EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
States routinely engage diplomatically with armed groups they have designated as terrorist organisations. In June 2026, the United States acknowledged indirect contacts with Hezbollah while maintaining its designation. Members of Afghanistan’s de facto administration remain individually listed under United Nations sanctions, yet hold ministerial office and receive travel exemptions to attend international meetings.
Designation regimes were built to isolate armed groups and deny them legitimacy. In such cases, they no longer fully achieve that objective. The constraint often falls instead on mediators and humanitarian organisations, who operate without legal certainty around groups that continue to govern territory and populations.
Terrorist designation now functions less as a tool of exclusion than as a framework that structures engagement, but one that operates informally, without published criteria or consistent practice across states.
The paper recommends publishing clear criteria governing engagement with designated organisations, extending legal exemptions beyond humanitarian action, operationalising the delisting reform adopted in 2024, and distinguishing armed movements from the institutions they control.
BACKGROUND
Engagement with proscribed armed groups is not new. In February 2020, the United States signed a joint declaration with the Taliban (US Department of State, 2020) while its leaders remained under United Nations sanctions.
What has changed is the scale and the openness of that practice. In June 2026, President Trump publicly acknowledged that he had spoken with Hezbollah through intermediaries and secured a commitment that it would stop firing at Israel (Al Jazeera, 2026). The group remains designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation by the United States. No delisting preceded the contact, and none followed it.
Terrorist designation regimes were designed to isolate armed groups by restricting their financial, legal and political space. Through sanctions, criminal prohibitions and material support offences, they seek to prevent engagement rather than regulate it.
Contemporary practice increasingly departs from that logic. This emerging “proscription paradox” reflects a broader transformation: terrorist designation now functions less as a tool of exclusion than as a framework that structures engagement. It concludes by considering how designation regimes could be adapted to reconcile counterterrorism objectives with the realities of contemporary conflict resolution.
PROBLEM
- Engagement has become unavoidable
Since 2021, states and United Nations agencies have continued to engage with Afghanistan’s de facto authorities. In June 2026, the Security Council unanimously renewed the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, describing it as a “facilitator of dialogue” between the international community and the Taliban (UN Press, 2026b).
Yet the sanctions regime established under Resolution 1988 remains in force (United Nations Security Council, 2011). Sirajuddin Haqqani, Interior Minister of the de facto administration, has been listed under that regime since 2007 (United Nations Security Council Committee, 2025), while the Haqqani Network continues to be designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation by the United States (France 24, 2025). Neither designation prevented engagement. In March 2025, Washington removed the $10 million bounty on Haqqani shortly after the Taliban secured the release of an American hostage, and the 1988 Committee granted him travel exemptions (The Associated Press, 2025).
The Hezbollah case reflects the same pattern. In June 2026, the United States acknowledged indirect contacts through intermediaries (Al Jazeera, 2026) despite the group’s continued designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (Al Jazeera, 2026). These cases differ in context but respond to similar operational necessities: securing hostage releases, facilitating humanitarian access, supporting mediation, or managing ceasefires. As Haspeslagh argues, engagement with proscribed groups often requires a transition phase in which the symbolic effects of proscription are temporarily neutralised, even when no delisting occurs (Haspeslagh, 2021).
- The unintended effects of designation
Sanctions regimes impose three principal measures on listed individuals and entities: an asset freeze, a travel ban, and an arms embargo (United Nations Security Council, 2011). More broadly, as Haspeslagh (2021) argues, proscription seeks to tie the act of terror to the organisation itself, thereby delegitimising, criminalising, and depoliticising the group.
In practice, however, designation does not necessarily prevent listed groups from exercising political authority or engaging with international actors. Members of Afghanistan’s de facto administration, including Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani remain individually listed (United Nations Security Council Committee, 2025), as does the network he leads (United Nations Security Council Committee, 2020). Likewise, HTS (Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham) governed Syria for over a year before the Security Council removed it from the 1267 list (ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list) in February 2026 (UN Press, 2026a). In neither case did designation prevent the exercise of authority or the need for diplomatic engagement.
