Executive Summary:
On August 5, 2026, the United States Department of the Navy (DON) replaced its Portfolio Acquisition Executive (PAE) for robotic and autonomous systems (RAS) with the Direct Reporting Portfolio Manager for Robotic and Autonomous Systems (DRPM RAS), consolidating the research and development, technical requirements-setting, and acquisition of RAS capabilities under a single official with the authority to bypass traditional acquisition processes and report directly to the Under Secretary of the Navy. Coming less than a year after the DON established the PAE model for RAS, this restructuring reflects the Department’s recognition of autonomy as a domain distinct from traditional platform portfolios. The restructuring does not, however, resolve the underlying challenge of integrating autonomous systems across multiple domains without constraining innovation or human oversight. The differences in technology and employment between traditional and autonomous systems raise questions as to whether a procurement model adapted from existing processes can accommodate the development and acquisition requirements of RAS in support of the DON’s broader hybrid naval strategy. Thus, the DRPM RAS should use its consolidated authority to design a procurement framework that accelerates system delivery without fielding RAS as separate programs bereft of a standard operating system and defined governance frameworks.
Background
The United States Department of the Navy’s (DON) restructuring of its robotic and autonomous systems (RAS) programs is posited as a move to advance the doctrine laid out in Force Design 2045 and the Navigation Plan for America’s Warfighting Navy (LaGrone, 2022; Chief of Naval Operations, 2024b). Under this doctrine, the DON advances a Hybrid Navy concept with plans to field a fleet of 350 crewed ships and 150 large uncrewed vessels, a ratio of 7:3, by 2045. The concept outlines a strategy to develop maritime capabilities in light of constrained industrial demand (i.e., shipbuilding delays and rising costs), with RAS providing operational and combat capabilities, and crewed warships assuming greater operational support and command-and-control responsibilities. To achieve this, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Daryl Caudle advanced a “hedge strategy” that balances existing financial and physical limitations with requirements of the contemporary operating environment by shifting acquisition focus toward scalable and cost-effective RAS (Chief of Naval Operations, 2024a).
This attention placed on RAS coincides with the publication of a Government Accountability Office report, which found that leadership turnover and shifting priorities, fragmented acquisition processes, and premature requirements-setting within the DON constrained the effectiveness of existing RAS programs (GAO, 2026). Notably, the report identified a provision in the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act that required the DON to place responsibility for autonomous systems acquisition within an existing Naval Sea Systems Command office, in effect positioning RAS programs in competition with crewed-shipbuilding acquisitions that received greater priority (The Maritime Executive, 2026).
In response to these challenges, the DON established a Portfolio Acquisition Executive (PAE) tasked with consolidating the existing 47 fragmented RAS programs and expediting the development of uncrewed surface vehicles (USVs) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) (Ceder, 2026). This PAE organizational model, in which a single official oversees an entire portfolio of weapons, technology, and equipment programs to accelerate delivery, was subsequently adopted for industrial operations, the Marine Corps, maritime operations, strategic systems programs, and Undersea/DRPM Submarines (Department of the Navy, 2026b).
However, less than a year after establishing the PAE organizational model for RAS, the DON restructured again on August 5, 2026, replacing the PAE with the Direct Reporting Portfolio Manager for Robotic and Autonomous Systems (DRPM RAS) (Department of the Navy, 2026a). The stated rationale behind this move is to address the institutional challenges constraining the procurement, testing, and fielding of RAS across the U.S. maritime defense apparatus. In practice, the existing command structure will be replaced with a direct-reporting model structured similarly to that previously established for the Navy’s submarine programs.
Under this restructuring, research and development, technical requirements-setting, and acquisition of RAS capabilities are consolidated under a single official with the authority to bypass the extensive acquisition processes and report directly to the Under Secretary of the Navy, or the official acting in that capacity (Stancy, 2026). Holistically, this portfolio shift reflects the DON’s recognition of autonomy as an acquisition domain distinct from traditional platform portfolios; however, the differences in technology and employment between traditional systems and autonomous systems raise questions as to whether a procurement model adapted from submarine acquisitions can accommodate the development and acquisition requirements of RAS in support of the DON’s broader hybrid naval strategy.
Analysis
The Department’s justification for this move is that RAS had previously been managed through “arcane processes” that failed to deliver capability at the required speed of contemporary conflict (Department of the Navy, 2026a). The transition from a domain-based procurement model to one in which RAS falls under the command of a single official with greater authority is therefore intended to streamline acquisitions and accelerate systems delivery to meet fleet targets under the Hybrid Navy concept. It remains less clear, however, to what extent the RAS model should mirror a process developed for submarine acquisitions. If autonomous systems were identified as sufficiently distinct from, and important enough relative to, other systems to warrant their own portfolio, this raises questions as to (1) what these differences are and (2) how these differences should impact the structure of that portfolio.
The U.S. Navy builds submarines through standardized processes involving design, material procurement, hull construction, nuclear reactor installation, testing, and commissioning. The procurement lead time for this process is typically 5 to 7 years for a nuclear submarine with a 30–40 year service life (U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, 2008). As such, the transition to the DRPM organizational model for submarines consolidated leadership over a complex, but comparatively standardized acquisition process supported by an established industrial base. This structure proves well-suited to a procurement environment in which a limited number of major contractors produce complex platforms according to long-established requirements; however, the emerging and still-dispersed RAS industrial base requires that the portfolio operate within a notably different defense-industrial environment.
