Executive Summary
Psychological warfare has existed for years, focused on altering emotions, morale, and behaviour, but has historically operated on the periphery of traditional conflict. The digital revolution has shifted this information war onto personal devices, turning the human mind into both a target and vector of conflict.
GenAI is reshaping how information is created, personalised, and deployed in modern conflict, emerging as a force that can shape human meaning itself. By advancing the speed, precision, and personalisation of ‘human meaning’, GenAI has pushed the world beyond psychological warfare – swaying attitudes and behaviour – into the more intricate realm of cognitive warfare, where the target is not just the message, but the thinking process. It threatens becoming a defining characteristic of modern conflict, pushing the concept of total war into the cognitive realm. The challenge is not only to counter disinformation but defending cognitive sovereignty itself. The battle for the brain has already begun; the question is whether democratic societies can adapt fast enough to preserve the integrity of reality against engineered illusion.
Key Points
- GenAI driven epistemic erosion enabling adversaries to manufacture synthetic realities – replacement of facts with realistic and convincing AI-generated illusions – that weaken shared trust in truth, facts, and knowledge.
- Cognitive warfare weaponises everyday digital tools – social media, content platforms, online gaming, search engine optimisation – to target perception, identity, and decision-making, exploiting human cognitive biases.
- Operational patterns of actors have rapidly shifted from merely boosting existing content (retweets, shares) to active synthetic content generation. Advanced tech and AI allow state and non-state actors to generate and spread massive waves of tailored disinformation faster than societies can manage or verify the truth.
- Existing cybersecurity and information-operations frameworks in social media and content creation platforms are insufficient, because they focus on technical intrusion rather than psychological manipulation.
- The universal reach of digital platforms – inside every home and community – enables adversaries to exploit cognitive traits, undermining social cohesion, governance, and trust in institutions.
Analysis
The July 2026 NATO Summit’s focus on cognitive warfare reflects a dangerous inflection point: illusion now outpaces reality. The nature of war – its political purpose and uncertainty – remains constant, but its character is being reshaped by advanced AI that weaponise perception. GenAI joins a lineage of transformative technologies – from the longbow and gunpowder to cyber operations – that redefine how power is projected.
Foundation models, including large language models, text-to-video systems, voice-cloning architectures, have entered the arsenals of state and non-state actors. Their deployment enables the industrialisation of epistemic erosion, making the truth itself a liability.
Debates over cyber sovereignty intensify this contest. Some states frame sovereignty as the rule of law, protecting the citizens from harmful content; others use it as rule-by-law, controlling information flows to consolidate political advantage. In this fragmented environment, cognitive warfare extends traditional propaganda into deeper psychological terrain, targeting human cognition with unparalleled precision that current doctrines cannot counter.
The Human Mind as a Battlespace
GenAI systems can fabricate persuasive content faster than can be verified, overwhelming society with synthetic stimuli – content, signals, or cues that imitate real events, people, or communication. This goes beyond an evolution of disinformation; it is a neuropsychological transformation of how influence is internalised. AI-generated content increasingly targets emotions, beliefs, and autonomy by exploiting cognitive biases and behavioural vulnerabilities.
The human brain represents valuable terrain in the international information race where strategic advantage can be gained. Influence operations now tailor narratives to demographic, ideological, or psychological profiles, shaping how individuals observe, orient, decide, and act. The shift from amplification to active personalised content generation reflects a dangerous operational logic: the goal is not to make messages viral but personal.
The Acceleration of Influence
Traditional propaganda relied on repetition, emotional triggers, and coordinated messaging. GenAI supercharges these techniques by enabling personalised influence operations that adapt to individual cognitive vulnerabilities. Cognitive warfare aims for disorientation, not persuasion, destabilising the digital environment through competing claims and synthetic media.
Deepfakes, tailored disinformation, and multimodal persuasion pipelines – text, audio, video, and interactive agents – blur the boundary between authentic and artificial. As these systems proliferate, distinguishing signal from noise becomes increasingly difficult, eroding an already fragile trust in shared reality.
The Limits of Existing Defenses
Conventional cybersecurity systems focus on malware, network intrusions, and technical anomalies. They are not designed counter operations that manipulate cognitive processes. Accountability gaps at the intersection of commercial AI development and national security further complicate the landscape, as powerful GenAI capabilities diffuse rapidly and can be weaponised by actors seeking cognitive advantage rather than territorial control.
Cyber sovereignty adds another layer of complexity. In some states, cyber sovereignty has been framed as the rule of law, protecting citizens. In others, it becomes rule-by-law, enabling information manipulation, censorship, and engineered public perception. This duality creates a global information environment where cognitive warfare becomes both a tool of external competition and an instrument of domestic political control.
Existing legislation is inadequate and reinforces democratic vulnerability. Cybersecurity frameworks do not address neuropsychological manipulation, and counter-disinformation efforts remain reactive and politically constrained. As cognitive warfare increasingly targets how people think – interpretation, trust, and decision-making – societies face widening vulnerability.
Cognitive security and governance architecture is complicated. In the absence of any meaningful change, societies risk losing the ability to maintain autonomous judgement, the main currency of democratic legitimacy.
Policy Implications
- Establish Cognitive Security as a Core National Priority: Protecting autonomous judgement is a foundational element of national resilience. This requires integrating cognitive threat assessments into national security planning, establishing dedicated cognitive operations units, and recognising the human mind as a protected domain.
- Develop AI-Enabled Early-Warning Systems: Governments should invest in multimodal detection systems capable of identifying synthetic media and behavioural anomalies, and in risk-scoring systems for influence operations.
- Regulate Foundation Models in Cognitive Domain: There are accountability gaps in commercial AI development. Policy options include strengthening transparency requirements for high-risk model capabilities and mandating watermarking of synthetic media.
- Ethical Considerations and Concerns: The ability to manipulate cognition threatens cognitive liberties, autonomy, consent, and the boundaries of acceptable conduct in (and/or to prevent) war. These issues need to be at the forefront of policy to ensure that the pursuit of strategic advantage does not undermine social values.
Further Readings
Ahuja (2026) The Battle For The Brain: Cognitive Warfare is Already Here
Dorigoni (2026) Beyond Cognitive Warfare: Differentiating Cognitive Battles for Cognitive Security
Dunn Cavelty et al. (2026) Cognitive Warfare: The Case for Disaggregation
Fitchew (2026) How AI is Transforming Conflict and Peace
Giordano (2026) Cognitive Warfare and the Changing Character of Engagement: A Neurostrategic Perspective
Heydarian (2026) China’s Networking Foreign Policy versus Trump’s Disruptive Challenge
Moldovanu (2026) The Expansion of Cognitive Warfare, and How to Cope With It
Rushing et al. (2026) Cognitive Warfare: Definition, Framework, and Case Study
Valantin et al. (2026) Cognitive Warfare: A New Strategic Frontier?
Vesterberg (2026) Defeating Dialectic and Alchemic Warfare in Cognitive Operations: Reclaiming Rational Doctrine for Western Resilience
Wirges (2026) Narrative as a Weapon: Russian, Iranian, and Chinese Approaches to Cognitive Warfare
Wood (2026) Cognitive Warfare Is Exploiting Polarization, Both in Nations and Companies
Zhang et al. (2025) MMPersuade: A Dataset and Evaluation Framework for Multimodal Persuasion
