On 19th September 2014, the declaration of votes in Glenrothes confirmed that Scotland had voted to remain in the United Kingdom in the Scottish Independence referendum. Now, twelve years later, a motion agreed in Holyrood this past May called on the UK government to grant a Section 30 order for another referendum. However, Scottish independence would damage the Scottish economy through increased trade barriers with the UK and have grave security implications for Scotland, the UK, and Europe centred on military readiness, coordination challenges, the nuclear umbrella, and distraction from the Russian threat.
Currently, the appeal of Scottish independence is persistent and largely centred on the feeling that too many decisions are made in Westminster. Talk of a referendum has resurfaced due to the rise of right-leaning Reform UK in England, while much of Scotland is traditionally more left-wing on the political spectrum, and what First Minister of Scotland John Swinney termed as “political chaos” in Westminster. However, while the SNP are focused on pushing for independence, leaders from the Conservative, Liberal Democrat, Reform, and Labour parties have all pushed back, with Scottish Labour leader Anas Sarwar saying the first minister had an “obsession” with independence that is not necessarily reflected amongst the general population. The combined constituency vote share of the pro-independence SNP and Greens fell from about 49 percent in 2021 to about 40 percent in 2026. Alongside Peter Murrell’s admission that he embezzled £400,000 as SNP CEO, the independence movement may struggle to regain the same momentum from a decade ago.
Yet, since the 2016 Brexit referendum where 62 percent of Scottish voters called for the UK to remain in the European Union, the National Centre for Social Research highlighted that “attitudes towards Brexit have become deeply intertwined with where people stand on Scotland’s constitutional status.” This is in spite of the fact that Scotland may not even receive the required unanimous vote to join the EU due to Spanish fears over its own secessionist movements in Catalonia, and that analysis from the Economic Observatory indicates that EU membership “would not offset Scotland’s economic losses from increased border costs with the rest of the UK.”
Beyond the economic costs of independence, Scottish secession from the UK also threatens the security of the UK and Europe. First, the partition of military assets and soldiers as a result of independence, at a time when the UK has just announced a £15 billion boost to defence spending to meet the rising Russian threat, poses severe coordination challenges. British soldiers would have to transfer to a new Scottish armed forces with potentially divided loyalties or conflicted feelings. While some Scots may choose to remain with the British army under a similar scheme as the Republic of Ireland, this would create further practical complexities in applications and admissions—all of which would detract from building up security.
Second, Scotland would lose its access to transatlantic alliances (such as NATO) and military cooperation with the remaining UK. Though many would assume the UK and a newly independent Scotland would continue to cooperate militarily, the SNP were at odds with the UK government over military involvement in both Iraq and Kosovo. A new Scottish military would likely come to resemble something similar to the Republic of Ireland where they account for their own security apparatus but do not engage militarily outside of UN peacekeeping operations. However, Ireland, which has a GDP around three times that of Scotland, is already viewed as ill-equipped to deal with the hybrid threats posed from an emboldened Moscow. At a time when Russia is becoming more aggressive in the North Sea, a vulnerable Scotland would jeopardise the security of the British isles.
Third, beyond military capability, the UK government has also historically stressed that Scotland would overnight lose access to British intelligence resources, cautioning that Scotland should not expect UK services to make up any shortfall. Analysis from 2014 concluded that an independent Scotland could eventually provide for its own security, but not in the 18 months after a successful referendum, and it would take decades to build up expertise for oversight committees of these new services. An independent Scotland would lose a foreign intelligence service, but more importantly it would lose the advanced cyber security capabilities provided by the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ).
Fourth, the greatest implication for the remaining United Kingdom would relate to the Naval Base Clyde, or Faslane, that houses the UK’s continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent of four Vanguard-class submarines carrying Trident II D-5 ballistic missiles. The site at Faslane is a deep water estuary that provides quick access to the Atlantic Ocean, giving it key strategic importance difficult to replicate in the rest of the UK. The Scottish government opposes nuclear weapons and has pledged to banish Trident from Faslane, a move that could temporarily demobilise the UK nuclear deterrent, thereby emboldening an ever more aggressive Russia. Scottish secession would also create vulnerability for Europe which, as Trump’s commitment to NATO comes into question, relies more greatly on the UK Nuclear Umbrella to deter Russia. This was demonstrated in the Northwood Declaration, a joint-commitment from the French and the UK to the NATO nuclear umbrella that created a backstop in the event of US failure to respond, assuming the continuity of the UK’s own nuclear deterrent.
Fifth, beyond a weakened nuclear deterrent, an independence referendum would benefit Russia by forcing the UK to look inwards. The first case of direct interference in a democratic election by Russia in the Western world was in the Scottish independence referendum in 2014. Since then, Russia’s disinformation machine has become more sophisticated and their actions more volatile and reckless. Similar to the aftermath of Brexit (which Russia was suspected to have interfered in) an independent Scotland would cause the UK to look inward, and, being bogged down in logistical arrangements, would weaken the UK’s ability to deter Russia and support Ukraine. Furthermore, with all three devolved nations now having first ministers, Scotland leaving the Union would also give political credence to Plaid Cymru and Sinn Fein to argue for their own independence.
Given the existing threat from Russia and an increasingly uncertain ally in the US, Scottish independence would create damaging security implications for both the UK and Europe. With Andy Burnham now as Prime Minister, his plans for devolution may be enough to quell urges in Scotland to pursue formal independence and allow the Union to pull together for common prosperity and security.
Recommended Readings
Ince (2025) Maintaining the UK’s Intelligence Edge in the Grey Zone
Fleming and Gebhard (2014) Scotland, NATO, and transatlantic security
Docherty (2023) On Surprises, Strategy, the Economy and What Comes Next for Scottish Independence