The referendum held in Kazakhstan on 15 March 2026 marked the final stage in the adoption of the country’s new constitution. 87% of voters supported its approval. The new constitution is widely interpreted as an important element of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s policy aimed at consolidating state power and definitively curbing the influence of former President Nursultan Nazarbayev. However, the outcome of the referendum – and, more broadly, Tokayev’s policies – should be analysed in the context of Russia’s posture towards Kazakhstan. Will the changes to the system of government foster more cooperative relations with Russia, or might they be perceived in Moscow as a loss of influence and thus act as a pretext for coercive or even military action?
There can be little expectation of ‘gratitude’ in Astana for the military intervention conducted in January 2022 under the auspices of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), led by Russia, which supported President Tokayev during a period of acute domestic unrest. At the same time, a key premise of Russian foreign policy remains unchanged: Kazakhstan, as part of the so-called ‘near abroad’, is not regarded as fully sovereign vis-à-vis Russia, and any strengthening of its independence or diversification of its external relations (with China, the European Union, and the United States) is perceived as a threat to Russian security.
Key Issues from the Perspective of Russia’s Policy Objectives towards Kazakhstan
1. Emphasis on national identity and sovereignty. President Tokayev described the 2026 Constitution as the foundation of the country’s independence and sovereignty [1]. This is not simply symbolic. The strengthening of state authority may significantly weaken informal networks within Kazakhstan’s power structures that have historically aligned with Russian interests.
2. Language policy and cultural autonomy. Although the new constitution continues to recognise Russian as an ‘official’ language, it places clear emphasis on Kazakh as the state language. This reflects a continuation of earlier policies initiated under Nursultan Nazarbayev and aimed at a gradual cultural and linguistic emancipation from Russia. By contrast, the preservation of the dominance of the Russian language and culture in the ‘near abroad’ remains a priority of Russian policy and is framed in terms of national security.
What Does Russian Political Discourse Accuse Kazakhstan of?
1. Assertion of independent identity. The principal accusation is that Kazakhstan is increasingly asserting its independence from Russia and its cultural, ethnic, and linguistic identity. Representatives of the Russian political elite and state-aligned media have repeatedly questioned Kazakhstan’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and even its historical legitimacy, suggesting that the Kazakh state is largely a product of Soviet ethnic policy. The most notorious example is the statement by Vyacheslav Nikonov in December 2020, who claimed that ‘the territory of Kazakhstan is a great gift from Russia and the Soviet Union’ [2]. This echoes broader neo-imperial narratives previously directed at Ukraine.
2. Pursuit of a multi-vector foreign policy. Kazakhstan’s efforts to pursue an autonomous foreign policy – including relations with China, Türkiye (within the framework of the Organisation of Turkic States), the European Union, and the United States – are met with strong criticism. Any form of non-Russian military presence in Kazakhstan, including cooperation or exercises with NATO, is interpreted as a serious threat to Russian national security [3].
3. The Russian-speaking population. A recurring accusation concerns the alleged discrimination against the Russian-speaking minority, particularly the gradual reduction of the role of the Russian language in public life. Even linguistic reforms of the Kazakh language, such as the shift from Cyrillic to Latin, are frequently framed in Russian discourse as hostile acts directed against Russia [4].
Possible Means of Pressure by Russia
Constitutional reform does not fundamentally transform Russian–Kazakh relations. As a member of the CSTO and the CIS, Kazakhstan remains structurally linked to Russia. However, this dependence is gradually diminishing as Russia’s capacity for external influence weakens under the strain of political, economic and military challenges.
A primary instrument of Russian influence remains the Russian-speaking minority in Kazakhstan. According to Russian strategic documents, one of the objectives of Russian policy is to ‘protect’ Russian-speaking populations abroad. In practice, this population is often instrumentalised. Situations interpreted by Russian authorities as threatening the rights of Russian speakers are readily securitised and presented as threats to Russia’s national security.
