The Problematic Use of the Term “Full-Scale War”
The Russian–Ukrainian war has continued since 24 February 2022 and is often called a ‘full-scale war.’ This term started in journalism but now shapes politics and academia. Ukrainian authorities use it to show that Russia’s earlier actions (including the illegal occupation and annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol in 2014 and support for separatists in Luhansk and Donetsk) were not just minor conflicts but acts of war. However, calling it a ‘full-scale war’ does not accurately describe the conflict. This term can also lead to analytical errors.
Firstly, Ukrainian authorities did not initially refer to the conflict with Russia as a war, but rather as an ‘anti-terrorist operation’.
Secondly, this term suggests that Russia has used all its military and non-military tools, such as sabotage and terrorism, in its aggression. But this is not true. Russia has not used weapons of mass destruction. Terrorist acts in Ukraine and the EU are happening, but their scale remains limited.
Third, the concept suggests that Russia devotes all its military, economic, and political capacity, implying it cannot launch further aggression soon. Actually, Russia is boosting its military, especially with modern weapons and armaments, supported by technological cooperation with states outside Western sanctions and state-driven smuggling through ‘parallel imports’. The only serious difficulty that could limit the aggressive plans of Putin and other Russian war criminals is the mobilisation capacity. Russian tactics, based on Soviet tradition, accept high casualties and require constant new recruits. This logistical challenge is manageable, as shown by Russia’s recent discussions about mobilisation. Economic strain matters less because the state prioritises war over other concerns.
We cannot underestimate the Russian threat. Russia could attack other countries during or after the Ukraine conflict. If Putin gets a favourable outcome (like the United States forcing Ukraine to yield parts of Donbas, accept permanent territorial losses, or not pursue Russian war criminals), the risk of more conflicts increases.
Russia’s new war does not have to resemble the war against Ukraine
The Russian army has revealed considerable weaknesses, many of which are systemic and stem from a pervasive culture of corruption and theft across Russia, including within its military institutions. More critically, these weaknesses stem from the army’s lack of preparedness for the type of warfare currently unfolding in Ukraine. Russian forces previously engaged in conflicts such as Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Syria, where they faced poorly equipped and organised adversaries. The early stages of the war in Ukraine appeared to rely on tactics reminiscent of World War II, such as large-scale troop deployments and intensive air operations. However, today’s Ukraine presents a fundamentally different context, and the conflict initiated by Russia in 2022 cannot be equated with previous wars.
Russia has changed its warfare because of large human losses. Russian propaganda no longer says Kyiv can be taken ‘in three days’. Russian military achievements remain limited. Still, they continue. More important are Russia’s political successes. Russia has avoided isolation, the United States has become less supportive of Ukraine, and doubt about NATO is growing. Russian disinformation spreads far-right and pro-Russian views in Europe. Pro-Russian messages are now common even in countries like Poland, which has experienced Russian and Soviet occupation and crimes.
After four years of fighting, it is unlikely that Putin will repeat the same military operation against NATO members. That does not mean Europe is safe. Instead, Russian actions – sabotage in the Baltic Sea, drone provocations against European air transport, and attempts to harm railway infrastructure in Poland – are working. These acts succeed partly because NATO and the EU respond weakly. This causes the public to lose trust in the authorities, NATO, and the EU. A Russian attack on a NATO country would likely not look like the 2022 Ukraine invasion. Instead, it would use tactics seen in early 2026: terrorist attacks, sabotage, and the spread of disinformation. The key assumption would be that NATO fails to defend not because it lacks power but because of weak political resolve.
Putin’s war is Russia’s war
A damaging misconception in some Western political circles is that the war against Ukraine is only Putin’s initiative. While Putin is responsible for starting and directing the war, it has become a Russian national project. There is minimal public opposition within Russia; most citizens support the war, though support is waning as economic problems grow. Russian soldiers routinely commit war crimes without restraint. The war enjoys the full support of Patriarch Kirill of Moscow, who calls it a ‘holy war’ and a ‘metaphysical war’ and gives it religious sanction. Pro-war sentiments have swept through Russian schools and universities, cultural institutions and artistic elites.
This situation comes from Putin’s policies since 2000, which destroyed civil society and built an authoritarian state. Still, the war involves all of Russia. Removing Putin will not turn Russia into a peaceful democracy. His death would not guarantee peace or change Russia’s neo-imperial and aggressive stance.
As Russia anticipates more conflict, its government is working harder to unite society and avoid unrest from mobilisation and economic pain. The state blocks access to independent news. Most Russians rely only on government propaganda for world events, including the Ukraine war. The authorities are limiting access to the open internet and restricting social media. When Putin decides to start another war, Russians will only know about its causes and course what state propaganda tells them.
When will Russia attack?
Speculating on timing offers little analytical value. Evidence suggests Russian preparation for future conflict, most likely focused on NATO’s eastern flank. In March 2025, the European Commission published the White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030. It sets an ambitious five-year path to enhance defence. However, complacency about preparation time is unwarranted.
From Russia’s point of view, now is a chance to destabilise Europe and maybe engage in limited military action. The European Union is just starting to improve its defence. The current U.S. policy does not guarantee it will uphold alliance commitments if Russia attacks. Under today’s U.S. administration, Russian leaders believe the U.S. will not respond, and Europe’s nuclear powers will stay out to avoid escalation. Even if NATO is involved, Putin might accept a truce and convince the Russian public that it is a win. Since Russians lack independent information, he can frame the outcome however he wants. Russia is not interested in waiting for Europe’s military to grow or for the next U.S. presidential election.
Historical patterns in Russian policy indicate that no genuine or ‘objective’ casus belli is required to justify aggression. The war against Ukraine demonstrates that Russian authorities can fabricate or alter justifications as needed, making it difficult to identify any consistent official rationale. Ultimately, these reasons are unimportant. The underlying causes of Russia’s wars are structural, rooted in the state’s identity as an aggressive empire that relies on instilling fear and using energy dependence as primary foreign policy tools. While Europe has largely reduced its reliance on Russian energy, the persistent fear of Russian aggression remains the principal means of Russian influence.
Conclusion
Over the past four years, the Russian-Ukrainian war has revealed both Russia’s vulnerabilities and its expanding military capabilities. The cohesion shown by European states, while encouraging, has not been strong enough to deter further Russian aggression. This exposes the urgent need to reassess the effectiveness of current European security policies against Russia’s broader ambitions.
It is key to recognise that only tangible demonstrations of force are effective in deterring Putin. Negotiations with Russia are generally ineffective, as the Russian political elite interprets them as signs of weakness. Ukrainians understand this reality well. Even if the current conflict concludes with a ceasefire, it will be necessary to further strengthen Ukraine’s defensive capabilities and military development. Any agreements with Russia are worth as much as the piece of paper signed by Hitler that the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain waved in London after returning from Munich on 30 September 1938, saying that he had brought ‘peace for our time’. Although Czechoslovakia was sold to the Third Reich in Munich, this did not save Europe from war. The same may happen this time if the West shows weakness towards Putin.
Action is needed now, including decisive measures against the Russian ‘shadow fleet’, countering sabotage, combating Russian disinformation, and, most importantly, providing strong support for Ukraine. This support should be both military and political, through recognising Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty within its 1991 borders and pursuing accountability for Russian war crimes. Ukraine has defended European interests for four years and must not be left to face this challenge alone.
Written by Professor Marcin Składanowski, Fellow at CISES and Full Professor of Russian and International Security Studies at the Catholic University of Lublin