The Quantum Shift is Arriving before the Rules Do
Quantum technologies are no longer a speculative frontier. They are moving unevenly but decisively into national security ecosystems, where advantages in computation, sensing, timing, communications and optimisation can translate into strategic leverage. This change is happening in a world that is already tense because of a lack of trust, rapid military modernisation, and weak arms control agreements. Because of this, quantum competition is increasingly discussed in the same breath as deterrence credibility, intelligence dominance, and crisis decision-making. However, this capability is not the only thing that makes quantum innovation so destabilising. The governance gap is equally significant. Quantum systems can be quietly added to command-and-control, intelligence processing, navigation resilience, undersea detection, and cyber operations. This is different from many older weapons systems that took decades to develop and had clear testing and delivery platforms. The strategic effects could happen suddenly, for example, if codebreaking breaks through, sensing accuracy improves, or an operational advantage shortens escalation timelines. This could happen before the international community has established a common language, norms, or stabilising expectations.
Why Only a Handful of States Matter and Why Everyone Else Should Care
In the short to medium term, the effective “quantum arms race” will be led by a small group of countries with strong scientific bases, well-developed defence-industrial ecosystems, and stable public funding. These countries are mostly the United States, China, Russia, the United Kingdom, and a few close partners. This concentration is important because it could lead to a familiar pattern: a technology advanced states sets standards, operational concepts, and rules of engagement through practice, while the international system adapts later and from a weaker position.
However, the effects will be felt worldwide Many states, especially those that rely on secure communications, financial systems, undersea cables, satellite services, and digital infrastructure, could be vulnerable to “harvest now, decrypt later” strategies. In these strategies, adversaries gather encrypted data today for later use with quantum technology. That is why major security organisations are already pushing for post-quantum readiness, which includes ways to move to post-quantum cryptography.
What “Quantum Weapons” Really Means in Practice?
If “quantum weapons” make you think of a single device like a missile or bomb, it can be misleading. The most transformative and potentially destabilising applications are likely to be system-level: quantum capabilities fused into intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; navigation and timing; secure communications; and high-speed optimisation for complex military planning.
Three areas are especially important:
First, quantum computing could make public-key cryptography less secure, which would give cyber operations a reason to act first and raise concerns about the loss of command-and-control confidentiality. The policy implication is immediate: states and operators of critical infrastructure must switch to quantum-resistant security before a breakthrough, not after it.
Second, quantum sensing, which includes gravimetry, magnetometry, and ultra-precise measurement, could make platforms that support deterrence stability less able to survive, especially subsea systems. Even small improvements in detection could change how risks are calculated, how patrols are planned, and how escalation incentives are altered. NATO’s own quantum strategy shows that sensing and positioning, navigation and timing are important areas of concern for defence, which means they are not just ideas but real planning categories.
Third, quantum communications (including quantum key distribution in some contexts) may enhance confidentiality for early adopters, while exacerbating disparities between “quantum-secure” and “quantum-vulnerable” entities.
None of these necessitate a singular, dramatic “quantum weapon”. They can change the stability of a crisis by using hidden integration, uneven adoption, and strategic surprise.
The Strategic Stability Problem: Speed, Opacity, and Misperception
Historically, strategic stability was contingent upon time: time to interpret warnings, time to verify signals, time to communicate, and time for leaders to opt for restraint rather than escalation. Quantum-enabled advantages, particularly when integrated with AI-driven decision support, can reduce those timeframes. If leaders think that their secure communications, early warning, or second-strike survivability are getting worse, these concerns may intensify.
The lack of clarity further exacerbates the problem. Quantum capabilities are difficult to observe externally and their effects on operations are often guessed at rather than seen. This makes it easy for states to make the worst-case assumptions. For example, if one state thinks another can break encryption or track platforms better, it may change its doctrine, take hair-trigger postures, or take risky countermeasures even before those capabilities are proven. The United Nations-focused security research has repeatedly warned that quantum technologies could make current security systems less stable. Instead of waiting for a crisis to happen, these issues should be dealt with through anticipatory governance.
A Transformative Futures Framework for Governing the Quantum Arms Race
The policy response should not be to wait for a clear “quantum moment.” What is required is a governance structure that works for disruptive, fast-moving, dual-use technologies and can work even when making treaties takes a long time.
A Transformative Futures Framework for quantum governance four mutually reinforcing tracks:
Foresight and early-warning governance: States and international organisations should put resources into structured horizon scanning and risk mapping that keeps track of quantum breakthroughs, supply chains, talent flows, dual-use diffusion, and defence adoption pathways. The goal is not to conduct surveillance for its own sake, but to find destabilising trends early on, like quantum-enabled anti-submarine detection, risks of cryptographic compromise, or new ways to use cyber coercion. Discussions linked to the UN have stressed the need for proactive strategic analysis across domains, rather than treating “quantum” as a single category.
Quantum confidence-building measures (Q-CBMs): Stabilising measures can still reduce uncertainty and improve understanding when treaties are not politically possible. These could include voluntary openness about national plans for the post-quantum transition, rules for quantum-enabled cyber operations, and non-binding promises not to use quantum-enabled exploitation to attack nuclear command-and-control communications. The goal is to reduce the risk of escalation and make it clear what the red lines are, especially for the few states that can do something about it.
Standards, resilience, and responsible adoption: Governance must reflect engineering realities. This means speeding up the adoption of post-quantum cryptography, creating security standards for quantum parts in important infrastructure, and making navigation and timing services more reliable. NATO’s push for quantum readiness and post-quantum resilience shows how organisations can frame adoption to enhance their own resilience and manage risk instead of exacerbating an arms race.
Inclusive multilateralism beyond the quantum “club”: A small group may be able to drive technological development, but for governance to be perceived as legitimate, more actors need to be involved. Smaller states and stakeholders in the Global South need ways to help set rules about responsible use, not interfering with important civilian infrastructure, and protecting against coercion through technology. Quantum governance that is exclusive will be weak and will lead to separate groups instead of working together to lower risk.
Implementation: From Concept to Policy Toolkits
The framework needs to create specific deliverables that policymakers can quickly use to put this agenda into action.
One deliverable is a Quantum Risk Governance Toolkit. This toolkit will include scenario-based risk assessment templates, escalation indicators, and policy options that are specific to quantum sensing, quantum cyber risks, and quantum communications. Another deliverable is a platform for dialogue between scientists, defence planners, diplomats, and operators of critical infrastructure. This platform will help them agree on technical terms and possible ways to build trust. International Geneva is well positioned institutionally for science-and-diplomacy work that looks ahead, such as UN-linked projects on security and technology.
A third deliverable is a pilot framework proposal that can be tried out in track-two processes and then used in formal settings, like alliance standards, UN talks about new technologies, or regional security talks.
The UK Angle: Sovereignty, Resilience, and Alliance Governance
The UK is in a unique position: it has a strong quantum science base, significant intelligence and cyber assets, and good connections with other countries. UK strategies explicitly connect quantum goals to national resilience and security-related goals, even when they are framed in terms of innovation and economic competitiveness. The UK can serve as a bridge between stakeholders by pushing for better technical standards and resilience measures, as well as governance approaches that lower the incentives for escalation, especially among major powers.
Conclusion:
If the quantum arms race is not controlled, it will not just be a competition of laboratories. It will become a test of crisis stability. Changes in cryptography, sensing, and decision-making that are made possible by quantum technology can change deterrence calculations in ways that are hard to see, easy to misread, and dangerous to correct once doctrine and procurement pathways are set in stone. The main challenge is therefore one of timing: setting up rules early enough to stop a destabilising spiral, but flexible enough to keep up with the technology.
A Transformative Futures Framework provides a pragmatic approach: integrate foresight, confidence-enhancing strategies, resilience benchmarks, and inclusive multilateral engagement into a functional governance structure. The goal is not to stop new ideas from coming up, but to keep them from causing strategic panic. In a time when only a few states can change the course of quantum military events, global peace and security depend on making sure that the rules and the habits of restraint that keep things stable arrive before strategic surprise.
Written by Dr Tahir Azad, Associate Fellow at CISES and Research Fellow at the University of Reading
This commentary represents the views of the author and not of any organisation or third party.