Executive Summary

On 6 August 2026, the United States announced new economic sanctions against Cuban military officials following the Cuban regime’s increasing cooperation with China and Russia on matters of procuring weapons and military equipment from both actors. While Cuba has been significantly weakened since the start of the year by numerous US sanctions, its increased military cooperation with China and Russia—both adversaries of the US which stand to gain from Cuba’s geographical position—represents a growing threat to US interests and national security, according to the Trump Administration. While Donald Trump and other US officials have been implying that military action against Cuba has not been ruled out, the nature of China and Russia’s defence cooperation with Cuba reveals military action is not the solution to the US’ ‘Cuban problem’. 

Introduction

Since the United States launched a special operation in Venezuela, a long-time ally to the Cuban regime, on 3 January 2026, US policies toward Cuba have hardened. On 29 January, Donald Trump signed an executive order imposing tariffs on imported goods from any country that aids Cuba by providing it with oil (The White House, 2026), something the country heavily depends on. Likewise, in late February, when speaking to reporters, the sitting United States president implied a “friendly takeover” of the island was in his administration’s cards, describing it as a failing nation and stating he would have the “honour” of taking Cuba (Johansen and Toosi, 2026; Collinson, 2026). Following comments by the sitting US President and officials, Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel responded to these claims on 18 May, stating that Cuba did not pose a military threat to the United States and any military intervention would lead to a “bloodbath” (Reuters, 2026). In response, on 6 August, the US Department of State announced new sanctions against five Cuban-based entities and eight Cuban officials, including the Cuban military attachés to Russia and China for facilitating “imports of foreign arms and military equipment to Cuba” (Department of State, 2026).  

Analysis

Cuba’s Defence Capabilities 

Before factoring in aid from Beijing and Moscow, it is useful to assess the Cuban threat on its own, because without the help of allies such as China and Russia, Cuba is a militarily weak country. Due to the United States embargo and its low economic position, it still heavily depends on Soviet-era systems such as MiG-29 aircrafts (Khomenko, 2025) and T-55 USSR tanks (Global Military, 2026). Such reliance on rapidly aging and obsolete systems make its defence capabilities poor (IISS, 2026). 

Russian and Chinese Cooperation with Cuba

Besides having knowledge in intelligence and counterintelligence, as well as being willing to assist US adversaries (Rosales, 2026), Cuba’s main advantage for allies like Russia and China is its geographical location and proximity to US soil (Funaiole et al., 2024). Indeed, for these countries, Cuba offers access to the United States’ ‘backyard’ to conduct intelligence and military operations they cannot conduct from their own soil. 

Moscow has in the past provided military equipment, oil, fuel, and maintenance assistance for Cuba’s current Soviet-era military inventory (Hermosilla, 2026; Khomenko, 2026), and Cuba has in these last months has sought to acquire more military supplies such as drones from Russia, which it has been collecting since 2023 (Caputo, 2026). However, because Moscow’s aid is irregular (Kuo, 2026), and despite the arrival of an Ilyushin Il-76 Russian cargo plane in Cuba on 1 February (which is known to have delivered air defence systems to Venezuela in the past (Höller, 2026)), there has been no official confirmation of Russia delivering military equipment to Cuba since the start of this year. This thereby raises questions as to whether or not the Kremlin is willing to continue aiding in keeping Cuba afloat prospectively. 

Meanwhile, Beijing has made its assistance to Cuba less visible but more consistent and long-term. US officials and policy analysts have reported that China, like Russia, is heavily involved in intelligence activities on the island, using signal intelligence (SIGINT) facilities, however both Havana and Beijing reject these accusations (Funaiole et al., 2024; WireScreen, 2026). Additionally, China has been aiding Cuba in the energy sector by building around 50 solar power plants this year (Paddison, 2026; Kuo, 2026), though this alone is not enough to erase its dependency on oil and fuel. If these factors are taken together, they suggest that China and Russia are helping Cuba maintain, rather than strengthen its defence capabilities, in order to buy it time. 

Future Outlooks

US officials therefore have several factors to consider when considering the Cuban threat in relation to foreign adversaries like Russia and China: 

• While Russia and China have been providing aid in defence cooperation and other areas, they are unlikely to intervene directly in a military conflict scenario between the United States and Cuba and risk open conflict with the former (Hernandez-Roy et al., 2026). 
• The United States launching military actions in Cuba could provoke a migration crisis, given the island’s proximity to the US coast in Florida (Malley, 2026). The humanitarian crisis that has worsened since oil and fuel supply has been cut off is equally at risk of exacerbating this possibility (Human Rights Research Center, 2026). 
• Finally, with midterm elections approaching in the United States, and the Republicans not performing strongly in current opinion polls (Goodwin, Binday, 2026), the Trump Administration initiating any kind of action—especially military action—toward Cuba would be a high-risk option before November.

Conclusion

Ultimately, when patterns regarding defence cooperation between China, Russia and Cuba are analysed, they reveal that both Moscow and Beijing have been providing enough aid to keep Cuba afloat for longer but not enough to transform it into a military threat that could successfully face conventional military action from the United States. Given these factors, along with the risk of provoking a migration crisis and worsening an already dire humanitarian crisis in Cuba, military action will not be beneficial to US interests. What remains more concerning for Washington however is China and Russia’s use of Cuba for intelligence gathering activities, and steps should be taken to disrupt and root out Sino-Russian intelligence efforts in Cuba. 

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