On the 16th of March in 1999, Jerzy Buzek, the then Prime Minister of Poland, stood next to the 19 NATO’s Allied flags flying side-by-side for the first time and delivered Poland’s first address to the North Atlantic Council as a NATO member, stating:
“After years of struggling for independence and sovereignty, the Polish people formally joined the North Atlantic community. Let me assure you that we take the responsibility for the security of each individual NATO member (…).”
After the fall of the USSR, and the fall of communism, Warsaw was, and still is, well aware of the importance of being part of the Alliance as part of its defence against Russian imperialism. Today specifically, in the time of Russian aggression against Ukraine, Poland, alongside other European countries (especially Eastern European), are coordinating their strategic and military efforts within NATO in order to strengthen their security. NATO plays a crucial role in deterrence, which in big part is represented by its nuclear shared plan, led by the USA. Poland is proudly, and necessarily, part of it, but recently declared it will not agree to installing US nuclear warheads in its territory. This declaration might seem unexpected for two main reasons. Firstly, Warsaw is today one of the main beneficiaries of NATO’s deterrence efforts. Secondly, Poland is committed to improve and increase its military artillery and capability. The piece will in fact try to explain here why Warsaw refuses to make its territory available for US nuclear warhead installations.
Poland’s vice-minister of defence Paweł Zalweski, while being in the NATO headquarters in Brussels, declared that Poland does not want to host (US) nuclear warheads in its territory, while answering questions related to the possibility of increasing the American military presence in the country. The main argument moved was that Warsaw indeed wants to cooperate within NATO’s nuclear deterrence programme, but this does not mean there is a need to place American nuclear installations in Poland’s borders. However, behind this mediatic argument, there may be other underlying reasons that Warsaw is rejecting nuclear warheads. First, one of the key elements of Poland’s foreign policy is the transatlantic alliance, which is based on two pillars: common values and common interests. When it comes to placing US nuclear warheads, Warsaw and Washington differ in the main aim such infrastructure would represent. The USA is indeed committed to support Europe’s security, but realistically speaking, the final interest of it is not the well-being of the Old Continent, but rather to play its Superpower role: contain Russia and reaffirm its control and influence in the region and in the world. On the other hand, Warsaw’s final interest is Poland’s security, sovereignty, peace and development. Placing foreign nuclear military infrastructure within its borders doesn’t properly fall under the definition of self-determination and safety. There is an underlying risk for Poland that, in the future, this move may compromise Poland’s ability to determine its own strategies. Nuclear warhead installations require long-term strategic planning, and the differences in interests between the two countries simply do not allow it.
Secondly, there is the security dilemma between NATO and Russia. European countries, and especially the Eastern Flank countries, are increasing their military capability, both in a plan of readiness but also as a form of deterrence. The reforms include, among others, raising the defence budget, improving and modernizing the equipment and infrastructure, and overall improving the resources needed for modern warfare. The warfare techniques used in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict are various, but nuclear is not among these. Therefore, bringing this card into the game, by installing nuclear warheads, might be interpreted, or even used, as a sign of escalation by Moscow. The current increase in defence tools in Europe is a proportional response to the ongoing conflict, while nuclear warheads would be an additional, further dimension. Since the mediatic reason for the invasion of Ukraine was Russia’s security and defence (as Kyiv would have been increasing its threatening potential by getting closer to NATO), Poland may also want to avoid making a step forward, especially into a direction in which it would completely depend on external help as it does not own atomic weapons on its own. Warsaw may prefer keeping the game stable and predictable, without drastically changing the cards on the table.
Poland is a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, but still declared to be supportive of NATO Nuclear Sharing deterrence programme, which indeed, involves the nuclear bellic infrastructure, but is part of a long-established plan. How, then, is Poland in the nuclear deterrence programme, without having nuclear on its own?
First, Poland participates in NATO’s broader nuclear policy discussions through the Nuclear Planning Group, a senior body responsible for consultation and decision-making on all issues related to nuclear deterrence. Second, Poland joined the Dual-Capable Aircraft program, a nuclear-sharing arrangement under which member states provide aircraft and personnel capable of supporting nuclear deterrence tasks.
As mentioned above, the current bellic security issues faced by Europe and even more vividly by Eastern Europe are in great measure militarily addressed by NATO’s Eastern Flank, which represents the first line of deterrence against Russia. NATO has increased its military presence along its eastern flank, locating multinational battlegroups in Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. Poland has been committed to cover a leading role within the Flank, together with Finland, as one of the countries with higher military capability. Warsaw is fully committed to improve Europe’s security, pushing itself and the Allies for increased military readiness. It therefore might be puzzling to see Poland refusing US nuclear warheads, as they might represent a positive development in the matter of deterrence and military capability, especially for the Eastern Flank as for Europe. Such a decision, though, is not believed to conflict with Poland’s, or Europe’s defence ambitions.
Poland’s decision should be therefore interpreted as a strategic, long term vision aimed at protecting Europe, strengthening its independent capability and decision making ability. It has demonstrated its will to stand firm on Europe’s interests at the cost of saying “no” to Washington and its military resources.
Recommended readings:
Strategic Comments (2023) Poland’s bid to participate in NATO nuclear sharing
Sulowski (2014) Polish Foreign Policy Since 1989
Graca & Gotkowska (2024) NATO’s nuclear deterrence: is it time for change?
United Nations (n.d.) Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons