The US intervention in Venezuela and the capture of Nicolas Maduro to bring him to trial on criminal charges have far-reaching implications for international politics. One particularly instructive perspective from which to analyse the events that unfolded in Caracas on 3 January 2026 is that of Russian imperialism. Maduro’s fall is evidence of the failure of Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy and of his attempts to transform Russia into a global power with political and military capabilities comparable to those of the United States.
Viewed from this perspective, several issues merit particular attention:
1. The actions undertaken by the United States represent a clear political defeat for Russia. This is yet another in a series of setbacks. Russia lacked both the political and military capacity to keep Bashar al-Assad, supported by Putin throughout the Syrian civil war, in power. Similarly, it proved unable to support Iran during the American–Israeli intervention in 2025. The assurances issued by the Russian political elite that Russia would support Maduro likewise proved impossible to fulfil. Russia appears powerless and unreliable in its attempt to portray itself as the leader of a global movement against Western hegemony.
2. Another political consequence of Maduro’s downfall is less obvious and has therefore attracted less commentary. Russia found itself compelled to condemn publicly the actions of the United States, with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov denouncing them as a violation of international law. This forced condemnation calls into question Russia’s policy since the beginning of Donald Trump’s second presidential term. A defining feature of this policy was the avoidance of any criticism of Trump, combined with efforts to foster tensions between the United States and Europe (both the European Union and the United Kingdom). Trump’s policies were portrayed as pragmatic and peace-oriented, while European policies were depicted as anti-Russian and pro-war. These efforts were accompanied by attempts to draw Trump towards Russia’s position on the Russian–Ukrainian war. Open condemnation of US actions in Venezuela significantly weakens, and may even negate, this orientation of Russian foreign policy.
3. Russia has failed to achieve any of the military or political objectives for which it has waged aggression against Ukraine since 2022. Against this background, the military effectiveness demonstrated by the United States stands in stark contrast to the ineffectiveness of the Russian armed forces. This comparison shows Russia’s lack of the military capacity required to play the role of a global power. Moreover, until recently, Russian state propaganda emphasised that Venezuela relied on Russian weapons systems, including air-defence systems. The US intervention, much like the earlier intervention in Iran, reinforces assumptions regarding the technical obsolescence of Russian weaponry. This undermines not only Russia’s propaganda-driven image of military strength, but also its economic interests associated with arms exports.
4. The primary source of revenue in Russia’s state budget is the export of unprocessed natural resources, above all crude oil. The regime change in Venezuela and the prospect of sanctions being lifted on the Venezuelan oil sector constitute a serious economic threat to Russia, exacerbated by the current decline in global oil prices. The potential re-entry of Venezuelan oil into international markets – and, in the event of reprivatisation and modernisation of the Venezuelan oil industry, an increase in supply – would further reduce Russia’s budgetary revenues. In the context of the ongoing war against Ukraine, this would lead to additional cuts to already severely reduced non-military expenditure, potentially provoking social unrest.
5. The intervention in Venezuela represents a striking example of the practical application of the Monroe Doctrine, according to which the United States does not permit foreign influence in the Western Hemisphere, particularly when such influence might threaten its political, economic, or military dominance. In seeking to assume the geopolitical role once played by the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Russia has attempted to construct a comparable zone of exclusive political, economic, and military influence through the concept of the ‘near abroad’, encompassing the states that emerged following the collapse of the Soviet Union, with the exception of the Baltic states. However, Russia’s efforts to exercise control over the ‘near abroad’ have proved largely ineffective. This is evident not only in the war against Ukraine, but also in the growing independence of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the Central Asian states from Russian influence. The effectiveness demonstrated by the United States casts the ineffectiveness of Putin’s foreign policy in an even sharper light.
Written by Professor Marcin Skladanowski
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this publication are solely those of the author(s) and do not represent the views or positions of CISES, its leadership, or affiliated organisations.