Executive Summary
The end of 2025 marked the start of an open crisis between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia, which had been building for years. Over the past decade, both states have collaborated closely on achieving regional security objectives, particularly in Yemen, opposing the Iranian-backed Houthi movement. However, diverging strategic priorities now complicate this coordination against the Houthis and risk further fragmentation within Yemen. This rivalry has direct implications for Yemen’s stability, the regional balance of power and Horn of Africa dynamics.
Key points
- Divergent approaches to Yemen: UAE backs the STC and a north-south state vision, while Saudi Arabia prioritises a unified Yemen and de-escalation
- Impact on Yemen conflict: The dispute may weaken unified efforts against the Houthis, potentially offering strategic advantages
- UAE’s regional influence: Beyond Yemen, the UAE projects power through networks in the Horn of Africa, particularly in strategic locations such as Somaliland
Analysis
Since 2011, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have cooperated closely on regional security objectives, particularly in Yemen, where both opposed the Iranian-backed Houthi movement. While this cooperation achieved short-term security goals, underlying disagreements over Yemen’s political future gradually intensified. These disagreements reflect fundamentally different threat perceptions and political priorities. Saudi Arabia aims to unite Yemen and de-escalate conflict to protect domestic goals, including an economic boost through tourism growth, while viewing instability near its border as a security threat. From this perspective, the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC), which seeks a return to a north-south two-state solution, poses a challenge to Yemen’s unity.
The STC’s recent advances into southern and eastern Yemen, including Hadramawt, threatened both Yemen’s unity and Saudi security interests. In response, pro-government forces backed by Riyadh reclaimed much of these areas, severely diminishing the STC’s operational capacity. This marked a clear assertion of Saudi red lines regarding Yemen’s unity.
The UAE, by contrast, has focused on fighting al-Islah, an Islamist party linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, while building influence as a regional power. Its support for the STC reflects this priority rather than a commitment to Yemeni unification. Tensions escalated when STC leader Aidarous al-Zubaidi was charged with treason and fled via Somaliland before arriving in Abu Dhabi, marking a shift from managed tensions to open confrontation between the two Gulf partners.
Beyond Yemen, the UAE’s foreign policy appears more flexible than Saudi Arabia’s, driven by immediate strategic interests rather than a single long-term objective. It focuses on economic prosperity and security through building networks across Yemen, Israel and the Horn of Africa. This is evident in the UAE’s alignment with Israel on Somaliland: Israel has formally recognised Somaliland, while the UAE supports the territory without recognition. Somaliland’s strategic location in the Yemen conflict, providing sea access opposite Yemen’s eastern border, outweighs diplomatic friction with Somalia. In this wider regional context, UAE-backed STC advances in oil-rich Hadramawt show how its regional strategy intersects with, and complicates Saudi objectives in Yemen. Even with the STC weakened, the UAE’s continued influence in Yemen and beyond complicates Riyadh’s objectives.
Policy Implications
The Saudi-UAE tensions threaten a unified effort against the Houthis, increasing political fragmentation and complicating anti-Houthi strategy. This comes at a critical moment for Iran, which is facing domestic unrest, increasing the stakes in Yemen. Despite the STC’s weakening, the UAE maintains regional leverage particularly in the Horn of Africa, which Saudi strategies must account for. Long-standing facilitator Oman could be utilised as a neutral broker to support coordination between the Gulf actors and Yemeni stakeholders, reducing the risk of further fragmentation.