Introduction
Since 28 February, Iran has been waging a war that prompted the Islamic Republic to redefine its approach to missile use. The state has moved beyond its previous reliance on missile strikes via proxies, such as the Houthis, Hezbollah, or other Shia militias in Syria and Iraq. Instead, recent airstrikes on Kuwait International Airport on 3 June and air bases in Jordan on 11 June indicate direct engagement in ‘missile diplomacy’. Facing attacks by the United States and its allies, Iran perceives that it no longer has to rely on plausible deniability and simply frames the air strikes as retaliatory. Since these attacks resulted in no considerable human or infrastructural damages (Al Jazeera, 2026), they have demonstrated intent to test and monitor the capabilities and response mechanisms of countries that host US military bases. The strikes are not irrational acts of panic, but signal Iranian pursuit of regional dominance by illustrating how no regional actor that hosts US-Israeli interests is safe from retaliation. The 2026 strikes represent a transition from a defensive stance to a coercive hegemony of the Middle East.
Theoretical Framework
In military theory, the concept of strategic depth refers to the distance between a combatant state’s front lines and core centres responsible for industrial production, administration, and political leadership (Mason, 2021, p.97). The longer the distance, the more secure the heartlands are. When the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force (IRGC-ASF) strikes civilian and military infrastructure in other Middle Eastern countries, it pushes the front lines deeper into Jordan, Kuwait, or Bahrain, protecting its own heartlands and simultaneously reducing the strategic depth of others.
While prior to 2026, the Iranian strategy focused on denying access to the US and Israel and warding off any attacks via their landmine and anti-ship missile systems (Bahgat and Ehteshami, 2017), this year, its forces have shifted to punishing allies of the US through retaliatory strikes for providing military platforms for such access. By striking back and increasing the intensity of the conflict, Iran is practising a strategy of vertical escalation. This involves the employment of types of weapons not previously used, such as the Fattah-2 missile (The Caspian Post, 2026), and the type and frequency of the attacks demonstrated by these strikes. Despite the low number of casualties, every successful hit signals that the Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) systems of the US and NATO are no longer impenetrable. By striking these non-combatant states, Iran reinforces a perception of unpredictability, causing them to re-evaluate their security and reliance on Washington. This strategy aims to indicate how the cost of containing Tehran is higher than its accommodation.
Case Study I: Jordan
The most recent Iranian airstrikes on 10 June targeted the Muwaffaq al-Salṭī airbase in Jordan’s Zarqā’ governorate (Al Jazeera, 2026). Despite claims of the IRGC that the missiles hit F-35 fighter jet nests and the US command centre, the Jordanian Armed Forces reported that they managed to shoot down all incoming missiles without major damages (Ruiter and Brezar, 2026). This, however, does not mean that the Iranian attacks have been a failure.
One of the economic and military routes that link Iran to the Mediterranean passes through Jordan. This land bridge, important for commercial and defensive reasons to both Iran and Israel (Milburn, 2017), provides access to the US and its allies to move their forces between the Mediterranean, the Levant, and the Gulf while disrupting Iran’s Iraq-Syria-Lebanon Shia axis. Additionally, Jordan serves as a military buffer zone and the first line of defence for Israel. Jordan’s land hosts US military bases and staging and refuelling stations, while its airspace provides extra coverage for Israeli air defence radars. By striking Jordanian soil, Iran performs anti-access and area denial operations that restrict troop movement and stationing. While increasing their own strategic depth, Iran equally reduces that of the US and its allies, constantly pushing the front lines into Jordan.
Iran does not only hope to destabilise Jordan from the outside. The Gaza War has already reinvigorated the long-standing contrast between the Jordanian public and King ʿAbd Allāh II’s US-allied foreign policies, as 2023 and 2024 saw waves of demonstrations, growing political opposition, and a resurgence in Islamic extremism on the streets of Amman (Ryan, 2024). Iran attempts to exploit this division in Jordanian society, and as the tensions and protests earlier this year suggest, it is already succeeding at that (Magid, 2026). Hence, Iranian airstrikes do not aim for direct destruction but compel the Hashemite monarchy to choose between domestic stability and its US defence pact.
