’s external landscape is shaped by the rise of China, the assertiveness of the United States, and the ongoing significance of Russia (Jaishankar, 2021). Balancing these relationships requires managing great-power competition while keeping options open (Khan, 2025).

Relations with China are marked by competition and distrust, especially after border clashes in Doklam (2017) and Galwan (2020) (Zhou and Interesse, 2025). India has responded by strengthening its defense through modernization and partnerships with the U.S. and Indo-Pacific nations while still engaging with China through BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Roy, 2025). This approach exemplifies strategic autonomy: resisting coercion while avoiding direct confrontation or alignment.

With the United States, India has expanded cooperation in defense, technology, and the Indo-Pacific framework (Khan, 2025). Still, it resists being labeled a treaty ally, focusing on cooperation based on specific issues instead (Jaishankar, 2021). Likewise, relations with Russia remain important for defense and energy, even though Moscow’s closeness to Beijing adds complexity (Gorenburg et al., 2025).

Regionally, India’s Neighborhood First policy aims to ensure stability in South Asia, countering outside influences and creating a secure environment for growth (Singh, 2020). Development aid to neighboring countries like Sri Lanka, Bhutan, and Nepal reinforces India’s role as a regional stabilizer while protecting its autonomy against Chinese influence (Nantulya, 2025).

In global governance, India’s push for multipolarity, its call for reform of international institutions, and its leadership in forums like the G20 show its desire to shape the rules rather than simply follow them (Jaishankar, 2021). Its active multilateralism from climate talks to digital infrastructure and strengthens its independent stance on the world stage (Ministry of External Affairs, 2023).

India’s commitment to strategic autonomy results from historical legacies, economic needs, and geopolitical realities (Mukherjee, 2020). The colonial experience created a strong focus on sovereignty and independence, further established through the Non-Aligned Movement (Saran, 2019). Economic liberalization and globalization added new dimensions to the principle, tying autonomy to diverse growth strategies, partnerships, and energy security (Singh, 2020). In the current multipolar world, managing relationships with major powers, ensuring regional stability, and engaging in global governance reflect the ongoing importance of autonomy (Jaishankar, 2021).

However, autonomy today does not mean total independence but a measured interdependence. India understands that its global goals require cooperation, partnerships, and engagement with institutions. Therefore, strategic autonomy remains both a guiding principle and a practical strategy, allowing India to protect its sovereignty while navigating a complex world order.

IV. India’s Foreign Policy Shifts (2018-2025)

India’s Foreign Policy in the Contemporary Era: Strategic Autonomy, Multilateral Leadership, and Regional Balancing

In the last decade, Indian foreign policy has changed significantly due to shifts in the international landscape and urgent regional issues. Today, India aims to balance its long-standing commitment to strategic autonomy with a more active role in global governance, managing great-power rivalries, and ensuring regional stability. Its reactions to crises at the Himalayan border with China, involvement in initiatives like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) (Pant and Rej, 2022), leadership of the Group of Twenty (G20) (Ministry of External Affairs, 2023), stance on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, pursuit of assertive multilateralism, and focus on the Neighborhood First policy showcase both continuity and change. This analysis shows that India’s diplomacy reflects a practical approach blending realistic considerations with idealistic goals, capturing the complexities of a multipolar and competitive international landscape.

Border Disputes and Strategic Assertiveness: The Doklam and Galwan Crises

The India-China border dispute has remained unresolved since the mid-20th century (Ganguly, 2020). Ambiguous views of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) often lead to standoffs. The 2017 Doklam standoff, which occurred at the junction of India, Bhutan, and China, marked a notable escalation (Joshi, 2024). China’s attempt to build a road in Bhutanese territory prompted Indian intervention, resulting in a drawn-out standoff that tested trilateral diplomacy. The more intense Galwan Valley clash in 2020 was unprecedented in decades, resulting in casualties on both sides despite long-standing agreements that banned the use of firearms along the LAC. These incidents are not just isolated events but part of a larger pattern of Chinese assertiveness and India’s determination to resist changes to the status quo (Zhou and Interesse, 2025).

