Executive Summary
India launched its Naval communications satellite CMS-03 aboard its homegrown LVM3 rocket successfully on 2nd November. It is also set to launch the third cohort of surveillance satellites, dubbed SBS-III, consisting of 52 satellites by 2029. Work on this has been fast-tracked since Operation ‘Sindhoor’ following the Pahalgam attack. This decision comes at a time when countries are realizing that space is the “ultimate high ground.”
China, in competition with the United States to become the global leader, is leading the race to control space, with diverse and lethal kinetic and non-kinetic ASAT capabilities. Although India became only the fourth country to acquire ASAT capability through its Mission Shakti (2019) test, India’s ASAT capabilities remain kinetic-only. Furthermore, integration between India’s civilian and military space programs is low compared to China. China’s space resilience is far greater, having developed a multi-layered Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) backup architecture that ensures robust redundancy in the event of satellite disruption. By contrast, NavIC still lacks a terrestrial backup system comparable to China’s, leaving it vulnerable in a space-denied environment.
Key Points
- CMS-03 is a naval communications satellite critical for the Indo-Pacific, a flashpoint of global trade and geopolitical rivalry.
- India is speeding up deployment of military surveillance satellites, recognizing that space is now an arena of global strategic competition- emphasized by China’s creation of the PLA Aerospace Force in 2023, which openly declared space as the “ultimate high ground.”
- China acquired kinetic ASAT capabilities in 2007, which served as a wake-up call for India and ultimately prompted India’s acquisition of similar capabilities in 2019.
- Since 2007, China’s ASAT capabilities have become far more diverse and lethal, including:
- · Sophisticated non-debris producing systems such as ground-based lasers and high-power microwave systems;
- · Co-orbital satellites with robotic arms, such as Shijian-21, nominally for debris clearing;
- · Jammers and spoofers targeting satellite communications and navigation;
- · Testing of spaceplanes and integration of AI into satellite management.
- India’s yet-to-be-deployed 52-satellite SBS-III cohort also incorporates AI-based inter-satellite communication between GEO and LEO satellites to detect threats from afar and prompt LEO satellites to investigate closely.
- The Centre for Strategic and International Studies reported that China operates 300 surveillance satellites in LEO, and the BeiDou constellation alone has 35 satellites, providing encrypted military services.
- India currently has only 10 surveillance satellites, according to ISRO’s chairman (May 2025).
- Although India established the Defence Space Agency (DSA) and launched Project NETRA to monitor threats to Indian satellites, Chinese counterspace technology is far more diverse and lethal, and China maintains a far larger number of military satellites- creating a clear space power asymmetry.
Analysis
India’s limited ASAT capabilities carry low deterrence value in times of conflict, and the balance of power in space is presently tilted in China’s favor. China’s proliferation of space weapons is driven by competition with the United States, and its space program is deeply integrated into its broader military modernization. The creation of the PLA Aerospace Force is symbolic of this integration, as it directly reports to the Central Military Commission, enabling highly centralized decision-making.
Indian Air Marshal Dixit remarked that Chinese satellites have demonstrated “dogfighting” maneuvers in LEO and have evolved from a “kill chain” to a “kill mesh”- an integrated network interweaving surveillance satellites with weapon systems.
India has initiated integration efforts through the Defense Space Agency, which is working on developing a military space doctrine, and through Project NETRA. However, the DSA and the Integrated Defence Staff are not part of the Space Commission, India’s highest decision-making body on space matters, which is dominated by civilian ISRO officials. Integrating the DSA into the Space Commission is necessary to harmonize civilian, commercial, and military space priorities.
China’s space resilience far surpasses India’s. It has built a multi-layered PNT backup architecture integrating BeiDou, eLoran, long-wave timing stations, and fibre-optic timing links, giving it strong redundancy in any disruption scenario. In contrast, India’s NavIC constellation has faced repeated atomic clock failures, reducing accuracy and reliability, and still lacks a comparable terrestrial backup system.
Policy Implications
- Develop Non-Kinetic ASAT Capabilities
India must prioritize directed-energy weapons, electronic warfare systems, and robotic interference capabilities that are not debris-causing, in order to counter China’s “kill mesh.” - Integrate the Defence Space Agency into the Space Commission
A unified civil- military- commercial space governance structure is essential for coherent national space strategy. - Establish Terrestrial PNT Backup Infrastructure
India urgently needs a ground-based PNT backup system, similar to China’s eLoran and fibre-timing networks. Without such redundancy, NavIC will remain highly vulnerable and could be among the first casualties in a space-denied conflict. - Strengthen Cooperation with Space-Faring Allies
India should deepen collaboration with partners such as the United States, Japan, France, and Australia to enhance space situational awareness, satellite resilience, and joint security in the evolving Indo-Pacific space domain.