The Houthis of Yemen, officially referred to as Anṣār Allāh, have been embroiled in a maritime conflict, commonly dubbed “the Red Sea Crisis,” since October 2023. The organisation’s primary objective is to inflict economic damages on Israel and the United States, which manifests itself in their attacks against commercial and naval vessels in the Bāb al-Mandab strait of the Red Sea. The US reaction, called Operation Prosperity Guardian (OPG) and other subsequent military operations, have failed to counter Houthi attacks; the indication of this failure is how the Houthis continue launches since earlier this year.
Command of the Sea versus Sea Denial
There are two important approaches that concern naval dominance: ‘command of the sea’ and ‘sea denial’. A US-centric definition of ‘command of the sea’ would be “the strategic condition of free and open access and usage of the seas necessary for [the] nation to flourish.” In practice the definition would be interpreted as the concentration of naval power in the hands of one state or alliance to the extent that it makes other actors unable to pose a threat. In comparison, ‘sea denial’ entails how an actor prevents another from having complete or partial control over a naval area while they themselves do not necessarily control that area.
The two approaches present an asymmetry of naval objectives. While ‘command of the sea’ requires an undisputed control over international waters and shipping routes, and thus a high success rate of military operations for passage to be deemed safe, ‘sea denial’ dictates that the Houthis do not need military ‘victories,’ only occasional hits, near misses, or simply the military capability that induces a perception of risk among the adversaries. Once the actors perceive that navigating the Bāb al-Mandab is a liability, the Houthi forces have already inflicted political and economic damage.
Cost of War
Despite the continuous heavy reliance of the Houthi arsenal on the import of missile and drone components from Iran (and, in some cases, from China), this dependence is not complete. Close-range anti-ship ballistic missiles and simple one-way UAVs are produced indigenously, with United Nations investigations into the conflict revealing that likely Iran has transferred technology that enables the manufacturing of missiles locally. Experts predict that the Houthis, in addition to the capability of “independent innovation in tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs)” and the production of UAV technology, possess Zulfiqar missiles and Sammad-3 drones, both of which are capable of inflicting damage as far as 1,500 km away from their launching sites. However, Houthi warfare capabilities are not limited to airstrikes. In July 2025, the Houthis attacked Liberia-flagged bulk carriers Eternity C and Magic Seas not with rockets but by deploying small craft ships with armed infantry and explosive uncrewed surface vessels.
The standardisation of close-range combat and localisation of weapon production indicate that engagement in the conflict is becoming increasingly cheaper for the Houthis. The costs of one-way attack drones can stay as low as $2,000, whereas the Shahed-136 medium-range ballistic missiles amount to approximately $20,000. In comparison, a single shot from the missile interceptors the US uses ranges between $4 million (Patriot PAC-3 MSE) and $9.5 million (SM-6). This comparison means that simply defending against Houthi missile attacks is considerably more expensive than firing them, putting the US Navy and Army at a significant disadvantage. Over the long term, the United States and its allies will not be able to afford catching Houthi missiles over the Red Sea.
Houthi Resilience
United Nations statistics indicate that even though Operation Prosperity Guardian, Operation Poseidon Archer, and Israeli airstrikes have all impacted the Houthis’ capabilities and thwarted attacks, the attempts themselves have mainly persisted and showed only a marginal decline since the start of these operations. The Houthis have been at war for two decades. The group demonstrated greater risk acceptance than other adversaries of the US in the Middle East, as a result of which operations lack the shock effect they caused to others. Houthi leadership is well-hidden and difficult to trace.
Based on news reports by the Saudi Press Agency I identified two of the Houthi launching sites and launcher hideouts. I located these to be on the Tihāmah coast, just north-east of the town of al-Ṣalīf, or at another instance, at the port of Ra’s ‘Īsā. The recent history of the second location highlights the resilience of the Houthis: it was a target of successful US airstrikes in April 2025; however, a few months later, in July, the port saw renewed launches. It is possible to conclude from this example that one-time US or US-allied military operations or airstrikes only achieve temporary pauses, as the Houthis are able to rapidly regenerate their firing capabilities.
Images 1, 2, and 3: Locations of Houthi hideouts and launching sites on the Red Sea coast
Image 4: Aftermath of US airstrikes on the port of Ra’s ‘Īsā in April 2025 (Source: China Daily HK)
Summary and Future Implications
The findings of this paper assert that the military approach of the US Navy towards the Houthi forces has largely been unsuccessful at eradicating the attacks in the Strait of Bāb al-Mandab. The costs of the operations, their theoretical background, and the ephemerality of their consequences have not led to the desired outcomes. More successful initiatives require going beyond airstrikes and missile defence systems. A possible solution for the United States is to provoke direct on-the-ground operations, finance and support the military capacity of the Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council and cut off all forms of Iranian aid to the Houthis. The aftermath of the ongoing war with Iran has the potential to open a new chapter in the Red Sea conflict.
Recommended Further Readings:
Heistein (2024) Saudi-Houthi Agreement: Four Scenarios and Their Potential Impact
Jensen, Eaglen, and Carroll (2026) What Can Trump’s Budget Buy the Navy? Exploring Options and Trade-Offs
Knights (2024) A Draw Is a Win: The Houthis After One Year of War