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The AES Paradox: Sovereignty at What Cost?

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On April 25th 2026, the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) launched coordinated attacks on several Malian cities: Bamako, Kati, Kidal, and Gao. Sadio Camara, killing the Malian Defence Minister Sadio Camara. These events took place almost two years after the creation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) and a few months after the creation of their joint military force in December 2025. 

The AES was created on September 16th 2023, as a mutual security alliance among Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, and was later transformed into a confederation in July 2024. Behind its creation lies sovereignty discourses centred on taking back control, removing external forces from the territory, and creating its own security framework. The coups and subsequent rupture with the regional organization are not only symptoms of a political crisis but also of a broader collapse of state legitimacy across the Sahel.

While the AES promised greater strategic autonomy, the rejection of old dependencies and partnerships has opened the door to new external involvement, notably from Russia, Turkey and China. Has the AES genuinely strengthened the region’s strategic autonomy, or merely shifted its dependencies elsewhere?

An inevitable rupture

By the time the AES was established, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso had already broken with most of the frameworks governing their security: they were suspended from ECOWAS and the African Union (UA), expelled from MINUSMA, the G5 Sahel was dissolved, and lastly, American and French forces were gone.

The AES perceived ECOWAS as too politicized with the sanctions taken against them “illegal, inhuman and irresponsible”. They considered the organization to be “under the influence of foreign powers, and unsupportive of their fight against terrorism and insecurity”. Moreover, the organization’s threat of military intervention in Niger following the military coup triggered coordination among the three states, and the harsh economic and financial sanctions imposed on Niger sealed the deal.

The African Union suspended the three AES states until their constitutional order is restored following the military coups in Mali in 2021, Burkina Faso in 2022, and Niger in 2023. The effects of this suspension are limited, and the Union cannot reverse the coups. Additionally, the G5 Sahel alliance was dissolved: Mali exited in 2022, followed by Niger and Burkina Faso in December 2023. The Alliance failed to fulfil its mission: to improve the fight against terrorism, organised crime and cross-border insecurity. It was also perceived as financially dependent on external actors, undermining its credibility. 

At the same time, Bamako expelled MINUSMA from its territory, arguing that it failed its mission by “fueling intercommunal tensions” and by not stopping the spread of jihadist violence. The head of MINUSMA also stated that the mission fell below expectations. In the same vein, French military troops were asked to leave Mali in 2022, as they were deemed incapable of subduing violence in parts of the country despite their numerous counter-terror operations. Similarly, French military troops were asked to leave Burkina Faso in early 2023 and Niger in December 2023 due to their lack of success in taming violence. American forces followed suit and withdrew from Niger by August 2024 after the junta considered their presence to be “illegal” and demanded a full restoration of sovereignty. Washington subsequently suspended all financial aid to the country.

The break from regional frameworks and external actors, although friends, not foes, was inevitable. By the time the AES was formally established, the three states had not merely lost confidence in their partners; they had lost confidence in the entire architecture that was supposed to keep them safe. The creation of the Alliance was therefore less of a strategic choice than a logical conclusion: building their own framework was the only remaining option.

Old Dependencies, New Faces

Despite this evident rupture, the Alliance’s security still relies on external actors. The Russian Africa Corps now occupies the space previously held by the Wagner Group, with Niger and Burkina Faso signing contracts with the Corps in 2024. Beyond Russia, other states have filled the vacuum left by Western actors: bilateral security agreements were signed with Türkiye (including military training and acquisition of drones) and China (military training). External actors remain central to security provision in the Sahel; the question is no longer whether the AES relies on outside partners, but whether partners chosen by the AES represent a genuine exercise of sovereignty, or simply a reiteration of the same dependency.

JNIM and the FLA launched coordinated attacks across Bamako, Kati, Kidal and Gao in April 2026. The two organizations took control of Kidal as the Malian military and Africa Corps troops withdrew from the city; the partners intended to replace Western forces, and the Wagner Group were unable to hold the line. These attacks represent the largest coordinated attacks in Mali in recent years,  occurring a few months after the AES launched its joint military force. No collective AES response followed, symbolising that political sovereignty does not translate into action.

Conclusion

The AES has undeniably transformed the Sahel region’s geopolitical landscape, calling into question existing regional and external partnerships and prompting their revocation. However, sovereignty cannot be limited to the rejection of old dependencies. While it is the first step, sovereignty cannot be achieved if the AES replaces old dependencies with new ones. By breaking with the old security order, the AES has asserted a new form of political sovereignty. Whether that sovereignty translates into genuine strategic autonomy or simply exchanges one set of dependencies for another will be determined in the coming years. 

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