Introduction
In 1991, Somaliland unilaterally declared independence from Somalia. Since then, the breakaway region has constructed relatively stable and democratic institutions in contrast to Somalia, along with many countries in the region surrounding it. What is even more notable is that this process took place largely in the absence of international recognition of the region’s statehood. Israel became the first UN member state to recognise Somaliland’s statehood in 2025, nearly 35 years after Somaliland declared its independence.
Somaliland is thus still a de facto state, despite the widespread acknowledgement of the region’s various successes in establishing and maintaining its governance. The government of Somaliland has advanced various historical, legal, and practical arguments in favour of its statehood—all to little effect.
Somaliland’s Arguments for Independence
Present-day Somalia was formed through the merger of independent Somaliland (in the north-west) and the Trust Territory of Somaliland under Italian administration (in the east and the south). The former was a British protectorate, while the latter was an Italian colony. The merger, based on a vision of Somali nationalism and unity, proved to be shaky from the start, in part due to the disparate colonial administrations set up by Britain and Italy.
The nature of north-western Somaliland’s merger with the rest of Somalia and the conditions that surrounded it make up a significant aspect of the official state narrative used to justify separation. The merger occurred five days after Somaliland achieved independence, and during the intervening period, 35 UN member states recognised it as a country. This, along with the region’s overall separate colonial status, led Somaliland to claim that its independence, rather than secession, was a reestablishment of its sovereignty and the dissolution of a failed union. This argument allows Somaliland’s independence to avoid violating the African Union’s preference to uphold the integrity of colonial borders. Another aspect of this narrative is the questioning of the legitimacy of the union itself. This is done based on the fact that the Somaliland and Somalia legislatures passed separate acts to formalise the union, and that there was no single international treaty between them. Additionally, the governmental excesses and human rights violations it suffered during the Mohamed Siyad Barre dictatorship in Somalia in the 1980s also feature prominently in the pro-independence narrative. This military oppression and lacking post-unification political representation have led Somaliland governments to claim a ‘remedial right’ to secession (Pegg, 2020: 418-9; Mahmoud, 2023: 23).
Furthermore, Somaliland also uses its de facto statehood as a basis for why the state should be granted recognition, arguing that since it meets all the basic criteria used to define states, it should be recognised as one. The 1933 Montevideo Conference on the Rights and Duties of States is often held as the basis for defining a state in international law. Based on this, four core empirical criteria may be set out: a permanent population, a defined territory, a functioning government, and the ability to enter into relations with other states; these are all conditions that Somaliland meets (Liyew, 2026: 3-4; Ali and Ylönen, 2022: 99). The region has an estimated population of approximately five million people (Ali and Ylönen, 2022: 99). In terms of territory, Somaliland claims the land of the erstwhile British Protectorate of Somaliland and maintains effective control over most of it. However, the breakaway regime faces insecurity and a threat to its legitimacy with the Somali federal state of Puntland and the federal North Eastern State actively contesting its eastern regions (Mahmoud, 2023: 23-4; Ahmed, 2025). Somaliland has demonstrated governmental control over most of its claimed territory and has maintained a relatively stable and democratic political system. The region’s stability compares favourably with that of Somalia and many other sub-Saharan African countries (Pegg, 2020: 420-1). Finally, Somaliland, despite its legal status, maintains pseudo-diplomatic contact with several states.
Demonstrating popular support for independence has also been a part of state efforts at justifying recognition. In the absence of a direct referendum on independence, the 2001 constitutional referendum is used as evidence for this. Article 1 of the constitution refers to Somaliland as an independent country. The referendum resulted in a 97.9 percent vote in favour of the constitution, demonstrating support despite various concerns regarding the legitimacy of the turnout and result figures. The government also points to a 2016 petition signed by 1.02 million Somaliland citizens appealing for formal recognition of the de facto state (Pegg, 2020: 420).
Current Conditions and Their Implications
However, wider recognition for Somaliland as a country cannot be guaranteed by meeting the above mentioned criteria. After all, such measures only serve as advisory instruments for other states, each of which reserves the right of recognition based on its discretion (Liyew, 2026: 5), and recognition for another tends to involve calculations of risks and rewards. Thus, an independent Somaliland would have to serve the interests of the state recognising it.
