Written by Michal Hunicz
Ongoing since 2023, the Third Sudanese Civil War has shown no sign of nearing conclusion. What began as a power struggle between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) effectively forming the government and the formerly pro-government, now-rebel Rapid Support Forces (RSF), has escalated from a coup attempt into one of Africa’s bloodiest wars and the world’s most severe humanitarian catastrophe. With tides of war shifting more than once, both sides’ entrenched will to fight, extensive foreign involvement and backing, as well as the conflict’s spillover into South Sudan, a negotiated end appears distant. Instead, the conflict’s territorial evolution is pointing toward an increasingly plausible outcome: the formation of a new, functional, de facto state – an RSF-controlled ,,West Sudan” – poised for protracted, if officially unrecognised, existence.
This trajectory is driven by the conflict’s evolving nature and trends. The initial phase of fragmented urban warfare raging across numerous enclaves, encompassing Khartoum, Kordofan and Darfur, have denied the RSF control of key lines of communication which could serve logistics within a contiguous territory and ultimately made Dagalo’s bid for leadership of Sudan a failed one. Once the SAF launched a strategic counteroffensive, it could limit the scale of costly urban warfare, ending sieges of several cities, the garrisons of which were tying down a great part of RSF military potential.
As the war progressed, the RSF has managed to consolidate its rule over Darfur with the fall of El Fasher, as well as securing vast swathes of northwestern Sudan bordering Libya. Currently, the war has moved to Kordofan, a new critical battleground. Babanusa, one of the province’s key cities, has already fallen following a nearly two-year-long siege and El Obeid, Kordofan’s historical capital and main hub, is reportedly ‘one or two steps’ away from being reached. The RSF rule over Kordofan would be a major step forward to the long-lasting quasi-state, bringing it to the vicinity of Khartoum and the Nile valley.
The other factor is the ruling faction’s deeply rooted locality. The RSF-led coalition originates in the Janjaweed, a largely Darfur-based Arab movement aiming for land seizure and the ethnic cleansing of non-Arab native populations. With its cadres and troops drawn from Darfur and Kordofan, the RSF is positioned to establish uncontested rule over these two regions of Sudan, exploiting local networks, shared identity and motivations, if the SAF’s presence as an opposing factor is eliminated.
The concept of independent Darfur-centred state rests upon a historical precedent. The area has remained independent under a single polity – the Sultanate of Darfur – which lasted from the 17th century until 1874, when it was incorporated into Egypt’s short-lived empire. After the British suppressed the Mahdist rebellion and reorganized Sudan under their rule as the Anglo-Egyptian condominium, the Sultanate of Darfur was re-established, before it was invaded once again in 1916 and incorporated into the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.
Such a state would not be without significant and attractive economic potential. In fact, the Rapid Support Forces owe their recent success to the United Arab Emirates, providing aid in exchange for gold from RSF-held mines. Seizing control of Kordofan would add much of Sudan’s remaining hydrocarbon reservoirs to the Janjaweed coalition’s wealth at disposal. Like South Sudan however, this landlocked state would be dependent on negotiating export routes through neighbouring nations.
Diplomatically, the RSF is far from isolated. Apart from the UAE being its most significant sponsor, it enjoys varying levels of support from several African actors: South Sudan, Chad, Khalifa Haftar’s LNA in eastern Libya, Uganda and Kenya, the latter hosting the RSF-led conference paving the way to establish the Government of Peace and Unity – a political structure responsible for civilian governance on the areas under RSF rule. If this state of affairs persisted, the potential West Sudanese state would be essentially buffered against international isolation.
The critical barrier is the regime’s foundational nature. In contrast to South Sudan’s SPLM, the RSF and its allies are an instrument of Arab supremacist rule, actively spearheading a genocide against Darfur’s non-Arab native peoples. The international community is unlikely to confer legitimacy upon such an entity.
Therefore, it is likely that in an era of degrading international norms, an RSF-controlled ,,West Sudan” may emerge as a stabilised (though not based on peaceful co-existence) de facto state, in possession of contiguous territory, strategic resources, a reliable armed force and substantial foreign backing. This would represent a resolution born not of a peace agreement, but of territorial conquest and ethnic subjugation.
Michał Hunicz is a PhD Candidate at Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, a Graduate in International Relations and a scholarship recipient at Link Campus University in Rome. He specializes in international political and military relations in the Middle East, with particular emphasis on Lebanon and Syria. He is currently researching the phenomenon of state collapse in the region as an effect of great and regional power rivalry.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this publication are solely those of the author(s) and do not represent the views or positions of CISES, its leadership, or affiliated organisations.