On March 30, 2026, the UN confirmed the death of two Indonesian peacekeepers in southern Lebanon during their UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) mission. As tension in the Middle East continues to rise, the risk of UN personnel and peacekeepers being affected or caught in the conflict increases. Moreover, it sheds doubt on the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions. The situation seems to resemble UN peacekeeping missions in other high-risk regions, such as Mali, in terms of their objectives. The current UNIFIL mandate adopts resolution 1701 (2006) along with a renewed resolution 2790 (2025). UN Resolution 2790 reaffirmed Resolution 1701, with a specific recall to never target UN personnel and peacekeepers, and to allow the UNFIL to carry out its mandate under Resolution 1701.
Resolution 1701 focuses on assisting in achieving a ceasefire with permission for UN peacekeepers to be deployed alongside the armed forces of the Lebanese government. Their task mainly involves the monitoring of the ceasefire, extending humanitarian assistance and to a certain level, assisting state-building through the securitisation of the area between the Blue Line and Litanoi River. However, a critique of the mission is its objective of helping Lebanon regain state integrity and border control, given the lack of a solid ceasefire between the parties involved. According to the Middle East Institute, the UN’s unwillingness or inability to enforce disarmament of Hezbollah’s armed forces drives the continued violence across the region, depriving the mission of its credibility and deterrence. The resolution was originally grounded in a more traditional peacekeeping principle, specifically the principle of non-use of force. Still, it was urged by France and the US to adopt Chapter II of the UN Charter into the resolution to give peacekeepers authority to bear arms and further enable them to ‘enforce’ the ceasefire.
This issue has been reflected in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) despite the context of conflicts, and the groups involved were inherently different from UNFIL; its resolution 2100 was focusing on the “…support for the re-establishment of State authority throughout the country” during violent conflicts between the rebels and extremist groups. The decision to deploy peacekeepers to support state-building and deliver the Protection of Civilians (PoC) amid ongoing armed conflicts, without an effective transition to a robust mission where peacekeepers were armed, and without properly facilitating a ceasefire before carrying out the tasks, hindered the mission’s effectiveness. The African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council had requested the UNSC to enable its peacekeepers to be more proactive during the mission. Eventually, the mission was requested to be terminated in June 2023.
The lack of consensus between the missions — MINUSMA and UNIFIL— objectives and the priorities of regional conflicts required, seems to be the common challenge they face. In both missions’ mandates, they show ambition to rebuild regional authority. Still, the peacekeepers and the mission’s mindset lack the capacity to enforce the measures necessary to uphold that security, leading to a ‘credibility gap’. Another drive to the mission’s inability to maintain stability could be the actors’ (Israel and Hezbollah) lack of consent to adhere to UNIFIL resolutions. Due to the strengthening Hezbollah armed force, Israel rejects the mission’s request to withdraw from Lebanon unless the “ceasefire understandings are fully implemented” from Lebanon’s side, likely referring to paragraph 8 of Resolution 1701.
Currently, UNIFIL is scheduled to be withdrawn from Lebanon starting in 2027 following its termination on December 31 2026. The UN Security Council decided under international pressure and criticism of the mission. The withdrawal indicates the deteriorating state of the conflict and UNIFIL’s inability to adapt in the shifting environment. However, during the withdrawal process, attempts to continue the PoC and address other administrative matters will continue, and the UNSC will offer an option to resume UNIFIL missions by 1st of June, 2026.
In conclusion, UNIFIL’s perceived inefficiency stems not only from the violence of the conflict between Israel and the Hezbollah militant, but also from the mission’s internal structure and mindset. The mission was first pushed to transition from a traditional to a more robust setting to better adapt to the hostile environment. However, the mission’s objective to prioritise restoring state authorities without properly addressing the ongoing hostility enabled Hezbollah to strengthen its armaments despite the call to disarm. This development leads to other involved actors, such as Israel, refusing their withdrawal from the region to respond to the increasing threat from the militants, thereby destabilising regional security. With mounting criticism, UNFIL faces a cessation mandated by the UNSC, with the option to renew by the beginning of June 2026. If the mandate were to be renewed, it could be suggested that it take on a more proactive role, ensuring proper disarmament and a ceasefire from all parties before aiding the Lebanese government, and that UNIFIL acknowledge that the Lebanese army does not possess the “capacity and capability” to be fully deployed. That requires the UN to provide the necessary ‘enforcement’ measures to ensure better implementation of the resolution.
Further Readings
Nassar and El Machnouk (2025). UNIFIL Should Reset or Go Home
Loft (2025). Lebanon and the end of UNIFIL’s mandate in 2026
United Nations (2006). Security Council Resolution 1701
Schenker and Orion (2024). The Pros and Cons of Salvaging (or Ditching) UNFIL