Case Study II: Kuwait
Following the strikes on Kuwait’s Mīnā’ al-Aḥmadī oil refinery in April (Al Jazeera, 2026), the hits on the Kuwait International Airport further demonstrate Iran’s vertical escalation of the conflict. Earlier attacks targeted US military bases, such as the ʿAlī al-Sālim Air Base (Al Jazeera, 2026), and infrastructure crucial to Kuwait’s economy as a petroleum-exporting country and a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). These affected the commercial capabilities of Kuwait and its ability to export oil, a direct response to the global sanctions imposed on Iran. Disrupting the oil and gas flows within the Gulf puts pressure on the US and its allies, framing them responsible for the global economic outcome of the conflict. It reveals how the cost of isolating Iran in the international sphere is not solely confined to Iran itself. The new wave of attacks, similar to those in Jordan, aims to engage in the ‘psychological coercion’ of the Kuwaiti citizens and leaders, as they have already led to civilian deaths.
Despite Kuwait not involving itself combatively in the conflict, similarly to other relatively smaller Gulf countries, like Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE, the Iranian missile strategy signals that the country and its economy are not safe from being hit. The implied message of the strikes is that Western protection in the Gulf is merely an illusion: the US-Israeli-Saudi security frameworks cannot protect the oil-extracting facilities, military bases, and increasingly, the civilian infrastructure in the GCC countries. The GCC leadership has already issued a statement explaining how the Iranian attacks destabilise the security of the member states (Alacaci, 2026) and create divisions within the organisation. The ongoing conflict further confirmed the inability of the GCC states to approach their relations with Iran in a unified manner (Haghirian, 2026). With their differences sharpened and divisions unresolved, each member state will likely leverage their position towards Iran at the expense of the others, rendering the organisation’s inner workings temporarily ineffective and its objectives of economic and military alliance unattainable.
Discussion
As of the current phase of the conflict, the most likely assumption is that Iran does not want to maximise damage but rather to push the boundaries of the front lines away from their borders, force combatant states into financially costly errors, and monitor the reactions of other air defence systems. The major argument behind this claim is that the IRGC-ASF is not using its most capable and destructive weapons it has in its arsenal. For instance, the Shahed-136 drones used in the attack against Kuwait International Airport (Hilotin, 2026) cost between $20,000 and $50,000, making them significantly cheaper than most long-range missiles (Emmett et al., 2026). At the same time, the interceptor that defence systems use to capture it, the Patriot PAC-3, costs about $4,100,000 per shot (Boucher, 2026). This major difference in costs indicates one element of Iranian strategy: oversaturating enemy airspace pushes the adversary into wasting resources. If Iran were to inflict major damages with hundreds of civilian casualties, it would resort to launching one of its Shahab-3 rockets effective against large, soft targets, like cities (Missile Defense Project, 2024); the Sejjil ballistic missiles that the US-Israeli air defence systems previously failed to intercept (The New Arab, 2026); or the Fattah-1 missiles, the high velocity of which helps them to bypass radar systems (Saha, 2026).
The continuous airstrikes and repeated airspace violations by Iran into the Gulf and Levant countries continuously reduce the certainty and trust these states have in their allies’ capability of defending them. Iran is successfully disintegrating the concept of national sovereignty and replacing it with spheres of interest in the Middle East. This uncertainty is coupled with the constant alertness required from the air defence systems. With the US focusing its most important military assets on Iran, it is forced to put less effort into keeping an eye on other allies and proxies of Iran, such as the Houthis, which gives them opportunities to expand. In addition, the reactions to these operations provide Iran with plenty of electronic (ELINT) and military intelligence (MILINT) to survey responses to flight paths and saturation levels.
Conclusion
Despite no significant casualties and damages inflicted, the Iranian airstrikes are far from being unsuccessful. They managed to destabilise the air defence systems in many of the Middle Eastern countries that host US military bases and contributed to the eroding trust these countries previously put into the hands of the United States. As a result of this Iranian anti-access/area denial campaign, the US failed to come closer to Iran, while Iran gained access to useful information on air defences. The events have also shed light onto the deep discontent certain echelons of these societies hold towards the presence of US military bases, an aspect that Iranian diplomacy could capitalise on even after the end of this conflict. It would be of no surprise if Jordan, Kuwait, or any other country in the vicinity of Iran would make diplomatic approaches. The strikes have shown that proximity to Iran within the region is at least as important a political and economic factor as is alignment with Washington. Iran has cemented its position as an unavoidable pillar of Middle Eastern peace.
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