The war failed to change Iran. It changed how Gulf states think about dependence on Washington. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi declared that the Strait of Hormuz was open but ‘closed only to our enemies’. The war that began on 28 February has changed the strait, but not in the way Washington intended.
The war convinced Gulf states that keeping Hormuz open could no longer depend on Washington alone. Saudi Arabia blocked Operation Project Freedom, the 4 May US naval mission to reopen the strait, by denying access to its bases and airspace. The Jeddah Summit in April endorsed alternative pipeline infrastructure. Pakistan brokered Lebanon’s ceasefire. Across the Gulf, governments are not managing a crisis. They are preparing for a different regional order.
Iran’s conduct in the strait broke international law. UNCLOS prohibits states from charging ships fees for transit through international straits, but Tehran is now moving to formalise the tolls it has imposed since the war began, with legislation in the Iranian parliament that would authorise the practice. Tanker traffic collapsed by more than 90% in March, falling from 50 to 70 oil and gas tankers per day to fewer than 10. The disruption hit globally. Across 15 major economies, including Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK, the share of energy consumption met by imported oil and gas rose 7% over the past decade. European supply chains were exposed: refining capacity has not grown in a decade while Gulf import dependence has risen.
Project Freedom showed the Gulf position shifting. Gulf states had positioned themselves from the start of the war as not party to it: this was not their war, and their territory would not be used to fight it. For three decades, US bases in the Gulf functioned as deterrents. The 2026 war turned them into targets. Iran struck the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain in retaliation, despite Gulf governments refusing to allow US offensive operations from their soil. Hosting Washington’s military presence had increased Gulf exposure to attack rather than reduced it. When Trump announced the operation, Saudi Arabia denied US forces the use of Prince Sultan Air Base and Saudi airspace, with Kuwait reportedly imposing parallel restrictions, and Trump suspended the operation 48 hours after launching it. Riyadh publicly denied the report, but the kingdom was reportedly “very supportive” of Pakistani-led mediation as the alternative track. Saudi Arabia had refused to let the US help reopen the strait its own oil flows through.
The Jeddah Summit in April 2026 treated infrastructure redundancy as a security priority. Saudi Arabia’s East-West (Petroline) pipeline can move up to 7 million barrels per day to Yanbu, and the UAE’s Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (ADCOP) carries roughly 1.5 million barrels per day to Fujairah, bypassing the strait entirely. Together these alternatives carry less than half of normal Hormuz volumes, and Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain currently have no equivalent. The Jeddah agenda advanced work on a joint Gulf pipeline network linking those three producers to existing Saudi and Emirati infrastructure. The crisis may push these states to develop their own pipeline alternatives. The pipelines are not emergency measures. They are investments in a future where Gulf states assume disruptions to Hormuz will happen again.
The diplomatic response divided as sharply as the military one. The UK and France convened 51 countries in April at an International Summit on the Strait of Hormuz, declaring a joint multinational naval mission, while Pakistan ran a separate channel between Tehran and Washington. Army chief Asim Munir reportedly carried messages between the two capitals, and Pakistan brokered the Lebanon truce. The Lebanon agreement also opened a wider channel: indirect US-Iran exchanges have since been routed through Islamabad. Europe organised conferences. Pakistan brokered the ceasefire. Macron later described US indifference to European security as “the elephant in the room”, an admission that the existing Western framework cannot manage this kind of crisis on its own.
Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain have reason to accelerate national pipeline planning rather than wait for the joint Gulf network to be delivered. The network may be regional, but the decisions that matter are still national. European policymakers, exposed through limited refining capacity and Gulf import dependence, have reason to engage the Jeddah infrastructure track directly rather than route Gulf engagement through Washington. The UK and France may be assembling the naval mission, with HMS Dragon pre-positioned and the Charles de Gaulle in the Red Sea, but the mission cannot launch until a fragile US-Iran ceasefire stabilises in the strait.
The Gulf no longer assumes Washington can keep Hormuz open on its own. Hormuz will reopen. Gulf states are already building for the next closure.
Further Readings
Roche (2026) ‘The Gulf War: Hidden Vulnerabilities and Strategic Failures’
Kaushal & Marks (2026) ‘The US Blockade of Hormuz: Who Holds the Advantage?’
Riedel (2026) ‘American Bases in the Gulf: Targets or Deterrents?‘