The legal constraints instead fall heavily on third parties. In the United States, the Material Support Statute criminalises assistance to designated organisations, including training and expert advice. In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (2010), the Supreme Court confirmed that even instruction in peaceful conflict resolution may constitute prohibited material support. Humanitarian organisations face similar uncertainty, while banks delay or refuse transfers involving areas under the control of designated groups. The Security Council acknowledged the problem itself in 2022, adopting Resolution 2664 (2022) establishing a humanitarian exemption across all its sanctions regimes.
Instead of eliminating engagement, designation often shifts its legal and operational costs onto those required to engage.
- The paradox
Rather than preventing engagement, designation over time determines how, by whom and under what conditions engagement takes place. In each of the above cases, the designation remained in place while states adapted their practices around it. Contacts were channeled through intermediaries instead of direct negotiations. Travel exemptions allowed listed officials to participate in “meetings supporting peace and reconciliation” (United Nations Security Council, 2020), while humanitarian exemptions enabled assistance to reach civilian populations (UN Press, 2022). The designation persisted, but its practical application became increasingly flexible.
This was not the function designation regimes were originally designed to perform. Designation regimes were originally designed to isolate armed groups, not to regulate relations with actors who later acquire governing responsibilities or become unavoidable interlocutors. As a result, a framework has gradually emerged in practice without ever being formally articulated. It operates on a case-by-case basis, without published criteria and without consistent approaches across jurisdictions. Third parties are left to guess what is permitted, and the designation itself loses much of the signal it was meant to carry.
The question is therefore no longer whether states should designate or engage with armed groups. It is whether the framework that already governs such engagement should remain implicit or be made explicit.
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
- Maintain the status quo
Designation regimes continue to operate as they do today, with engagement taking place informally through exemptions, intermediaries or ad hoc political arrangements. This approach preserves flexibility and avoids the political costs associated with revising terrorist listings. However, it also perpetuates legal uncertainty for mediators, humanitarian organisations and financial institutions, while allowing practice to drift further from the stated objectives of designation regimes.
- Expand the use of delisting
States could rely more systematically on periodic reviews and, where appropriate, remove organisations whose designation no longer reflects political realities. This would reduce the gap between legal frameworks and diplomatic practice. However, delisting remains politically contentious, is often procedurally complex, and may be perceived as rewarding armed groups that acquire territorial control or governmental authority.
- Clarify the conditions for engagement while maintaining designation
States could move away from ad hoc practice by clarifying when and how engagement with designated organisations may occur without altering the designation itself. This approach seeks to preserve the counterterrorism objectives of designation while reducing legal ambiguity surrounding mediation, humanitarian access and other forms of operational engagement.
RECOMMENDATIONS
- Publish clear criteria for engagement
States should publicly clarify how, by whom and under what conditions engagement with designated organisations may occur, while maintaining clear prohibitions on political recognition and financing.
- Extend legal exemptions beyond humanitarian action
Building on Resolution 2664 (2022), states should consider extending explicit legal carve-outs to mediation, hostage negotiations, and other conflict-resolution activities conducted under appropriate safeguards.
- Operationalise Resolution 2744 and strengthen periodic review
States should ensure the effective implementation of Resolution 2744 (2024), including the appointment of the new Focal Point, while making periodic reviews of listings the default rather than the exception.
- Differentiate governing institutions from designated organisations
Where designated groups exercise sustained governmental functions, designation regimes should distinguish, where feasible, between the armed organisation itself and the public institutions on which civilian populations depend.
REFERENCES
Al Jazeera (2026). Trump says Israel, Hezbollah to stop fighting: What we know. [online] Al Jazeera.
CBS NEWS (2011). Clinton: U.S. reached out to Haqqani for talks. [online] CBS News.
France 24 (2025). US drops bounties on top Afghan Taliban officials. [online] France 24.
United Nations Security Council (2011). Resolution 1988 S/RES/1988 (2011). [online] Un.org.
United Nations Security Council (2020). Travel Ban | Security Council. [online] Un.org.
US Department of State (2020). Joint declaration between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of America for bringing peace to Afghanistan. [online] http://www.state.gov.
US Supreme Court (2010). Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 u.s. 1 (2010). [online] Justia Law.