India’s response was multi-faceted. Diplomatically, New Delhi emphasized its sovereignty and stated that normalizing relations with China depended on maintaining peace along the borders. Militarily, India sped up infrastructure development in border areas, increased troop deployments, and invested in logistics and surveillance to maintain a sustainable presence in high-altitude regions. At the same time, India strengthened its partnerships, coordinating closely with the United States, Japan, and Australia, while reinforcing ties with Bhutan (Khan, 2025).

The Doklam and Galwan crises have strained India-China relations, diminishing trust and reinforcing rivalry. They also have broader regional security implications, especially by increasing China’s interest in gaining influence in South Asian countries like Nepal and Sri Lanka, challenging India’s position (Nantulya, 2025). From the perspective of strategic autonomy, these crises highlight a paradox: while India aims to act independently, it finds it necessary to rely more on partnerships to balance China’s disproportionate power.

The QUAD and India’s Indo-Pacific Strategy

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), which includes India, the United States, Japan, and Australia, represents India’s shift towards minilateral cooperation. Initially proposed in 2007, it was revived in the late 2010s due to China’s growing assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific (Ganguly, 2020). Today, the QUAD has developed into a broad framework that includes not only maritime security but also cooperation on infrastructure, critical technologies, health security, and supply-chain resilience (Jaishankar, 2021).

For India, the QUAD serves three main purposes. First, it helps promote stability in the Indo-Pacific by ensuring freedom of navigation and countering coercion in maritime areas. Second, it acts as a counterweight to China’s influence, allowing India to strengthen its deterrent capabilities without entering into a formal alliance. Third, the QUAD enables India to enhance economic and technological cooperation in areas like digital infrastructure and renewable energy, aligning with its domestic priorities (Ministry of External Affairs, 2023).

The rising significance of the QUAD has important implications. On one hand, it strengthens India’s security partnerships and affirms its role in the Indo-Pacific framework. On the other hand, it risks escalating tensions with China, which views the QUAD as a containment strategy. Experts warn that India needs to carefully navigate its involvement to avoid getting caught in bloc politics. Thus, the QUAD reflects India’s broader strategy of multi-alignment, where cooperation is flexible and focused on specific issues (Saran, 2019).

G20 Leadership: Global Governance and India’s Diplomatic Showcase

India’s presidency of the G20 in 2023 offered a unique chance to demonstrate leadership in global governance. Centered on the theme Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam (“One Earth, One Family, One Future”), India focused on inclusive growth, reforming multilateral financial institutions, climate justice, digital public infrastructure, and integrating the Global South into global decision-making (Mukherjee, 2020).

Concrete results included launching a Global Digital Public Infrastructure Repository, efforts for debt relief, and successfully advocating for the African Union’s membership in the G20, showcasing India’s role as a bridge between the Global North and South (Ghosh, 2023).

India’s G20 presidency strengthened its global leadership credentials, enhancing its legitimacy as a representative for emerging economies. It also offered a platform for economic diplomacy, enabling India to attract investment and highlight its developmental successes. However, the presidency also revealed the limits of building consensus, as New Delhi had to manage sharp divisions between Western nations and Russia. Analysts suggest that while India achieved symbolic victories, the actual implementation of commitments will be the real test of its leadership (Tharoor, 2021).

Russia-Ukraine Conflict: India’s Strategic Autonomy At a Glance

The Russia-Ukraine conflict has tested India’s principle of strategic autonomy more than any recent event. India has abstained from several UN votes condemning Russia while consistently calling for dialogue and respect for sovereignty (Gorenburg et al., 2025). This approach reflects a careful balancing act: maintaining long-standing ties with Russia while engaging with Western nations.

India’s reliance on Russian defense equipment and parts is significant, making a sudden break costly. At the same time, cheap Russian crude oil imports have provided India with economic advantages amid global energy challenges (Ghosh, 2023). Scholars highlight that this practical approach reflects the impact of material dependencies on foreign policy decisions.

This balancing act affects India’s strategic partnerships. While Western nations recognize India’s limitations, they also push for greater alignment. For instance, the balancing or hedging approach taken by India has led to a setback within India-US ties. This bilateral relation is currently going through a rough patch since the Trump administration is in full-throttle by imposing a 50 percent tariff on India for not advocating America’s cause (Race and Meierhans, 2025). Failing to strike the right balance could jeopardize emerging sectors for partnerships.

