Last night saw a number of airstrikes launched across Venezuela, with President Donald Trump announcing that a raid by US Delta Force and the FBI’s Hostage Rescue Team had captured Venezuela’s President, Nicolás Maduro. Recent reports from the Venezuelan opposition in exile have claimed that this was the product of back-channel negotiations between Maduro and the US government. This swift and effective regime-change operation, which is still ongoing, may have the ability to place the opposition in charge in Venezuela and shift the regime towards being more Western-friendly.
Ordinarily, this would be seen as a win taking a regime that has traditionally sat within the orbit of Russia, China and Iran, moving it in a more favourable direction, and freeing up oil on the global market, thereby allowing more effective competition with major producers such as Russia. However, the recent US National Security Strategy has intentionally played down ideas of great power competition in favour of a renewed focus on Latin America, representing a return to some form of revived Monroe Doctrine. At this point, only a year into the current US administration, this strategy may already be suffering from catastrophic success, as the United States appears to be running out of snakes to slay in its own back garden while ignoring the dragons that represent far more significant threats, even if they are geographically more distant. With irregular migration flows across the southern US border reduced to almost nothing, and a regime-change operation carried out against the most geopolitically threatening regime in the region one which, in the grand scheme of things, was relatively straightforward to execute what remains in Latin America is largely limited to Cuba’s residual influence, the drugs trade, and some lingering presence from Hezbollah linked networks.
This has always been the central problem with the idea of a neo-Monroe Doctrine. Whereas previous blunders in US strategic planning often stemmed from dreaming too big assuming the rest of the world was eager for some form of Jeffersonian democracy and that the United States could spread it while being welcomed with open arms, the recent National Security Strategy has arguably dreamt too small. The original Monroe Doctrine emerged during a period of US westward expansion and was intended to allow American growth without interference from European powers. Today, the United States faces few existential, or even mid-level, threats from Latin America. Even at the height of the Cold War, the strategic environment was considerably more dangerous, with events such as the Cuban Missile Crisis and the presence of communist governments and insurgent movements throughout the region. Yet even then, the United States was still able to compete effectively with the Soviet Union across the Eurasian landmass.
While strategy is often defined in terms of ends, ways and means a useful framework what is frequently overlooked are external factors. Whether one welcomes it or not, the international system is entering what some describe as multipolarity, or what might more accurately be termed an era of great power competition. This reality cannot be escaped by either large or small states, as it reflects the prevailing zeitgeist of the age. Even if the National Security Strategy attempts to move away from this framing, it cannot ultimately do so. It is often said that great philosophers and intellectuals are less adept at inventing entirely new ideas than at recognising and articulating the prevailing mood of their time. The 2017 National Security Strategy under the first Trump administration captured this sentiment through its explicit embrace of great power competition and its departure from the post-Cold War ‘end of history’ mindset and the Global War on Terror. This explains why the Biden–Harris National Security Strategy ultimately looked very similar: the same structural trends were present and are likely to persist for decades to come, barring genuine black swan events.
Serious questions must therefore be asked about the purpose of a trillion-dollar military if it is not primarily focused on securing global shipping lanes and deterring China and Russia. There is a recurring tendency within right-wing populist movements to project military strength while simultaneously being hesitant to develop a coherent strategy for its use. This often results in the targeting of low-hanging fruit while more significant challenges are deferred or ignored. In isolation, the operations in Venezuela last night appear efficient and effective, aligning with a series of recent Western successes, including Israel’s operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon and diplomatic breakthroughs in Syria and the South Caucasus that have removed allies of Russia, China and Iran from the geopolitical chessboard. However, if the United States is indeed abandoning the broader strategy of which these actions might once have formed a part, it is difficult to see what enduring purpose such an operation ultimately serves.
Ultimately, the apparent success of operations such as those in Venezuela risks obscuring a deeper strategic problem rather than resolving it. Tactical effectiveness and short-term geopolitical wins do not, in themselves, constitute a coherent grand strategy, particularly in an era increasingly defined by great power competition. The United States remains uniquely positioned to shape the international system, yet its recent actions suggest a preference for achievable, low-risk interventions in peripheral theatres over the far more demanding task of contesting power on the Eurasian landmass. While this approach may deliver visible successes and domestic political dividends, it does little to address the structural challenges posed by China and Russia, nor does it articulate a clear theory of victory for the coming decades.
The danger, therefore, is not failure but strategic drift. By focusing on manageable problems in its immediate neighbourhood, the United States risks mistaking activity for strategy and momentum for direction. History suggests that great powers are rarely undone by a lack of capability, but rather by the misalignment of ends, ways and means with the broader international environment in which they operate. If the current administration wishes to move beyond episodic successes and towards enduring strategic advantage, it will need to reconcile its actions with the realities of great power competition rather than attempting to sidestep them. Without such clarity, even the most efficient operations may ultimately serve little purpose beyond the satisfaction of short-term gains.