RAS acquisition processes therefore differ from those of submarines and crewed naval vessels in that autonomous systems operate across a broader range of domains and operational contexts. To this point, procuring RAS for maritime applications will require the DRPM to both coordinate acquisitions across a broad network of suppliers as well as to establish standards that accommodate technological development without compromising integration or human accountability requirements. These additional requirements are outlined in DoD Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapons Systems, which requires autonomous and semi-autonomous systems to be designed so that commanders and operators exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force (U.S. Department of Defense, 2023).
Taken together, these distinctions indicate that a central challenge for RAS procurement, and the advancement of the DON’s Hybrid Navy more broadly, is enabling the integration of autonomous systems across multiple domains without constraining innovation or human oversight in system development. Organizational restructuring to accelerate procurement of the DON’s RAS portfolio therefore only addresses part of the problem facing the DON in employing its Hedge Strategy. That is, if USVs, UUVs, drones, and artificial intelligence are procured and fielded as separate programs bereft of a standard operating system, the result will be a digitized version of existing fleets, not an interoperable hybrid force (Prest, 2026). The recognition of autonomous systems under its own portfolio with the establishment of the DRPM RAS therefore tasks DoD leadership with retaining accountability structures while adapting acquisition practices to the distinct development, industrial, and human-accountability requirements of contemporary technology and conflict.
Policy Recommendations
The transition to the DRPM RAS structure creates a centralized authority for RAS procurement, laying a foundation for the Navy to reach its long-term goal of procuring a hybrid fleet. However, the success of this restructuring will depend on whether the new portfolio can balance acquisition speed with the additional technical and governance requirements of autonomous systems. To achieve this balance, the DRPM RAS should:
- Design procurement and contracting models for attritable, tech-centric systems focused on low-cost, high-volume production. The established processes for developing traditional naval infrastructure are not suited to systems pursued for scalability, low per-unit cost ratios, and propensity for rapid integration. The DRPM should therefore pursue contracting mechanisms that reward volume and speed of delivery, and should introduce incentives to encourage companies that meet identified cost and production requirements. Factors to consider in setting these requirements include unit cost, production scalability, and acquisition lead time.
- Establish and enforce a common operating system before scaling procurement. The DRPM should define which interfaces are to be used, along with common data-sharing and handling standards, so that RAS are integrated as interoperable nodes of the hybrid fleet. These standards should be adaptive so as not to constrain development, while also structured enough to preserve continuity across systems and to preserve the human accountability required under DoD Directive 3000.09.
- Incorporate training on autonomous systems as RAS are developed. Building training programs as RAS mature promotes familiarity with their use and supports the gradual transition toward humans providing command-and-control and operational support while RAS executes more of the operational mission. This approach ensures that human-control and human-machine teaming requirements shape acquisition decisions during initial cycles.
Bibliography
Chief of Naval Operations. (2024a). CNO Fighting Instructions. [online]. Available at: https://media.defense.gov/2026/Feb/06/2003871752/-1/-1/1/CNO%20FIGHTING%20INSTRUCTIONS.PDF/CNO%20FIGHTING%20INSTRUCTIONS.PDF
Chief of Naval Operations. (2024b). For America’s Warfighting Navy: Navigation Plan 2024. [online]. Available at: https://www.navy.mil/Portals/1/CNO/NAVPLAN2024/Files/CNO-NAVPLAN-2024-high-res-v2.pdf
Department of the Navy. (2026a). Department of the Navy Establishes Direct Reporting Portfolio Manager for Robotic and Autonomous Systems. [online]. Available at: https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/Press-Releases/display-pressreleases/Article/4565150/department-of-the-navy-establishes-direct-reporting-portfolio-manager-for-robot/
Department of the Navy. (2026b). Navy Reshapes Warfighting Acquisition System. [online]. Available at: https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/Press-Releases/display-pressreleases/Article/4435370/navy-reshapes-warfighting-acquisition-system
LaGrone, S. (2022). Navy’s Force Design 2045 Plans for 373-Ship Fleet, 150 Unmanned Vessels. USNI News. [online]. Available at: https://news.usni.org/2022/07/26/navys-force-design-2045-plans-for-373-ship-fleet-150-unmanned-vessels
Prest, S. (2026). Hybrid Navy: Building the Maritime Operating System. Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). [online]. Available at: https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/hybrid-navy-building-maritime-operating-system
U.S. Department of Defense. (2023). Autonomy in Weapon Systems (DoD Directive 3000.09). [online]. Available at: https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/300009p.PDF
U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2026). Robotic Autonomous Systems: Navy Needs to Address Leadership and Organizational Challenges to Meet Urgent Needs (GAO-26-109014). [online]. Available at: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-109014
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee. (2008). Submarine Force Structure and Acquisition Policy (H.A.S.C. No. 110-30). Hearing before the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee, 110th Congress, First Session, March 8, 2007. [online]. Available at: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg37655/html/CHRG-110hhrg37655.htm
Stancy, D. (2026). Navy Creates New Robotic and Autonomous Systems DRPM. Breaking Defense. [online]. Available at: https://breakingdefense.com/2026/08/navy-creates-new-robotic-and-autonomous-systems-drpm/
The Maritime Executive. (2026). GAO: U.S. Navy’s Unmanned Systems Programs Needed Restructuring. [online]. Available at: https://maritime-executive.com/article/gao-u-s-navy-s-unmanned-systems-restructuring-is-much-needed