On the other hand, as far as the context of global governance is concerned, India’s neutrality as perceived by the international community has paradoxically strengthened its position as a potential mediator or swing state in multipolar competition. Ultimately, this conflict underscores the need for India to diversify its defense and energy sources to maintain long-term autonomy (Pant and Rej, 2022).

Assertive Multilateralism: From Rule-Taker to Rule-Shaper

India has increasingly embraced assertive multilateralism, shifting from a cautious participant to an agenda-setter (Mukherjee, 2020). This change is evident in its leadership of initiatives like the International Solar Alliance and Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure, as well as active involvement in organizations like BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the United Nations. India pursues issue-based coalitions, enabling it to lead in areas such as climate governance or digital infrastructure without being tied to rigid alliances (Tharoor, 2021).

This approach enhances India’s ability to shape global rules, especially in areas where its development experiences provide valuable insights (e.g., digital public goods) (Ghosh, 2023). It also increases India’s flexibility in forming coalitions, allowing engagement with a wide range of actors from both the West and the Global South. However, assertive multilateralism demands a stronger diplomatic corps and better inter-ministerial coordination, which poses challenges. As India becomes more proactive, it also faces growing pressure to take sides on contentious issues, which may strain its autonomy.

Neighborhood First Policy: Regional Stability and Connectivity

India’s Neighborhood First policy highlights the importance of South Asia in its foreign policy goals. It focuses on connectivity, economic integration, and development partnerships with countries like Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives (Nantulya, 2025). Mechanisms like SAARC and BIMSTEC are central to this strategy, although SAARC has faced challenges due to India-Pakistan tensions (Mukherjee, 2020).

Through development aid, favorable financing, and infrastructure projects, India has aimed to build goodwill and promote interdependence. Providing humanitarian assistance, particularly during crises in Sri Lanka (2022) and Nepal (2015), has reinforced India’s position as a primary responder in the region (Ghosh, 2023).

The Neighborhood First policy directly affects regional stability. Closer relations with neighbors create safeguards against outside influences, especially from China, whose Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has made significant inroads into South Asia (Zhou and Interesse, 2025). However, India must address credibility issues, as delays in project implementation or perceptions of being heavy-handed can weaken its influence. Scholars emphasize that for India to succeed, it should balance generosity with respect for sovereignty and partnership.

India’s current foreign policy reflects a dynamic interaction between practical needs and idealistic goals. The Doklam and Galwan crises illustrate its commitment to defending territorial sovereignty and building strategic alliances (Ganguly, 2020). Participation in the QUAD highlights its role in shaping Indo-Pacific security while maintaining its autonomy. Leading the G20 shows its ambition to act as a representative for the Global South and a mediator in divided global governance (Ministry of External Affairs, 2023). The Russia-Ukraine conflict tests India’s balancing act between traditional partnerships and new alignments. Assertive multilateralism marks its shift from a passive participant to a proactive norm-setter, while the Neighborhood First policy grounds its diplomatic efforts in regional stability.

Throughout these areas, the principle of strategic autonomy remains central. Yet, in today’s interconnected world, autonomy means not isolation but multi-alignment, flexible partnerships, and proactive leadership. India’s challenge is to turn diplomatic ambitions into concrete actions, building its institutional capabilities, delivering on commitments, and navigating contradictions. If it succeeds, India could solidify its position as a key player shaping the future of a multipolar world (Pant and Rej, 2022).

V. Emerging Trends and Implications

India’s foreign policy in the 21st century is increasingly influenced by the rise of a multipolar world, the changing power dynamics in Asia, and the needs of global governance. Historically, India has stressed non-alignment and strategic independence. However, globalization, economic dependencies, and regional rivalries have pushed it to engage more actively with various players. Recently, New Delhi has positioned itself as a “third power center” in global politics. It seeks to balance its relationships with the United States, China, and Russia, enhance its role in the Indo-Pacific, and pursue economic diplomacy alongside security needs.

