1. Executive Summary
On 25 April 2026, JNIM and the FLA mounted a coordinated offensive across Mali, including attacks on Bamako, and killed Defence Minister Sadio Camara at Kati. A second coordinated offensive on 4 July and renewed fighting in August showed that the April operation opened a sustained campaign rather than constituting an isolated assault. The campaign is demonstrating that tactical coordination between jihadist and separatist actors can produce operational surprise against a weakened state. It also showed that Mali’s conflict order no longer fits a simple state-versus-jihadist frame. Public disagreements between FLA and JNIM representatives over whether their cooperation constitutes an alliance further demonstrate that this cooperation has not eliminated their separate political aims. If separatist and jihadist movements are treated as a single category, mediation options narrow and tactical convergence becomes easier to sustain.
2. Introduction
On 25 April 2026, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) conducted synchronised assaults on Kidal, Gao, Sévaré, Kati and Bamako, killing Defence Minister Sadio Camara at his Kati residence and seizing or temporarily holding several northern towns. The two movements issued separate statements openly confirming joint operations, the first such admission since the conflict began (Egmont Institute, 2026; Critical Threats, 2026; ACLED, 2026). On 4 July, they launched a second coordinated offensive against positions in northern, central, and southern Mali. Fighting around Anèfis continued into late August, turning the April operation into the opening phase of a wider campaign (ACAPS, 2026b; Al Jazeera, 2026c; AFP, 2026)
The campaign indicates a higher level of coordination between a Sahelian jihadist coalition and a Tuareg separatist front than previously observed. This brief argues that the operation reflects a more fluid conflict order that has weakened Malian state control and complicated external mediation. It first maps the armed ecosystem in Mali, then examines earlier precedents for jihadist-separatist cooperation, and finally assesses the implications for regional security.
3. Analysis
Conflict ecosystem in Mali and actor map
Mali’s armed landscape comprises several distinct but interacting actors, each pursuing different objectives. The Malian junta, in power since the 2020 and 2021 coups under Assimi Goïta, relies on Africa Corps, a Russian Ministry of Defence-backed force largely drawn from former Wagner personnel, to sustain its counter-insurgency effort (Africa Defense Forum, 2026).
JNIM is the dominant Sahelian jihadist coalition, formed in 2017 from the merger of Ansar Dine, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Macina Liberation Front and al-Mourabitoun. JNIM fields approximately 6,000 fighters across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, and has shifted towards economic warfare and shadow governance (Human Rights Watch, 2026a; Al Jazeera, 2026a).
The Islamic State’s Sahel Province (ISSP) developed from the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, formed in May 2015 after Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi, a leader within al-Mourabitoun, pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. The Islamic State publicly acknowledged the group’s pledge in October 2016. In March 2019, the group was formally incorporated as the Greater Sahara faction of Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). It became a stand-alone Islamic State province in March 2022 (ACLED, 2023; ACLED, 2024). The redesignation coincided with an offensive in Ménaka and Gao and reinforced ISSP’s position as JNIM’s principal jihadist competitor for territory in the tri-border area (ACLED, 2024). Since their first clashes in 2019, JNIM and ISSP have fought hundreds of times, causing more than 2,100 deaths (Reuters, 2026). ISSP remains more explicitly oriented towards a caliphate project and is generally assessed as less embedded in local communities.
The Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) is the largest Tuareg separatist front. Founded in November 2024 from the dissolution of the Strategic Framework for the Defence of the People of Azawad (CSP-DPA), it unites former factions from the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), the High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA) and rebel fringes of the Arab Movement of Azawad and GATIA. Its main objective is the total independence of Mali’s Tuareg-majority northern region (WAMAPS, 2024; ICCT, 2026; Al Jazeera, 2026d).
Across the Sahel, local self-defence militias have proliferated as states delegate security to armed auxiliaries. In central Mali, Dozo groups have militarised under pressure from JNIM, weakening state authority and increasing civilian exposure to reprisals from insurgent and state-aligned forces (ACLED, 2026).
Table 1: Core armed actors and conflict roles in Mali
| Actor | Objective | Relationship to others | Relevance to April 2026 |
| Malian junta | Reassert territorial control, preserve military rule, and survive security and legitimacy pressure. | Withdrew from the Algiers Accord in January 2024; left ECOWAS in January 2025; relies on the Africa Corps; fighting terrorism while using coercive governance. | Forced into a reactive, multi-front posture after the offensive. Goïta assumed the defence portfolio after Camara’s death. |
| Africa Corps | Sustain Russian military influence and support the junta’s counter-insurgency effort. | Principal external security partner of the junta to fight insecurity; coordinates with Malian forces. | Suffered reputational and operational strain after the Kidal withdrawal, now concentrates forces around Bamako. |
| JNIM | Expand influence and embed sharia-based governance across the Sahel. | Main Sahelian jihadist coalition; Al-Qaeda affiliate; rival to ISSP; tactically aligned with the FLA since 2025. | Led high-impact southern strikes in April, supported the capture of Kidal, and participated in the July offensive. |
| ISSP | Expand Islamic State influence and compete for territory and recruits with JNIM. | ISIS affiliate and main rival to JNIM since 2019; outside the current JNIM-FLA alignment. | Exploited the wider security vacuum around Ménaka, but its position remains contested. |
| FLA | Seeks independence or autonomy for Azawad and to restore separatist power in northern Mali. | Tuareg separatist front; coordinated tactically with JNIM while rejecting equivalence with jihadists. | Jointly captured Kidal (its 2013-2023 stronghold) and made the Africa Corps withdraw, participated in April and July offensives. |
| Local self-defence militias | Defend communities, on occasion, support state or regime security efforts. | Proliferate where states delegate security; can displace state authority and leave civilians vulnerable to reprisals. | Supported government operations around Anéfis and illustrates the broader expansion of delegated violence |
Historical precedents and the breakdown of the old settlement
In 2012, Tuareg rebels of the MNLA and jihadist groups, including Ansar Dine and AQIM, advanced jointly across northern Mali. The alliance broke down after the MNLA declared independence on 6 April 2012, with Ansar Dine sidelining the MNLA and the jihadists seizing most of Azawad until French Operation Serval intervened in January 2013 (Clingendael, 2015).
