Recent Escalation
Since June 2026, drone attacks have intensified across Sudan, with strikes targeting fuel stations, transport infrastructure and other strategic sites in El Obeid, Atbara and Omdurman. The escalation has expanded the geographical reach of a conflict increasingly shaped not only by the military capabilities of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) but also by the external networks that sustain them. As both sides acquire increasingly sophisticated drone capabilities, the question is no longer simply who controls territory. More importantly, the growing reliance on remotely operated warfare raises a broader question: are drones merely another tool sustaining Sudan’s conflict, or are they changing the conditions under which the war can continue?
External support and the RSF – What is actually happening?
Since April 2023, Sudan has been at the centre of a conflict between the formerly allied Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). What began as a power struggle between rival generals has developed into one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. As conflict has evolved, both sides have relied on external sources of military and political support. At the same time, the RSF has developed extensive supply networks involving weapons, financial flows and increasingly sophisticated drone capabilities. The growing importance of these external networks has now attracted renewed international attention. This week, US Africa Envoy Massad Boulos called on the UN Security Council to extend the existing arms embargo beyond Darfur, warning that external financial and military support, including drones and related technologies, risked further regionalising the conflict. Investigative reporting and weapons analyses have also raised persistent questions about the UAE’s alleged role in supplying the RSF, including evidence that Chinese-made weapons previously imported by the UAE have been used in Sudan.
How Drones are Changing the War
The growing use of drones has expanded the conflict beyond conventional front lines, increasing both military and civilian vulnerability. Their ability to strike targets at considerable distances allows the SAF and RSF to attack logistical hubs, military positions and critical infrastructure without necessarily controlling the territory in which those targets are located. This has particularly severe consequences for civilians. UN officials reported that drones had repeatedly struck markets, schools, fuel stations and water infrastructure, with 1,400 civilians reportedly killed in drone strikes between January and June 2026. The difficulty of establishing who carried out individual strikes also creates challenges for accountability. Sudan’s 2025 case against the UAE before the ICJ illustrates this distinction: Sudan argued that the RSF was sufficiently dependent on and controlled by the UAE to be considered a de facto state organ, but the Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction without ruling on the merits. This ambiguity may itself be one of the most significant consequences of increasingly internationalised drone warfare. As weapons, technology and logistical support move across borders, responsibility for violence becomes more difficult to trace, even when the immediate perpetrators are known.
Changing the War or Prolonging It?
The strategic significance of drones therefore extends beyond their immediate destructive effects. By allowing armed groups to project force without securing or holding territory, drones can alter the traditional relationship between territorial control and military power. For the RSF, access to externally supplied drones could help compensate for limitations in conventional air power and maintain pressure on SAF positions even where territorial advances are limited. At the same time, the SAF’s own growing use of drones demonstrates that this technological advantage is not exclusive to either side. Rather than guaranteeing victory, the proliferation of drones may therefore contribute to a more sustainable military stalemate, allowing both parties to continue striking each other’s positions while limiting the need for major territorial offensives. External support may consequently be less important for determining who wins the war than for determining how long the war can continue.
The strategic significance of drones may therefore lie less in their ability to produce a decisive military breakthrough than in their capacity to make continued warfare sustainable. For both the SAF and RSF, the ability to strike beyond the front line reduces the extent to which military pressure depends on territorial advances. In this sense, the proliferation of drone capabilities may not fundamentally change who is winning Sudan’s war, but it could change how difficult the war is to end.
The Broader Geopolitical Implication
The growing role of drones illustrates a broader transformation in Sudan’s war. Its trajectory is increasingly determined not only by the balance of power between the SAF and RSF, but also by the external networks capable of sustaining their military capabilities. The recent US call for a Sudan-wide arms embargo reflects growing recognition that Sudan’s conflict can no longer be treated solely as a domestic power struggle. Limiting the flow of drones and other weapons would not end the war on its own. Yet if external actors continue to provide the capabilities that allow both sides to absorb losses and sustain military pressure, the central question may become not who can win Sudan’s war, but whether either side can afford to stop fighting.
Recommended Readings
Ashraf (2026) – UN Security Council and Sudan: Arms embargo exposes gap between international will and action.
Plett (2026) – Two-year curfew lifted in Sudan’s capital.
Ramadan & Abdulaziz (2026) – Chad accuses Sudan of cross-border strike, raises alert level.