This section looks at five aspects of India’s foreign policy: its role as a third power center, its balancing act with major powers, its involvement in Indo-Pacific affairs, its commitment to strategic independence, and how economic diplomacy intersects with strategic interests. Together, these aspects highlight the complex balancing act India must perform as it faces regional and global challenges.

India’s Third Power Center Role Analysis

The post-Cold War era has been marked by the unipolar dominance of the United States, followed by China’s gradual rise as a key competitor. In this context, India has increasingly sought to establish itself as a third pole in global politics, especially in Asia. India’s growing economy, large population, and expanding military capabilities support its effort to play an independent role in shaping global governance and regional stability.

India’s rise as a third power centre stems from its demographic weight, expanding economic base and growing military capabilities. Unlike China’s state-led authoritarian model or the United States’ liberal democratic tradition, India emphasises strategic autonomy rooted in its civilizational ethos and non-alignment legacy. This role reflects a reassertion of sovereignty in a multipolar order where middle powers seek greater voice and independence.

For instance, India has recently conducted the first joint naval exercises with the Philippines (Patomoster, 2025). These naval drills expanded its “Act East” policy, challenging China on multiple fronts while protecting crucial trade routes. For New Delhi, backing the Philippines’ claims underscores its commitment to international law and adherence to UNCLOS (Palomoster, 2025). The partnership underscores India’s commitment to a rules-based maritime order, signalling its aspiration to transition from a regional actor in the Indian Ocean to a global maritime stakeholder.

In terms of defence cooperation, India and Africa have strengthened their defence partnership through initiatives like the first-ever India-Africa Army Chiefs Conclave held in March 2023 alongside the Africa-India Field Training Exercise (AFINDEX) in Pune, India (Nantulya, 2025). India provides training slots for African countries under the ITEC program, covering areas like artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and maritime surveillance. African navies have participated in 47 editions of India’s Maritime Partnership Exercise (MPX) in the Western Indian Ocean, and India has signed MOUs with Tanzania and Kenya on shipbuilding and port development, as part of its efforts since the “Gandhinagar Declaration” in October 2022 (Nantulya, 2025). India’s defence cooperation focuses on building partner self-sufficiency, deploying technicians to strengthen African capacity and supplying hardware like offshore patrol craft and armoured vehicles, promoting regional stability and security through cooperation (Nantulya, 2025).

Unlike traditional great powers, India focuses on strategic independence rather than alignment. By building relationships across the Global South, engaging in forums like BRICS, QUAD, and the G20, and contributing to global public goods such as climate initiatives, India enhances its legitimacy as a balancing force. Observers note that India’s influence comes not only from its military strength but also from its ability to mediate between the Global North and Global South, reinforcing the idea of a multipolar world.

One good example of India’s eagerness to harness good relations between the nations of the Global South is in Central Asia, where the water security issue is very prevalent. However, the water security crisis, driven by uneven distribution, interstate conflicts, outdated infrastructure, corruption and climate change, presents opportunities for cooperation and innovation. India, having successfully implemented policy initiatives like the National Water Policy, Jal Jeevan Mission and Jal Shakti Abhiyan, is well-positioned to share its expertise with Central Asian countries (Roy, 2025). By collaborating on sustainable water management, conservation and equitable access, India and Central Asian states can work together to address common challenges. India is eager to share its knowledge and technologies, such as smart water grids, rainwater harvesting and wastewater treatment, to help Central Asia find solutions to its water security issues and promote regional stability and cooperation (Roy, 2025).

India’s rise as a third power center has several implications. Regionally, it encourages smaller South Asian and Indian Ocean states to diversify their partnerships, leading to more flexible alliances. For Western strategies, India is increasingly seen as a necessary partner in countering China’s rise, though it is not a formal ally. Globally, India’s participation in discussions on climate justice, development financing, and digital governance enhances the inclusivity of global governance structures, which also raises expectations for its leadership.

