Executive Summary:
The Syrian Transitional Government headed by President Ahmad Al Sharaa has so far avoided the fate of post-Gaddafi Libya, integrating the Syrian Arab Army (SAA), Syrian National Army and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), albeit after a brief period of armed conflict between them. Nevertheless, Syria faces several major obstacles to reconstructing its security. The southern part of the country exists largely outside state control, with cities falling under armed Druze militias and drug traffickers, backed by Israel, which has made further incursions from the annexed Golan. The coastal region faces an ongoing insurgency from pro-Assad holdouts, alongside killings, kidnapping and looting of the Alawite minority by renegade security forces. During French President Macron’s state visit, IEDs were detonated across Damascus, killing one and injuring 36.
Key Points:
- The government has made positive progress consolidating rebel groups into the SAA, including the SDF, demonstrating capacity to absorb rival factions.
- The SAA lacks an air force and air defence capability, a significant gap in its ability to exercise sovereignty.
- Amnesty has been given selectively to former-regime officers and soldiers, with notable war criminals arrested.
- The SAA is attempting to professionalise but has taken part in sectarian violence against the Alawite and Druze communities.
- Sectarian violence against minorities appears widespread, including forced marriages, kidnapping and robbery. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights estimates over 4,100 killed since Assad’s fall.
- Recent explosions in the capital indicate the security apparatus still struggles to combat terrorism.
Analysis
Syria’s government has consolidated rebel factions and former regime personnel into the SAA with little factional infighting, setting a significant precedent for post-conflict reconciliation and avoiding Libya’s fate. Unlike Libya, where rival militias retained separate command structures and external patrons after Gaddafi’s fall, Syria’s transitional government secured formal integration agreements bringing the SNA and SDF into a single SAA chain of command. This has reduced, though not eliminated, the conditions for sustained factional war.
However, allegations of sectarian killings in the coastal region and south indicate security forces still require significant progress to restore discipline and professionalism. The lack of air power means Syria cannot exercise sovereignty over its own airspace without outside assistance. Israeli air operations and reported support for Druze armed groups in the south, framed by Israel as protecting minorities, further constrain the government’s practical sovereignty over its territory and airspace. Any Western support for Syrian air defence will need to account for this dynamic. The Damascus explosions during Macron’s visit again demonstrate that Syria’s security apparatus requires substantial improvement, alongside pacifying non-reconciled insurgent groups.
Policy Implications:
- Western governments and multilateral bodies should condition continued normalisation on a credible, internationally monitored accountability mechanism, or risk engagement being perceived as tacit tolerance of abuses, undermining minority trust and prolonging instability.
- Al Sharaa has touted Syria as an investment opportunity for states, private entities and development agencies. While Syria has remained relatively stable, investors should exercise caution given persistent gaps in the security apparatus.
- Syria’s security services require professionalised training from European law enforcement and militarised bodies to accelerate reform.
- Syria can act as a model for post-conflict reconciliation, particularly in its integration of the SDF and rebel factions, offering a demonstrable framework for other post-conflict states.
Conclusion
Syria’s security reconstruction remains fragile and uneven. Progress integrating armed factions has not been matched by progress in discipline, minority protection, or counter-terrorism capacity. The lack of air power presents a further challenge to Syria’s sovereignty, complicated by Israel’s presence in the south. Western choices on training, accountability and conditionality will determine whether Syria consolidates and becomes a model for post-conflict reconstruction.
Bibliography:
Alhosain (2025) https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/from-rubble-to-rebirth-a-model-for-syrias-reconstruction/
The New Region (2026) https://thenewregion.com/posts/5807
New York Times (2026) https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/27/world/middleeast/syria-mass-killing-druse-un.html
International Center for Transitional Justice (2025) https://www.ictj.org/latest-news/home-syria-new-chapter-justice-and-reconciliation
House of Commons Library (2025) https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10428/
Al Jazeera (2026) Syria says one killed, 36 wounded after Damascus blasts during Macron visit
Middle East Monitor (2024) Israel destroys 85% of Syria’s air defence systems
Renne, F. D. (2025) ‘The rush for Syria: Sovereignty, patronage, and New-old threats to equitable political participation in post-Assad Syria’
Renne, F. D. (2025) ‘The rush for Syria: Sovereignty, patronage, and New-old threats to equitable political participation in post-Assad Syria’