Antimony is a metalloid element on the European Critical Raw Materials (CRM) list. The material is widely used in military applications, liquid batteries, semiconductors, and fire retardants, and in nuclear and renewable energy applications. The widespread use makes it a high-demand product globally, with market prices reaching $60,000/t in June 2025. Major producers of this material are China, Russia and Tajikistan, while the EU has no active production or refining capacity for this material, and it previously sourced the material from China. To diversify its imports and in response to Chinese export controls on the material implemented in 2024, the EU has shifted to importing raw antimony primarily from Turkey and refined material from Tajikistan.
However, up to the 1990s the European continent used to source antimony domestically, demonstrating that the continent has the geological capacity to supply the material. Indeed, Trojárová, an antimony deposit in Slovakia, was discovered in the 1970s, but the project was then abandoned due to low antimony market prices. Recently, Military Metal Corps, a Canadian-owned company, resumed exploration of the area. In April 2026, they estimated that 67,000 tonnes of antimony remained to be mined at the site and sought investors to start drilling the mine. Restoring this deposit could be an opportunity for the European Internal market to secure antimony supplies within its territory. However, the project has not received formal support from the European Commission. Instead, it has drawn attention from US investors, suggesting that they may seek to secure access before the EU mobilises.
One reason for this might be that antimony is not included among the strategic materials in the EU Commission’s Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), which identifies crucial materials for the green and digital transition, as well as for defence and aerospace. Recently, the Commission approved 60 Strategic Projects aimed at ensuring supply security for key materials like lithium, cobalt, and nickel, but not antimony. This suggests that Trojárová may not be a current priority for the Commission, as their resources are focused on these initiatives.
Another roadblock came from Slovakian political opposition. Slovakia initially presented the Trojárová site to the EU in 2025 as part of the mandatory CRMA National mapping program. However, in a second moment the project received opposition from the Slovak Ministry Environment, who in May revoked Metal Corps’ exploration licence on the site, which suggests an inconsistent position of Slovakia with the goals of protecting the supply of critical minerals in Europe. This also reflects a lack of dialogue between the Commission and the member state as well as a wider internal regulatory instability at the European level. Military Metal Corps will likely pursue legal avenues, and until the dispute settles the site will remain non-operational.
In addition, if the regulatory issues are resolved at the Slovak level, the EU, outside the CRMA, lacks a structured funding plan to carry out mining on European territory. Instead, mining operations in European territories rely mainly on national strategies or private capital. In addition to this central funding challenge, the EU also lacks the metallurgical capacity to refine CRMs. Therefore, mining alone, while it could be a positive initial step toward achieving autonomy in the supply of CRM, would not translate into supply independence for the refined product and would leave the EU still vulnerable to global market disruption.
Supply chain resilience requires extraction and refining capabilities within collaborating jurisdictions. In this context, the US is ahead of Europe. Indeed, the block is using state funding to restart mining operations and to strengthen its domestic processing infrastructure. Additionally, it is taking a more proactive approach to tackling supply issues. Indeed, the lack of action on the Trojárová mine has prompted a US company to express interest in visiting the site. This is not an isolated case, as the US government’s investment arm, the US International Development Finance Corporation, agreed on a $5 million deal to restart another dormant antimony mine in Northern Macedonia, an EU accession country. This raises concerns about whether the EU risks replacing dependence on foreign supplies of antimony with dependence on American Policy frameworks. If US companies secure offtake agreements at Trojárová first, Europe could eventually find itself a secondary buyer of materials extracted from its own backyard. As the Trump administration has already demonstrated its willingness to use tariffs and trade pressure to destabilise the European economy, the involvement of a US-controlled critical minerals supply chain on European-adjacent soil could restrict European market access rather than bringing a valuable solution.
Conversely, expanding US investment in Europe could facilitate allied cooperation on CRMs. Cooperation on antimony mining in Europe could be a promising first step toward establishing bilateral US-EU co-investment projects. Such projects could operate under the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), signed in April 2026, which includes collaboration on research, stockpiling strategies, and the development of common standards for mining. However, this partnership must be supported by a structured European framework and coordinated strategic goals between member states and the EU Commission. It is essential for the EU to move from fragmented national initiatives to a single, targeted European project pipeline towards resource security. This approach would enable the EU to uphold its priorities within the agreements and ensure that mining activities adhere to European Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) laws.
The next few years will be the clear test of whether EU institutions will fully mobilise to keep up with geopolitical speed and safeguard European geological resources from potential exploitation by the US. If assessed strategically, US investment in Europe could help the EU to secure critical resources while strengthening its global competitiveness. In addition, as the US is currently expanding its antimony refining capacity, this alliance could offer Europe a limited but important window to diversify its supply chain. It could also provide time for the EU to develop internal coordination frameworks to address its lack of refining capacity for CRMs. In the long run, the transatlantic alliance could contribute to the development of an alternative standards-based benchmark for fairer antimony market value and thus insulating the EU from global price shocks triggered by Chinese export controls.
Further Readings:
Discovery Alert (2026) Slovakia’s Antimony Deposit and the EU Critical Minerals Supply Chain
European Commission Press Release (2026) EU and US launch strategic partnership on critical minerals
IFRI (2026) The US’s Critical Mineral Offensive Strategy: How Can Europe Step Up?
Military Metals Corp (2025) Antimony
References:
CRU (2026) Antimony market prices fall despite strong outlook. Available at: https://www.crugroup.com/en/communities/thought-leadership/2026/antimony-market-prices-fall-despite-strong-outlook/ [Accessed 30 May 2026].
Discovery Alert (2026) Slovakia’s Antimony Deposit and the EU Critical Minerals Supply Chain. Available at: https://discoveryalert.com.au/eu-critical-minerals-antimony-slovakia-governance-crisis-2026/ [Accessed 30 May 2026].
EUR-Lex (2024) Consolidated text: Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020 (Text with EEA relevance). Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1252/2024-05-03 [Accessed 7th June 2026].
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European Commission (2025) Critical Raw Materials Act, Selected strategic projects. Available at: https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/raw-materials/areas-specific-interest/critical-raw-materials/strategic-projects-under-crma/selected-projects_en[Accessed 30 May 2026]
European Commission Press Release (2026) EU and US launch strategic partnership on critical minerals. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_26_862 [Accessed 30 May 2026].
European Commission JRC (2025) ‘China’s Antimony Export Controls: Risks and
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U.S. International Trade Commission (2021) ‘Antimony: A Critical Material you’ve probably never heard of’, Executive Briefing on Trade, October 2021. Available at: https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/executive_briefings/ebot_a_critical_material_probably_never_heard_ofpdf [Accessed 30 May 2026]
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