Balancing Act: Relationships with the US, China, and Russia, India’s Diplomatic Efforts

India’s foreign policy revolves around a careful balancing act among three major powers: the United States, China, and Russia. With the U.S., India has built a strategic partnership based on defence cooperation, technology transfers, and shared concerns about China’s growth. Agreements like the U.S.–India Civil Nuclear Agreement and military logistics pacts emphasise this collaboration. India and the US have also strengthened defence and technological cooperation through initiatives such as the Quad and bilateral agreements on critical technologies (Khan, 2025). This status was granted to India when it was designated as a Major Defence Partner in 2016 by the Trump Administration. Defence Cooperation includes agreements such as Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA), which facilitated geospatial intelligence sharing, Logistics Exchange Memorandum (LEMOA) allowed reciprocal access to military bases for logistics and refuelling and enhancing operational flexibility and Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) which enabled securing real-time information sharing and enhance interoperability between Indian and US military (Khan, 2025).

Simultaneously, despite recurring border tensions, India maintains engagement with China through economic interdependence and multilateral forums like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Moreover, China has reclaimed its spot as India’s largest trading partner, with bilateral trade reaching USD $138.48 billion, marking a significant milestone in their economic relationship (Zhou & Interesse, 2025). India’s relationship with China remains tense due to border disputes, economic imbalances, and Beijing’s increasing influence in South Asia. While India engages with China through BRICS and SCO, events like the Doklam and Galwan crises highlight ongoing mistrust.

In contrast, Russia remains a long-standing partner, crucial to India’s defence procurement and energy supplies. Despite Moscow’s growing reliance on Beijing and the challenges posed by the Ukraine war, India continues to value its ties to Russia for maintaining balance in a multipolar world. Moreover, despite US pressures, India has maintained its relations with Russia, skillfully balancing its ties with both nations. This is evident in India’s refusal to join the anti-Russia sanctions regime, even as it pursues a multi-vector foreign policy and fosters positive ties with the US. For instance, India continued to cooperate with Russia in areas like defence and trade, with bilateral trade growing over 30% in the past year, driven by India’s rising fossil fuel consumption (Gorenburg et al., 2025). Examples include India’s purchase of Russian oil and gas, as well as cooperation in sectors like aerospace and information technology. Additionally, the two countries have explored alternative payment mechanisms, such as Vostro accounts, to bypass US dollar transactions and sanctions (Gorenburg et al., 2025). India’s balancing act is also reflected in its military relations with Russia, where, despite cancelling some arms deals post-Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, India continues to maintain a stable relationship, with joint production and technology sharing remaining intact. The relationship is likely to remain steady, driven by mutual interests and a shared vision of a multipolar world order.

Managing relationships with these three powers is crucial for regional stability. Strengthening ties with the U.S. enhances deterrence against China, but overt alignment could undermine India’s claim to independence. Keeping relations with Russia ensures continuity in defence and energy needs, though it complicates engagement with the West. Navigating tensions with China presents the biggest challenge, as conflict could destabilise not just the border but the entire Indo-Pacific region. This balancing act reflects India’s goal of being an independent influence rather than a subordinate ally.

Indo-Pacific Dynamics and Regional Security: India’s Role

The Indo-Pacific has become the central geopolitical region of the 21st century, shaped by maritime competition, strategic chokepoints, and economic interdependencies. India’s location, connecting the Indian Ocean and the Pacific through Southeast Asia, places it in a key position to influence this regional landscape.

India has strengthened its interests through strategic partnerships with the United States, Japan, Australia, and ASEAN while participating in forums like QUAD, BIMSTEC, and the Indian Ocean Rim Association. Beyond security, India promotes economic cooperation through initiatives focusing on supply-chain resilience, connectivity, and digital infrastructure.

India’s involvement in the Indo-Pacific has important consequences for regional security and competition. It improves deterrence against Chinese assertiveness and provides smaller states with alternatives to Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. However, it also risks drawing India into great-power rivalries, requiring careful management. For India, engaging in the Indo-Pacific is also about maintaining strategic independence—working with like-minded partners without forming binding alliances.

Strategic Autonomy in a Multipolar World Analysis

As discussed earlier, strategic autonomy remains the guiding principle of Indian foreign policy, though its interpretation has evolved. During the Cold War, it primarily meant non-alignment. Today, it refers to multi-alignment, that is, the ability to engage with multiple powers while preserving independence in decision-making. India’s participation in both Western-led forums like QUAD and G20 and alternative platforms such as BRICS and SCO illustrates this dual approach.

