Executive Summary
Recent U.S. threats of military action against Iran have prompted explicit concern from Washington’s Gulf partners. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait have responded hesitantly, engaging in active diplomacy by not allowing the United States to utilize their airspace, territory, and military facilities for airstrikes against Iran. This collective ban indicates a deep apprehension regarding regional instability, retaliation risks, and economic disruption. While for years state consent and alignment between the United States and its Gulf partners have seemed automatic, this instance reflects how political consent and host-nation risk calculations can reshape the balance between diplomacy and escalation.
Key Points
- In January 2026, Trump commented regarding the ongoing mass protests in Iran, threatening to intervene and take “strong action” against Iran’s conduct if its government continues to use lethal force against demonstrators. In response, Iran’s leaders threatened to strike against U.S. military bases in the Middle East over Trump’s threats.
- On January 26, 2026, the United Arab Emirates publicly stated that it will not allow the U.S. to make any use of their airspace, territory, and military facilities for action against Iran. Instead, the UAE’s emphasis was on diplomacy, de-escalation, and risk mitigation. The rest of the Gulf partners – notably Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait – have followed the UAE’s stance by avoiding being involved in direct confrontation between these two major political actors.
- As tensions are increasing, the U.S. has deployed a major carrier strike group, led by the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, and additional naval resources to the Middle East. Following the U.S. carrier deployment, Iran-backed militias in Yemen and Iraq have threatened new strikes, as well as Iran itself is reported to be preparing for a possible escalation if attacked.
Analysis
The Gulf states’ refusal to grant access to their airspace, territory, and military facilities marks a significant shift in long-standing assumptions of U.S. regional access in crisis situations against Iran. Gulf partners have declared that their concern regards regional instability and their willingness not to be drawn into the conflict. Alternatively, this would have strong security and economic repercussions on Gulf partners. For example, in October 2024, Teheran warned Gulf states that their involvement in supporting attacks against Iran would implicate strikes on their oil facilities, resonating with the 2019 strike on Saudi Arabia’s Aramco facilities. Additionally, involvement would compromise and disrupt energy exports, exposing critical infrastructure to attacks and undermining investor confidence.
This stance complicates operational planning for Washington, resulting in a security problem. Although the U.S. maintains around 40,000 troops across their bases in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, the lack of host-nation approval is crucial in limiting its military campaigns. Such a stance implies reliance on further and secondary bases, recalling the late 1990s, when similar Saudi restrictions forced the U.S. to operate outside the Gulf during strikes on Iraq.
Policy Implications
- U.S. operational planners can no longer assume automatic access to their bases in the Gulf states, which may require a differential planning procedure, forcing the U.S. to utilize further military bases, such as the Diego Garcia military base in the Chagos Archipelago.
- The Gulf states’ “non-alignment” and “non-involvement” between the U.S. and Iran may serve as a launching pad for diplomacy and risk mitigation procedures without resulting in a direct conflict.
- Teheran may interpret Gulf resistance as a disadvantage and lack of regional backing for Washington, potentially strengthening Iran’s negotiating leverage.
Bibliography (for Editors)
Arms Control Association. “Trump Threatens New Military Action Against Iran.” Arms Control Today (January/February 2026), by Kelsey Davenport. Accessed January 2026. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2026-01/news/trump-threatens-new-military-action-against-iran
Chatham House. “Would Trump’s Threatened Strikes Help Iran’s Protesters or Boost the Regime?” Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank, January 12, 2026. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/01/would-trumps-threatened-strikes-help-irans-protestors-or-boost-regime
Iran International. “Iran International News Article.” IranIntl.com. Accessed January 2026 https://www.iranintl.com/en/202601143811
Euronews. “Iran Warns Qatar and Saudi Arabia It Will Strike US Targets If Attacked, Expert Says.” Euronews, January 15, 2026. Accessed January 2026. https://www.euronews.com/2026/01/15/iran-warns-qatar-and-saudi-arabia-it-will-strike-us-targets-if-attacked-expert-says
Reuters. “UAE Bars Use of Its Airspace for Military Action Against Iran.” Reuters, January 26, 2026. Accessed January 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-bars-use-its-airspace-military-action-against-iran-2026-01-26/
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, United Arab Emirates. “UAE Reaffirms Commitment to Not Allowing Its Airspace, Territory or Waters to Be Used in Any Military Actions Against Iran.” January 26, 2026. Accessed January 2026. https://www.mofa.gov.ae/en/mediahub/news/2026/1/26/