Somaliland occupies a strategic position in Northeastern Africa. It is placed on the Horn of Africa, marking the southern boundary of the Gulf of Aden, which in turn leads into the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, thus overlooking a crucial maritime artery. The wider region has also faced increasing tensions due to confrontation between various geopolitical interests. Ethiopia and Egypt have continued to square off regarding the management of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Ethiopia’s quest for sea access has also put it into confrontation with Eritrea. Sudan is still in the midst of a civil war, which has affected all surrounding states . Further, tensions between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have also caused relations in this region to deteriorate.
Ethiopia has been supportive of Somaliland, especially when compared with other states in the region. Ethiopian desire for greater sea access, alongside Somaliland’s desire for recognition, led to a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the two states in January 2024, which allowed Ethiopia to lease part of Somaliland’s coast to Ethiopian naval forces, reportedly in exchange for formal recognition. This created a major diplomatic row between Ethiopia and Somalia, despite the Ethiopian side never confirming its intention to formally recognise Somaliland. The Ethiopian deal with Somaliland could also be seen in the context of the former’s tensions with Egypt, which has positioned itself as a strong supporter of Somalian unity, as both aim to expand their influence in the region. However, in December of the same year, Ethiopia and Somalia agreed to find arrangements to ensure Ethiopian sea access under ‘Somalia’s sovereignty’, easing tensions between the two (Yibeltal and Rukanga, 2024; Holleis, 2026). This left the status of the earlier Somaliland MoU in limbo, and Ethiopia has yet to recognise the region as a state. Neighbouring Djibouti is also apprehensive of Somaliland gaining recognition due to fears of increased competition for foreign military establishments and economic corridors (Pegg and Kolstø, 2015: 198).
Middle Eastern countries also play a significant role in the region, as does the growing rift between countries in the region, with the UAE on one side and Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar on the other. In this light, the UAE has developed substantial relations with Somaliland, and Dubai-based DP World has made a USD 442 million investment to develop and operate the port of Berbera. The UAE also trains Somaliland’s security forces. Israel’s decision to recognise Somaliland’s sovereignty is also often believed to have been facilitated by Abu Dhabi (Saba, 2025), something which led Mogadishu to cancel all port management and security cooperation agreements with the UAE (Mohamed, 2026). Both the UAE and Israel appear to be aiming toward increased influence around the Gulf of Aden and viewing Somaliland as a means to this end. Despite the various forms of support Abu Dhabi provides, it has stopped short of recognising Somaliland’s sovereignty.
Somaliland’s chances of wider recognition are hurt by the fact that the regime does not have any great power backing it to spearhead the process. China firmly considers the region as a part of Somalia, especially in light of Somaliland’s ties to Taiwan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, 2026; Prunier, 2021: 217-8). The US, despite having informal relations with Somaliland, has also made no moves to recognise it formally.
Finally, Western countries have hinted that they may follow an African lead in recognising Somaliland (Pegg and Kolstø, 2015: 198). However, the African Union’s concern about postcolonial border change fueling separatist forces across the continent remains strong. Therefore, the AU is unlikely to accept Somaliland in the absence of Mogadishu’s consent, which seems improbable currently. This kind of consent was crucial in the wider acceptance of South Sudan and Eritrea as states. Despite a 2005 AU fact-finding report which judged the case ‘historically unique and self-justified’ (Pegg, 2020: 419), the situation has not changed, and is unlikely to do so in the future.
Conclusion
December 2025 marked a significant milestone for Somaliland as it received formal recognition from a UN member state for the first time since declaring independence. However, the potential of this event to promote further acceptance of Somaliland remains questionable. Despite the credibility that Somaliland’s arguments may hold, it has to grapple with various geopolitical realities standing before it. Countries that have maintained various pragmatic relations with it have historically stopped short of formally recognising it as a country. The situation is unlikely to change unless a state or multilateral organisation with significant diplomatic capital, such as the US, China, or the African Union, takes an active interest in the wider international recognition of Somaliland. Thus, the status quo is likely to persist, and Somaliland is likely to remain a ‘partially recognised’ state for the foreseeable future.
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