The relationship between separatists and jihadists was ambiguous from the outset. During Serval, French and Chadian forces appear to have tolerated the MNLA and an Ansar Dine splinter, the Islamic Movement of Azawad, as part of the anti-AQIM campaign (Combating Terrorism Center, 2013).
The Algiers Accord, signed in June 2015 between Bamako and the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA), temporarily reduced violence. It kept separatists within the Malian state framework and widened the gap between separatist and jihadist politics, though implementation remained slow and incomplete (SIPRI, 2015).
That settlement eroded after 2020 as the junta consolidated power and expelled French and UN forces. The Malian army, supported by Russian Wagner mercenaries, retook Kidal in November 2023, and Bamako then declared the 2015 accord null and void on 25 January 2024. After that, the CMA fragmented, and the dissolution of the Azawad coalitions produced the FLA in November 2024, which adopted a harder separatist posture (ICG, 2024; Human Rights Watch, 2024).
From the April offensive to a sustained campaign
The 25 April offensive unfolded across several theatres. In the north, a joint JNIM-FLA force captured Kidal and partially took over Gao, while attacks also targeted Bourem, Mopti and Sévaré. In the south, they targeted the airbase outside Bamako and the army base and officers’ residences at Kati, where a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) killed Defence Minister Sadio Camara and wounded intelligence chief Modibo Koné. Reporting also described the use of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, drones and a man-portable air-defence system, alongside some attackers disguising themselves as Malian soldiers. Analysts characterised the attack as one of the most complex coordinated offensives since 2012, with the FLA more visible in northern territorial control and JNIM concentrating on high-impact southern strikes (Critical Threats, 2026; Egmont Institute, 2026).
The 4 July offensive targeted Aguelhok, Anéfis, Gao, Sévaré and Kenieroba. JNIM and FLA fighters took most of Anéfis before Malian and Africa Corps forces retook it on 10 July. A returning convoy was then ambushed near Tabankort, and Anéfis became contested again on 22-24 August, when Africa Corps personnel remained entrenched inside the military camp (ACAPS, 2026; Associated Press, 2026; Al Jazeera, 2026c; AFP, 2026a).
The cooperation appears to have followed more than a year of negotiations. Reporting suggests that JNIM and the FLA reached a compromise over locally led application of sharia, with the FLA acting as a local governing partner in exchange for JNIM’s military support. The nature of the relationship remains contested. FLA spokesperson Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane described it as tactical military coordination against a common enemy, and FLA president Bilal Ag Acherif denied that an alliance existed.
In July, a JNIM commander described their objectives as relatively unified and claimed that the FLA had accepted Islamic legal arbitration (Sahel Intelligence, 2026; Al Jazeera, 2026d).
This ambiguity matters because it shows how tactical cooperation can increase offensive capacity without eliminating the actors’ separate political projects. State counter-measures followed, including a three-day night curfew in Bamako, arrests and restrictions on movement, alongside civilian fatalities and disruption at the capital’s airport (ACAPS, 2026). Goïta assumed the defence portfolio on 4 May, and the authorities later announced rewards for information on JNIM and FLA leaders, and arrested personnel suspected of complicity (Al Jazeera, 2026b). Africa Corps has shifted personnel from outlying posts towards Bamako, although still engaged in northern operations. The campaign has produced mounting civilian consequences, with nearly 40,000 people displaced by fighting and bombardment between late April and 11 August (AFP, 2026b; Human Rights Watch, 2026b; Human Rights Watch, 2026c)
6. Policy Implications
The campaign shows that armed-group cooperation can emerge when a weakened state creates shifting local incentives and rival non-state actors see value in temporary alignment. JNIM has adapted to complex, coalition-based warfare, using drone-enabled and IED-heavy assaults while presenting itself as a governing actor (Security Council Report, 2025). Tuareg actors used the alliance to recover bargaining power lost after the fall of Kidal in 2023, while ISSP exploited the broader security vacuum by capturing Labbezanga and massing forces around Ménaka, showing that the same conflict space can generate parallel insurgent escalations (Critical Threats, 2026).
The collaboration undermines Malian state capacity on three fronts. First, military overstretch and the loss of strategic towns leave the army in a reactive, multi-front posture that prevents it from concentrating force. Second, growing over-reliance on Africa Corps and airpower has coincided with documented civilian harm and rising insecurity: Wagner and Malian forces were responsible for 1,443 civilian casualties between January 2024 and June 2025, about four times the number attributed to JNIM over the same period (Africa Defense Forum, 2026). Third, treating separatists and jihadists as a single category narrows political space and reduces the number of non-jihadist interlocutors available for mediation, especially in the Tuareg-majority north.
JNIM’s fuel blockade of Bamako, first declared in September 2025 and reimposed in 2026 after the April offensive, remained active in late August 2026 (Le Monde, 2026; Soufan Centre, 2026). Its broader use of shadow governance shows that economic coercion and local administration are part of a strategy to deepen control and weaken state capacity, thereby limiting the effect of purely kinetic responses. JNIM’s rivalry with ISSP also creates a second layer of instability: competition for territory and recruits increases fragmentation and complicates any policy that treats the jihadist threat as a single bloc. Pressure on one actor may displace violence towards the other unless containment is paired with local protection and actor-specific engagement.
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