Autonomy is also evident in India’s issue-based diplomacy: it collaborates with the U.S. on Indo-Pacific security, with Russia on defence, and with the Global South on climate and development. This flexible approach allows India to maximise its options while avoiding strict commitments.

Strategic autonomy affects global governance and regional dynamics. It allows India to act as a mediator in polarised conflicts, as shown by its careful stance on the Ukraine war. It also helps India shape regional security without being seen as an extension of U.S. strategy. However, autonomy is not absolute; economic and defence dependencies, along with structural inequalities with China, impose limits. The challenge is to maintain independence while using partnerships for strategic benefits.

Economic Diplomacy and Strategic Interests Intersection of Economy and Strategy

India’s foreign policy is increasingly defined by the link between economic diplomacy and strategic goals. As the world’s fifth-largest economy and a hub of digital innovation, India uses its market size and development experience to strengthen ties. Trade agreements with the UAE, investment initiatives with the EU, and efforts on supply-chain resilience with QUAD members show how its economic pursuits support its strategy.

Energy security remains a priority, with imports from the Middle East, Russia, and Africa providing resilience. India also promotes developmental partnerships, offering concessional loans and infrastructure support to neighbours and the Global South, thus increasing both goodwill and influence.

Economic diplomacy supports India’s role in regional stability by fostering connectivity and growth in South Asia and the Indo-Pacific. Globally, it enhances India’s credibility in debates on trade, technology, and climate. Strategic partnerships deepen when economic interdependence aligns with security cooperation, as seen in U.S.–India technology collaboration or India–Japan infrastructure projects. Still, challenges like trade deficits, protectionism, and competition from China’s economic power persist.

One recent example of such economic collaboration is the India-UK Free Trade Agreement (FTA), signed in July 2025. The agreement was announced in May 2025, aimed at reducing the trade barriers between the two nations. The deal is expected to enhance bilateral trade by £25.5 billion per year and raise the UK’s GDP by £4.8 billion (Race & Meierhans, 2025). In May, India’s Ministry of Commerce and Industry announced that under the trade deal, 99% of Indian exports, including clothes, shoes and food, will be exempt from import duties (Al Jazeera, 2025). The UK and India, the world’s sixth and fifth-largest economies, share a trade relationship valued at about £41 billion ($55.3bn), supporting over 600,000 jobs across both nations. Additionally, the free trade agreement eases the immigration and visa policy towards Indian professionals and students (Race & Meierhans, 2025).

Simultaneously, economic outreach to Africa, Central Asia and Southeast Asia aligns with broader strategic goals of diversifying partnerships and reducing dependence on any single power. During the G-20 summit in New Delhi, India proclaimed itself as the leader of the Global South, particularly in the context of its relations with Africa. Between 2018 to 2022, Indian investment in Africa surged to an average of $26.39 billion, a sharp rise from $5.34 billion during 2013-2018 (Myles, 2023). This growth has positioned India as one of Africa’s leading investors, even surpassing China and the United States in certain years (Dye & Kumar, 2024). Similarly, trade rebounded from a downturn between 2016 and 2021, climbing from $78 billion in 2015 to $97.8 billion in 2022.

While in Central Asia, India has been active not just to improve economic relations but to attain critical raw materials and rare earth minerals. In May 2025, the 4th meeting of the India-Central Asia Dialogue was held in New Delhi (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2025). This conference reflects the renewed outreach policy of India, known as the Connect Central Asia Policy and its National Critical Mineral Mission, which aims at critical mineral supply while strengthening its exploration, recycling, stockpiling and research (International Energy Agency, 2025).

India’s strategic agenda centres on expanding its influence, securing priority access to raw materials and consumer markets and countering China’s growing presence in Africa, Central Asia and Southeast Asia. While presenting itself as a responsible global actor and “Vishwa Guru” (global teacher), it is actively advancing its national interests, primarily the pursuit of greater power and status through economic, geopolitical and diplomatic means (Qazi, Abbas & Qaisrani, 2025). These strategies are built on the premise that they will safeguard India’s national interests and support its ambition to emerge as a major power and leader of the Global South.