Despite Kazakhstan’s traditionally cautious, non-confrontational policy towards Russia – under both Nazarbayev and Tokayev – its independence and territorial integrity are regularly questioned in the Russian public sphere. Statements of this kind, issued by both state-aligned media and members of the political elite and left without official rebuttal, appear to serve a strategic signalling function: they remind Kazakhstan that, from Moscow’s perspective, its sovereignty is neither absolute nor guaranteed, and that Russia retains the means to exert political and military pressure. In this context, Kazakhstan’s gradual but consistent efforts to strengthen state institutions, including its armed forces, may be interpreted in Moscow as an emerging strategic challenge.
Is Russian Military Aggression against Kazakhstan Possible?
In April 2022, the Russian propagandist Tigran Keosayan (who died in 2025) publicly suggested that Kazakhstan, for its alleged ‘ingratitude’ towards Russia, could become the next target of Russian military intervention after Ukraine [5]. Similar views are articulated within broader neo-imperial circles. Official representatives of the Russian state refrain from making such explicit claims, yet they neither clearly reject nor condemn them.
Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine may be interpreted as a temporary ‘window of opportunity’ for Kazakhstan. From Moscow’s perspective, the existence of a fully sovereign Kazakhstan pursuing an independent foreign and security policy remains problematic. However, while engaged in a large-scale war, Russia is unlikely to risk a comparable intervention in Kazakhstan, which could also undermine its position across Central Asia. At least for the duration of the war in Ukraine, Russia’s ability to exert direct pressure on Kazakhstan remains constrained.
This does not, however, rule out hostile actions below the threshold of armed conflict, including the instrumentalisation of the Russian-speaking minority to destabilise the country internally. Therefore, Kazakhstan’s genuinely multi-vector foreign policy represents a rational strategic response. Nevertheless, the extent to which such diversification can provide effective security guarantees remains uncertain. Xi Jinping’s remarks during his visit to Kazakhstan in September 2022, interpreted as a warning to Russia, were particularly noteworthy, as he affirmed China’s firm support for Kazakhstan’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and its opposition to external interference [6]. He reiterated a similar position in May 2023 [7]. However, closer cooperation with China also entails risks. Consequently, if Kazakhstan’s multi-vector policy is to enhance its security, it must also include deeper engagement with Türkiye, the European Union, and the United States.
Written by Prof. Marcin Składanowski, Senior Fellow at CISES and Full Professor of International Security and Russian Studies at the Catholic University of Lublin
References
[1] В условиях обострения ситуации в мире новая Конституция укрепит фундамент нашей независимости – Токаев (6 March 2026), https://informburo.kz/novosti/v-usloviiax-obostreniia-situacii-v-mire-novaia-konstituciia-ukrepit-fundament-nasei-nezavisimosti-tokaev
[2] Депутат Госдумы назвал территорию Казахстана «подарком России» (13 December 2020), https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2020/12/13/kazakhstan/
[3] Полковник Баранец: Казахстан предал Россию на фоне новых военных амбиций и отношений с НАТО [28 December 2025], https://myseldon.com/ru/news/index/339881790
[4] Переход Казахстана на латиницу – новый плевок в лицо России. Но кто виноват? (17 April 2017), https://topwar.ru/113583-perehod-kazahstana-na-latinicu-novyy-plevok-v-lico-rossii-no-kto-vinovat.html
[5] «На Украину гляньте». Про угрозы Тиграна Кеосаяна казахам, 28 April 2022, https://respublika.kz.media/archives/66748
[6] President Xi Jinping Makes a State Visit to the Republic of Kazakhstan, 15 September 2022, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zy/jj/2022/cxshgsfwhw/202209/t20220915_10766191.html
[7] President Xi Jinping Chairs the Inaugural China-Central Asia Summit and Delivers a Keynote Speech (19 May 2023), https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjhdq_665435/2675_665437/3255_664392/3257_664396/202305/t20230519_11080116.html