India’s modern foreign policy reflects both continuity and change. Its aim to establish a third power centre shows its desire to shape global governance and regional stability. Its balancing act with the U.S., China, and Russia illustrates the complexity of managing unequal relationships while maintaining independence. Its heightened profile in the Indo-Pacific underscores the significance of maritime security and partnerships. The guiding principle of strategic autonomy continues to direct its choices, albeit in a more flexible, multi-aligned manner. Finally, economic diplomacy grounds its global ambitions, connecting strategic partnerships with development goals.

In a multipolar world marked by competition and interdependence, India faces the challenge of sustaining this balancing act. By leveraging its economic strengths, strategic location, and diplomatic adaptability, India can solidify its role as a significant power shaping the future of 21st-century global order.

VI. Implications for Global Governance

Reforming International Institutions: India’s growing influence highlights the need for reform in international institutions such as the United Nations Security Council and International Monetary Fund (IMF). For example, India has been advocating for a more representative UN Security Council, which would include more permanent seats for emerging powers like itself. This would allow for a more inclusive and equitable global governance structure.
Promoting Multipolarity: By fostering strategic partnerships with countries like Russia (through the BRICS grouping) and engaging in forums like the Quad with the US, Japan and Australia, India is contributing to a more multipolar world. This multipolarity helps balance power dynamics and reduces dependence on any single nation or bloc.
Strengthening South-South Cooperation: India’s growing influence is also promoting South-South cooperation, where countries in the Global South collaborate on issues like trade, technology, and development. This could lead to more equitable global governance structures that reflect the needs and priorities of developing countries.
Enhancing Regional Governance: As a key player in regional organisations like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), India is contributing to the development of regional governance structures. These structures can help address regional challenges and promote stability and prosperity.
Promoting Sustainable Development: India’s focus on sustainable development and achieving the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) has implications for global governance. India is promoting sustainable practices, renewable energy, and inclusive growth, which can serve as a model for other countries and influence global governance on these issues.
Shaping Global Norms and Standards: With its growing influence, India has the opportunity to shape global norms and standards in areas like technology, trade, and human rights. For example, India’s approach to data protection and digital governance could influence global standards and best practices in these areas.

VII. Currency Challenges For Independent Indian Foreign Policy

Dilemma of External Balancing

India faces the strategic choice of either conceding to U.S. influence or seeking détente with China. Multialignment has not been able to provide reliable external balancing, forcing India to rethink its approach (Sahu, 2025).

Energy Security Risks with Russia

Halting Russian oil imports would have compromised India’s energy security at a critical time, illustrating the vulnerability of over-dependence on global energy markets and Western sanctions.

U.S. Meddling in South Asia

The U.S. crediting its own role (specifically President Trump) in the ceasefire with Pakistan conflicted with India’s long-standing policy of rejecting external interference in the subcontinent. This undermined trust in Washington as a dependable strategic partner.

Dependence on Critical Technologies from the U.S.

The lack of American sensitivity during crises exposed India’s over-reliance on Washington for advanced technologies such as jet engines and defence systems. In addition to this, there are collaborations in semiconductors, critical minerals, space, quantum technology, AI and advanced telecom (Joshi, 2024). This dependence is seen as a significant vulnerability in times of conflict.

Chinese Leverage Through Economic Tools

Beijing’s export controls on essential commodities like rare earths and fertilisers highlighted India’s dependence on Chinese supply chains. At the same time, China’s support for Pakistan compounds India’s regional security challenges.

Border Tensions and the Cost of Confrontation with China

Although New Delhi managed disengagement at the border, India’s decision to accommodate Beijing was driven partly by fear of economic repercussions, showing the difficulty of countering China without hurting its own economic stability. India faced similar accusations after Trump’s tariff imposition, forcing New Delhi to strengthen economic ties with China, which in turn drew criticism for perceived accommodation of Chinese interests (Pant & Manikikar, 2025)

Contradictions of Multialignment

While multialignment has helped India gain capital, technology and diplomatic flexibility, it has failed to provide credible support during crises (Sahu, 2025). This contradiction limits its utility as an external balancing strategy.

Risk of Strategic Dependence on Partners

The crisis moments demonstrated the danger of becoming overly dependent on any one partner, whether the U.S., Russia or China. This reinforces India’s lesson that true security lies in self-reliance rather than external alignment.

Need for Internal Balancing

Prime Minister Modi’s Viksit Bharat 2047 vision stresses the urgency of self-reliance, securing critical minerals, building indigenous defence capabilities, deepwater exploration and accelerating reforms. However, the challenge lies in whether India can generate domestic capacity quickly enough to meet external pressures. As of now, India lacks critical technologies to efficiently utilise its own rare earth minerals despite having the third largest reserves of rare earth minerals.

Shifting from Alliances to Issue-Based Cooperation

Despite India’s balancing and multi-alignment, India must now balance working with multiple powers (U.S., Europe, Japan, Russia and China) without allowing any to become indispensable. This balancing act is difficult to sustain amid rising global rivalries and regional instability.

VIII. Conclusion

In conclusion, India’s foreign policy from 2018 to 2025 illustrates a decisive transformation from cautious non-alignment to proactive strategic autonomy. In a volatile international environment shaped by great-power rivalry, pandemics and conflicts, India has positioned itself not as a passive actor but as a confident, agenda-setting power. Its balancing of ties with the US, China and Russia, coupled with leadership in forums such as the G20, QUAD and I2U2, reflects how autonomy has become both a shield against external pressures and a tool for expanding global influence.

Looking ahead, India’s ability to sustain this trajectory will shape not only its own strategic interests but also the stability of regional and global governance frameworks. By embracing multi-alignment while defending sovereignty, India has emerged as a credible leader in bridging divides between the Global South and the West. Its evolving role suggests that strategic autonomy is no longer defensive non-alignment but a forward-looking, pragmatic approach to international politics, one that will remain central to the global order’s future.

IX. Recommendations for Western Strategy

Respecting India’s Strategic Autonomy
India’s foreign policy has long been anchored in the principle of strategic autonomy, a doctrine rooted in its historical non-alignment movement and post-colonial identity. For Western powers, especially the United States and the European Union, acknowledging this autonomy is crucial in building a durable partnership. Unlike traditional allies that often align closely with Washington’s global agenda, New Delhi prefers a flexible, issue-based approach to cooperation (Tellis, 2021). Attempts to pressure India into a rigid bloc, whether in the context of U.S.-China rivalry or the Russia-Ukraine war, risk alienating it and undermining mutual trust.

Respecting India’s independence allows Western partners to better integrate India into global governance structures without compromising its agency. Such respect enhances cooperation across multiple domains, including defence collaboration, technology transfer and democratic governance promotion (Hall, 2021). Moreover, by affirming India’s autonomy, Western states can position themselves as reliable partners rather than coercive actors, thereby promoting regional stability and safeguarding shared strategic interests in Asia and beyond.

Cooperation on Shared Interests

Another central recommendation involves broadening cooperation with India across areas of shared interest. Counter-terrorism is a particularly significant domain. Both India and the West face persistent threats from transnational extremist networks, making intelligence-sharing and capacity-building vital (Tellis, 2022). Non-proliferation is another area where convergence is possible, despite past frictions over India’s nuclear program. India’s responsible track record in nuclear stewardship has increased Western willingness to cooperate, particularly within frameworks such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (Pant & Rej, 2020).

Climate change represents a further area of alignment. India, while still a developing economy, is also one of the largest carbon emitters and thus a critical partner in achieving global emission reduction targets. Collaborative initiatives in renewable energy, sustainable urbanisation and green finance could benefit both India’s developmental trajectory and Western climate commitments (Dubash, 2021).

Economic cooperation also provides fertile ground for expanding strategic ties. India’s rapidly growing economy, projected to become the world’s third largest within this decade, offers Western partners significant opportunities for investment, supply chain diversification and digital partnerships. Such cooperation not only strengthens bilateral relations but also contributes to global economic governance by embedding India more deeply within the liberal economic order.

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